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: ABSTRACT 
This is a study of the role religion plays in the construction of ethnic identity 
in Macao's multiethnic society. There are three main ethnic groups: the Chinese, the 
Macanese and the Portuguese, and ethnic differentiation largely coincides with 
distinct religious affiliation. In such a context, I was interested in finding out 
whether, and how, religion was being deployed to differentiate ethnic groups and 
reinforce a sense of belonging. The political dimension inherent to the construction 
of an ethnic identity led me to include in my analysis the nature of the relationship 
between religion and political power. This is thus a study of the interrelationship of 
religion politics and ethnicity in Macao. 
Since ethnicity is here perceived as a dynamic process, I combine an 
anthropological approach with an historical contextualization. I demonstrate how 
changing political, social and economic factors have affected the role played by 
religion in the drawing of ethnic boundaries. In the first part~Catholic religion, it is 
argued that religion used to constitute the criterion chosen by the colonial 
government to erect ethnic boundaries and legitimate its ruling position. Since the 
1970's, though, religion lost its appeal as a cultural marker due to political changes 
and the process of localization of the Church among other factors. Chinese converts 
I are no longer required to renounce the cultural markers of their own ethnic identity; 
i conversion being therefore now socially regarded as the result of an individual 
I option. 
j In the second part I analyze Chinese popular religion, concentrating on 
I public practices, more precisely on temple management and temple activities. I 
focus on a decaying neighborhood temple (Kun Iam Ku Miu), and on a prospering 
major temple (Kun Iam Tong), which are illustrative of the present situation in 
Macao. The role of neighborhood temples as the center of community activities has 
diminish. Furthermore neighborhood affiliation lost its relevance and these temples 
no longer fulfill the needs of the population, their future being therefore injeopardy. 
On the other hand, major temples like the Kun Iam Tong came to symbolize a 
territory-wide identity. Their appeal as a symbol of a pan-Macao identity has 
enabled them to prosper. 
I contend that in Macao the engagement of the Chinese population in ritual 
practices has had the largely unintended sociological effect of reproducing social 
solidarity and therefore, of promoting the cohesion of the Chinese community. By 
enabling the expression of a Chinese identity, it also differentiates Chinese from 
non-Chinese. On the other hand, Catholic religion although drawn upon to establish 
a boundary between Christians and non-Christians, never enabled the emergence of 
a cohesive community. 
To conclude, ethnic identities are contextual constructions. Religion has been 
losing its role as the tool to emphasize ethnic distinctiveness that it had throughout 
Macao's colonial history. With the transfer of sovereignty in 1999, "Macao people" 





Names of places, persons, and organizations in Macao are written using the 
Cantonese romanization used in Macao. Other Cantonese terms are romanized 
according to the Yale system. The Pinyin transcription system was also used 
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Research Object and Methodology 
This is a study ofthe role reHgion plays in the construction of ethnic identity in 
Macao. When I first decided to analyze how reUgion could be deployed to build 
ethnic boundaries, Macao seemed, for several reasons, the ideal place to cany out 
this research. First, it is a multiethnic society. Broadly speaking there are three main 
ethnic groups, the Chinese, the Macanese^ and the Portuguese. Second, ethnic 
differentiation largely coincides with distinct reHgious affiUation. The majority of the 
Chinese population practices Chinese popular reUgion, while the majority of the 
Portuguese and Macanese are practicing or nominal Catholics. In such a context, I 
was interested in finding out whether reUgion was being deployed to differentiate 
ethnic groups and reinforce a sense of belongingness or, on the contrary, reHgious 
affiUation was considered to pertain to the level of individual choice with no 
impUcations whatsoever on each person's ethnic identity. 
Ethnicity has a political dimension~when it comes to the construction of ethnic 
identity, poUtical power may play an important role in determining which set of 
crit^a differentiates one ethnic group from another. This is the case in Macao where 
powerfiil institutions have been involved in the way religion is drawn upon to 
estabUsh ethnic boundaries. I therefore included in my research the analysis of the 
nature of the relationship between religion and political power, namely between the 
Portuguese government and the Catholic Church and between the government and 
the leaders of the Chinese temples. I also focused on the relations between the 
Chinese authorities and the leaders of the temples. This is thus a study of how 
religion, poUtics and ethnicity intermingle in Macao. 
Among several social markers that groups can resort to in order to differentiate 
themselves, religion is a particularly interesting one because it is frequently used and 
shows a degree offlexibility that other social markers lack? A number of works have 
shown that religion is frequently employed and manipulated as an ethnic criterion that 
serves poUtical ends. For example, Ben Rafael and Sharot (1987) argue that in Israel, 
where Jews from different geographical origins have heterogeneous reUgious 
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practices, a standard prayer style was adopted by state institutions for pubUc 
ceremonies in order to promote a common Jewish identity. Another example is the 
case of the Hmong Cambodian minority converting to Catholicism in order to 
differentiate themselves from the Buddhist Khmer majority (Tapp 1989)? 
The dynamic feature of ethnicity implies that a study of the process of ethnic 
construction cannot be limited to the analysis of the present situation. This would 
lead to a distorted conception of ethnicity as something static. It is necessary not only 
to focus on the present situation but also to inscribe it in the historical continuum. I 
therefore decided to combine an anthropological approach with an historical 
perspective that would aUow me to understand how the changes in the poUtical, 
social, and economic spheres have led to transformations in the role played by 
religion in the construction of ethnic identity. ReUgion and ethnicity are thus studied 
as evolving social phenomena. 
Until now very few scholars have concentrated their research in Macao. In what 
concerns religion and ethnicity, the subjects I am concerned with, very Uttle has been 
done. Jn terms of the presence of the CathoUc Church in the territory several works 
have been pubUshed. They constitute, for the most part, historical studies or detailed 
descriptive accounts {Teixeira^ 1940 and 1969; Silva Rego 1968; Carmo 1993). 
Studies on Chinese popular reUgion in Macao are even scarcer. A few articles were 
pubUshed, most of which are of an ethnographic nature; they usually describe the 
architectural features of a specific temple and teU the story of the god to which the 
temple is devoted. For example, Teixeira (1982), Porter (1990), and Stevens (1980) 
studied various temples of Macao while Amaro focused on the history of the Kun 
Iam Ku Miu {Guan Yin Gu Miao) (1967). Brito Peixoto (1988) wrote on the legend 
of A Ma (Mazu) and the religious beUefs and practices of the boat people in Macao. 
Some works have been published concerning the issue of ethnicity. However, the 
Macanese constitute the only ethnic group that has been object of in depth research. 
There are the works of Amaro (1988 and 1991), that consist basicaUy in an analysis 
of the Macanese from a physical anthropology standpoint. This scholar has also 
pubUshed several articles that provide interesting ethnographic data on the Macanese 
community. More valuable though, are a series of articles and one book co-authored 
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by Pina Cabral and Nelson Lourengo that provide an in depth anaiyas of the 
Macanese community and demonstrate how political economic and social changes 
have affected the way in which they construct their ethnic identity. 
In general though, we could say that Macao constitutes a cultural and 
geographic region that has been largely ignored in the academic literature. Macao 
cannot be dismissed as being generaUy similar to Hong Kong or any other region. Its 
idiosyncrasy deserves the attention of researchers. In the last decades we have 
witnessed a concentration of work in Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, experts on 
Chinese culture have only to gain from the enlargement of the geographical field. 
This study modestly attempts to reverse the tendency to overlook this specific 
territory. The practical objective is to contribute information on Macao and to 
provide a better understanding ofhow the distinct ethnic communities that coexist in 
Macao construct their ethnic identity. The theoretical significance of this research is 
an improved understanding of the role religion plays in the construction of ethnic 
identity and how this can be manipulated by poUtical powers. It contributes to the 
literature on issues of ethnicity, reHgion, and identity construction. Furthermore, it 
also provides useful data for cross-cultural comparisons with, for example, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Mainland China. This is the first study specificaUy conceived to 
research the relationship between reUgion and ethnic identity in Macao. 
I conducted fieldwork in Macao from September 1994 until January 1995. 
During this period, I held in depth interviews with more than fifty persons, including 
temple leaders and workers, monks, worshippers, cathoUc priests, members of 
different reUgious congregations, people working in the diocese, converts, presidents 
of residents associations (kaifong i^e^ 5awg) and members of the administration, I also 
conducted a survey among worshippers of one temple (the Kun Iam Tong/ Gucm Yin 
Tang), interviewing sixty persons. During the four months of the research I attended 
reUgious activities and spent several hours making observations in both the temples 
and social welfare institutions run by the Catholic Church. 
Another procedure adopted for the collection of data consisted in the review of 
written sources such as the coUection of the government publications (among which 
the Boletim Oftcial de Macau, equivalent to the Hong Kong Government Gazette) 
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and the consultation of archival records in the Central Library and in the Historical 
Archives. 
Definition of the Main Concepts 
Religion and ethnic identity are the core concepts that structured this research. 
To understand ethnic identity, it is necessary to acknowledge that ontological 
foundations are vital for both individuals and social groups. Every member of society 
needs an identity that confers a place in the historical continuum as well as in society. 
Previous works in anthropology portrayed identity as something fixed, rigid: a sort of 
label that is conferred to individuals and social groups. However, recent research has 
shown that identity is a far more complex subject (Barth 1969; De Vos 1975a; Honig 
1992).. It should be regarded in a dynamic way, as something that is being 
continuously reiterated as well as negotiated. Moreover it is a maUeable 
construction~^each individual has different layers of identity that he manipulates 
according to the goals he wants to achieve. To regard identity as something that is 
manipulated impUes taking into consideration human agency. However, as 
Dominguez argues, "the individual exercise of choice takes place within socio-
historical environments that deem only certain kinds of choices possible" ^Dominguez 
1986:9). 
Furthermore, since identity does not exist without public affirmation, it is better 
conceived as a social construction. "Social identities are simply not who we are 
geneticaUy nor how we as individuals think about ourselves. They are, I contend, 
conceptions of the setf, constructed in time and place both epistemologicaUy and 
sociaUy in opposition to other selves" (ibid.:10). It is in the contact with others that 
we formulate our social identity but also that we mn the risk of loosing it, of being 
incorporated into the "other." Therefore the awareness of proximity and difference 
may cause certain social markers to be strengthened and to become emblematic. 
However, as De Vos argues, "the use of contrast is not so much dictated by 
geographic proximity as by the nature of the contact with another group, bi identity 
maintenance one has to use the nature of the possible threat which close contact with 
an alien group implies’ (1975a: 368). In the context of colonial societies the danger 
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of being assimilated and therefore loosing a previous identity is particularly high. 
There are, however, different constructions of identity deriving from different 
colonial experiences and responses to colonization. 
Ethnicity is one ofthe most important forms of social identity. It was formerly 
conceptuaUzed as consisting of a shared cultural heritage^mainly in terms of 
language and so>caUed traditions. However, recent works have showed that there are 
no essential characteristics common to aU ethnic groups, and therefore it is 
impractical to use substantive cultural or Unguistic criteria to define them. Since no 
feature inherently represents an ethnic marker we should focus on the ethnic 
boundaries~~it is these boundaries, and not the cultural content they enclose, that 
defines the group (see Barth 1969; De Vos 1975a; Wu 1990). So what we must 
examine is how and why these boundaries are maintained. "The boundaries are 
maintained by ascription from within as weU as from external sources which differ in 
content depending on the history of contact of the groups involved" ^De Vos 
1975a:6). 
Ethnicity is better conceived as a process rather than as an objective thing. As 
Honig puts it, ethnicity "involves the creation, invocation, and manipuktion of 
notions of cultural distinctiveness to estabUsh selFother dichotomies among people in 
a shared political and economic system. Language, race, historical experience, and 
geographic origins are among the myriad attributes that may be drawn on to create 
such boundaries, but it must be underlined that what constitutes a different or distinct 
language, reUgion, race, history, or place of origin is entirely maUeable" (1992:8). 
In this work, I foUow recent anthropological worics that regard ethnic identity as 
being essentiaUy subjective and dialectical, a sense ofbelonging to a particular group 
defined by some real or imaginative traits that vary according to the context within 
which the formation of this identity takes place and the boundary it is intended to 
preserve or create. 
In the last decades there has been an ongoing debate on the notion of religion. A 
quick look at the literature on this subject suffices to show that this term has become 
too polysemous and maUeable, which raises the question of whether it can serve any 
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analytical purpose. There seems to be a consensus among schohrs that the use ofthe 
concept of religion in Asian contexts is problematic (Pas 1979; Feuchtwang 1991; 
Demerath 1994). 
For example, a dogmatic claim of truth is considered a prominent feature of 
proselytizing religions such as CathoUcism. However, people engaged in Chinese 
religious practices do not have such an exclusivist perception of "truth." The 
syncretic attitude displayed by the Chinese is not something recent. On the contrary, 
a quick look through the Uterature on Chinese reUgion shows that there has been a 
long tradition of "acculturation" of "imported" reHgions. This was the case with 
Buddhism, a reUgion that had its origin in the hidian subcontinent but that was 
molded to Chinese culture without, however, losing its identity. Furthermore, in 
China, this process of adaptation does not take place exclusively within one religion 
but also between religions. The historical interaction and mixture between Buddhist, 
Taoist, and Confucian principles that occurred in China has been regarded as a result 
of the fact that Chinese religions are "religions ofharmony ." They concur to integrate 
in an harmonious whole contradictory elements, in contrast to exclusivist reUgions in 
theWest(Chingl993). 
There has been a tendency to start from the Judeo-Christian tradition to define 
religion. This raises the problem of trying to interpret one culture in conceptual terms 
derived from another. As a matter of fact, the word zongjiao, reUgion, did not even 
exist in China before the nineteenth century when it was introduced through Japanese 
transhtions ofEuropean works (Feuchtwang 1991:141). What I would Uke to argue 
though is that the inadequacy of a concept does not imply that it has to be dismissed 
but rather redefined. As Demerath claims: "Concepts must be used as flexible 
benchmarks instead of rigid absolutes, bideed, it is precisely in observing how 
concepts themselves take on different meanings in different settings that much of the 
comparative task is accomplished. And not infrequently, concepts which must be 
altered to fit other societies wind up fitting even our own better" (1994:108). 
Although the dominant reUgion in China was never a sectarian religion like 
Christianity, I agree with Ching when she argues that we can find in the Chinese 
tradition what is functionaUy equivalent to retigions in the West, and that its diffiised 
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character has much to tell us about the reHgious phenomenon itsdf(1993:l-2). The 
majority of scholars agree that we can speak about retigion in China but the specific 
nature of this phenomenon has led to the development of distinct approaches. 
ReUgion has long been analyzed in terms of elite and folk levels but is now being 
recast as "popular religion."^ The choice of terms has expressed basic assumptions 
about Chinese religion~in reaction to the separateness of "official" and "folk," the 
term "popular reUgion" was appropriated to designate an emphasis on social unities. 
The dichotomies of "eHte/folk," "great/little" ORedfield 1956), or "rational 
traditional" (Weber 1951) which constituted the basic structure of the first 
approaches to Chinese religion were chaUenged by C. K. Yang (1961). He proposed 
an analysis of Chinese reUgion as having two aspects: "diffused" and "institutional." 
According to Maurice Freedman (1974) a major impUcation ofYang's q>proach was 
that elite and peasant cultures were versions of each other and not two different 
things as they had been conceptuaUzed. 
The different approaches to the "unity/diversity" issue ascribed distinct roles to 
reUgion. According to Yang and Freedman, reUgion is the source of cultural unity 
underlying a socially diverse society. Li contrast, arguments for the diversity of 
religious practices have tended to see religion as reflecting the social distinctions of 
its adherents, thereby emphasizing ethnic boundaries or differentiating groups (see 
Wolf 1974; Watson 1976). Weller (1980) does not side with either of the factions, 
developing instead a theory that accounts for both differentiation and integratioa 
According to him, the relevant question is not whether there is diversity or unity in 
Chinese reUgion but, rather, questions such as: which type of interpretation is used by 
which group, in what circumstances, and for what purposes. He explores these 
questions in his work, and gives evidence of specific ways in which people reproduce 
social distinctions and social unities by assimilating different understandings and 
producing distinct meanings. However, as Bell claims, "he does not follow the 
circularity of cultural production to show not only how different groups produce 
different interpretations, but how the differences among these interpretations 
reproduce the differences among social groups" (1989:51). 
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It is in the work of Sangren (1987) that we find a specific concern with this 
circularity ofcultural production and with the concomitant importance ofrecognizing 
religion as more than a mere reflection of social structure. He sees culture as the 
dialectical dynamic by which ideologies and social conditions produce each other, 
providing both differentiation and integration of various groups. I decided to foUow 
this Une of approach since it provides a more dynamic understanding of the role of 
reUgion plays in the construction of a social identity. 
Religion and Ideology 
Li this study, I wiU concentrate on the way religion can be deployed as an 
ideological instrument and how it is manipulated to reinforce specific social identities. 
The issue of reUgion as ideology has been discussed by several scholars. E>urkheim, 
Uke Marx, emphasized that reUgion and ideology have a social basis. However, 
Ehirkheim also accorded them a certain degree of autonomy, rejecting the historical 
materiaUst theory according to which beUefs and ideologies could be reduced to mere 
functions or reflections of material circumstances and interests. Max Weber, likewise 
rejected the reductionist materiaUst explanation; he argued that material 
circumstances and interests as well as ideas govern people's conduct (Weber 1963). 
EspeciaUy relevant for this study are the discussions of religion and ideology as 
cultural systems put forward by Geertz. He defines culture as "an historically 
transmitted pattem of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited 
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, 
perpetuate and develop their knowledge about attitudes toward Ufe" (1973:89). He 
defines reUgion as: “. . .(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) estabUsh powerM, 
pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating 
conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with 
such an aura of factuaUty that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely reaUstic" 
(ibid.:90). Ideology, according to him, refers to "that part of culture which is actively 
concerned with the establishment and defence of patterns ofbelief and value," though 
keeping in mind that “the pattems of belief and value defended may be, of course, 
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those of a sociaUy subordinate group, as weU as those of a socially dominant one" 
(ibid.:231). 
A purely materialistic theory that views ideology and religion as the outcome of 
specific material interests disregards the relative autonomy of religious symbolism 
and values. On the other hand, theories that concentrate on the reUgious symbolism 
per se, regardless of the social context within which it has originated, fail to 
acknowledge that reUgion is part of a wider cultural, political and economic set of 
relations. These theories are therefore obUvious to the "elective affinity" between 
status groups (or for that matter ethnic groups) and sets ofbeliefs, and to the way 
this affects religious symboUsm (Bocock and Thompson 1993). 
bi Macao, broadly speaking, ethnic groups overlap with class divisions, though 
they are not reducible to class. Until very recently, the Portuguese were equated with 
the ruling dass, However, since the middle of the nineteenth century a Chinese eUte 
class has emerged and now, with the changes in the political scenario, it plays an 
important poUtical role. Within the Chinese community, however, there is social 
differentiation, and the Chinese elite has a considerable and undeniable political and 
economic power. But, to some extent, we might say that ethnic groups overlap with 
dass divisions in the sense that Portuguese are (or more accurately~were) 
commonly perceived as belonging to the upper class while the majority of the Chinese 
popuktion is (was) regarded as belonging to the lower class. 
We can also say that ethnic groups embrace different religious systems. Li this 
study I am particularly concerned with analyzing the ideological deployment of 
reUgion. By focusing on the nature of the relationship between ethnic groups and 
specific sets ofbeHefs we can better perceive the dynamics of this process. ReUgion 
provides an ideological field for the reproduction of poHtical authority, and there can 
be more than one source of authority at one time in one place. In Macao, 
Catholicism^ has been a source of poUtical authority; the official endorsement of the 
Church was used by political authorities to legitimize and therefore reinforce their 
power as weU as to gain the loyalty of the CathoUc population. On the other hand, 
Chinese popular reUgion should be regarded as the source of another authority 
conveyed by the representation of traditionaHty, of a common cultural heritage. In 
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this research both CathoUcism and Chinese popular religion, and the way they relate 
to each ethnic group, became the object of study. 
Macao s Historical Background 
As mentioned earlier, research on the construction of ethnic identity in Macao 
cannot be Umited to the analysis of the present situation. The history ofMacao was 
characterized by frequent transformations and is now in the process of undergoing a 
major change with the transition of sovereignty in 1999. Political and economic 
forces can bring about variations in the way social markers are manipiUated, ethnic 
identities constructed and in the nature of the interaction between the groups. Since 
the communities are produced by particular historical forces, an understanding of the 
process of construction of ethnic identity in Macao implies a historical 
contextuatization. I wiU outline the historical background, paying particular attention 
to the recent poHtical and economic changes. 
The first contacts between the Portuguese and the Chinese date from the first 
decades of the sixteenth century. But it was not until 1557 (Montalto de Jesus 
1990[1926]:22) that the Portuguese estabUshed themselves in the territory. It is 
commonly beUeved that this marked the beginning of the Portuguese colony. 
However, a closer look at the historical data shows that until the middle of the 
nineteenth century it is more appropriate to speak of double sovereignty than of a 
true colony. The Portuguese presence in the territory since the Ming Dynasty was 
characterized by a strong degree of ambiguity; the Portuguese paid land tax as weU as 
trade taxes to the Chinese authorities. Furthermore, the Portuguese only had 
jurisdiction over the Christian population while the Chinese were under the authority 
of a Chinese magistrate (ibid.:138~41). This situation was the result of what K.C. 
Fok calls the "Macao Formula" of the Ming policy: 
Trade relations were . . . made possible through the connivance of the provincial 
officials. The exchange was voluntary. Its continuance depended on the goodwill of the 
Portuguese to honor their obligations to the local officials and the wiUingness of the 
Chinese ofl5ciak to run the risk of being censured by Peking, bi rcaUstic terms it 
depended on whether both sides had any compelUng needs for the profits that could be 
derived from such an exchange. But the workability of the fonnula, above aU, had to 
torgely rely on the compliance and tranquillity of the Portuguese in Macao. [ 1991:343 
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This fragile and continuously negotiated equiUbrium prevailed until the middle of 
the nineteenth century when the Opium War, the decUne of the Qing dynasty (shown 
in their lack ofmilitary power), and the establishment of the British colony ofHong 
Kong led to a shift in the situation in Macao. In 1846 the governor Ferreira do 
Amaral instaUed a colonial administration, expelling the Chinese officials and 
suspending the payment of land tax. In 1849, he reinforced his colonial poUcy 
through the suppression of the Chinese customs duties. His despotic attitude and 
disregard of the Chinese customs went as far as to destroy a Chinese c^etety to 
implement a new urban plan poUcy. This lack of concem for the Chinese population 
and brutal policy led to his murder in 1849. Nevertheless, the colonial administration 
was now established and was formaUy recognized in the Sino-Portuguese treaty 
signed in 1887. 
With the consoUdation of the colonial administration, the influence of the 
Chinese authorities diminished but persisted.® During the first half of the twentieth 
century, China was undergoing a critical period~faU of the Qing dynasty, 
establishment of the Republic, Japanese invasion, civil war. Jn such a context the 
issue of Macao did not constitute a priority; it was a minor problem. From 1949 
onwards, wkh the estabUshment of the People's RepubUc of China, things started to 
change. Li the sixties the Chinese authorities became more concerned with the 
situation in Macao and estabUshed contacts with leaders of the Chinese community, 
such as the presidents of the different kaifongs. By that time ethnic tensions within 
the territory were increasing. The Chinese population started to complain against 
discriminatory treatment and to challenge the colonial administration. Strengthened 
by the echoes of the Cultural Revolution in the Mainland, local Chinese voiced their 
anger. The conflict intensified and led to the turmoil that took place from December 
1966 to January 1967 that became known as the 1, 2 3 riots. The government 
attempted to brutally suppress the protests of the population which led to an 
upheaval of the Chinese community that was strongly supported by the government 
of the P.R.C. bicapable of reestablishing order, the colonial government was forced 
j 
to sign an agreement in which it accepted the demands put forward by the Chinese, 
namely their claim to have access to the Administrative Services. 
11 
The years following the 1’ 2’ 3 riots were marked by hostilities and the Church 
was one of the institutions that was object of strong persecutions. As one of my 
informants, a Chinese Catholic priest, said: 
After the 1 2 3 riots, and during the Cultural Revolution, things become very 
dangerous. The Church was silent, because the Church had been very friendly with the 
Portuguese government and it was pro-Taiwan. The Seminary and the CathoUc schools 
were surrounded by the members of the population. For example, the principal ofthe S. 
Jose School, a Chinese priest called Luis Ho, had to run away to Hong Kong for 
protection. He never rctumed to Macao. . . . Because the Church was so close to the 
government, due to the Padroado, some pro>China newspapers started waming the 
members ofthe Church saying that they knew what the priests were doing so they should 
be careful. Some priests got really frightened. 
Although the Catholic Church was object of retaliation and some priests were 
persecuted, many religious people working for the congregations were protected by 
local Chinese. One French sister, belonging to the Petites Soeurs congregation, who 
has been living in Macao's poorest neighborhood for thirty-eight years, described 
what she experienced in the foUowing way: 
The people here respect us they even protect us. During the Cultural Revolution, tiie 
Chinese were writing things on the waUs of the CathoUc schook, private houses, 
everywhere. The people in this neighborhood were aU wearing Maoist clothes. We 
camiot forget that the majority of the recent immigrants Uve in this area. At that time aU 
the people in the market were forbidden to seU food to foreigners. So the other sisters 
and I decided that we would not go shopping so that we would not compromise tiie 
workers of the market. But, you know, we did not starve, every night we found some 
food left at our door, we never knew \^o put it there. 
hi the seventies, there was a major twist in the situation due to the combination 
of different factors. On April 25, 1974 there was a democratic revolution in Portugal 
that put an end to the fascist regime, hi the new constitution promulgated in 1976 the 
status of Macao was amended: Macao was now classified as a "Chinese Territory 
under Portuguese Administration." M the miUtary personnel was sent back to 
Portugal. Macao's government changed its policy and modernized the administration 
through, among other aspects, the creation of more departments that responded to 
the needs of the population. The relations between Portugal and the P.R.C. became 
closer. Simultaneously, the economic development that was occurring in several 
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Asian countries reached Macao. This decade was also marked by a strong increase in 
the number ofimmigrants from Mainland China. 
On April 13 1987, the Joint Declaration between Portugal and the P.R.C. was 
signed. Portugal formalfy agreed to retum the territory in 1999, and the conditions 
for the transfer of sovereignty were established. 
Relevance of the Historical Contextualization 
This brief account ofMacao's historical background and of the major political 
changes in the last decades serves different purposes. First, in order to understand 
Macao's present situation, it is essential to have a notion of its history. Second, it is 
important to clarify the fact that the Portuguese nile in the territory relied on a fragile 
equilibrium of interests and concessions. Macao's legal status was irrelevant in 
comparison with the de facto situation. The territory was under double sovereignty 
until the middle of the nineteenth century, and even during the colonial period the 
Chinese authorities maintained a certain degree of influence. The Portuguese 
government did not have the miUtary power to confront the Chinese and therefore 
never managed to attain the degree of control that the British had over Hong Kong. 
Furthermore, instead of adopting a strict control policy Uke the one enforced by the 
British government, it opted, in most areas, for a laissez-faire policy. This is an 
important aspect that I want to emphasize since I will argue that the restriction of the 
poUtical power imposed by the Chinese led the Macao government to resort to more 
subtle ways to reinforce its own position. And here religion played a major role as I 
will later demonstrate. Third, since I am particularly interested in perceiving the 
process of construction of ethnic identities~and poUtical and economic changes can 
bring about transformations in ethnic identity and in the nature of interaction between 
ethnic groups~it is important to consider the historical evolution and to 
conte7ctualize the existing political situation. Furthermore, the discourse of the people 
interviewed reflect that the historical events led not only to important changes in the 
nature of interaction between the different communities but also, in certain cases, to 
a redefinition of personal strategies in terms of ethnic identity. An analysis of the 
present situation historicaUy contextuaUzed and taking into consideration the 
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profound change that will take place in 1999 and which impact is already being felt, 
will allow us to perceive ethnicity "in the making." 
One thing that attracted my attention when I was conducting interviews in 
Macao, was that most people discussing their present situation felt it necessary to 
refer to the past. They would start conunenting on something and then would say that 
the situation was different before this or that happened. For example, when the 
president of one kaifong was speaking about the present situation of the Chinese 
community, he immediately commented that things before the 1, 2, 3 riots were 
different as the Chinese had no say whatsoever in the way things were run in Macao. 
A Chinese priest commenting on the Catholic Church in Macao labeled it as very 
conservative, and mentioned that although the ecumenical council Vatican n, was in 
1962~65 it was not until the late seventies that the new orientation of the Church 
reached Macao. An old Chinese kdy that had converted to CathoUcism when she 
married a Macanese fifty years ago, claimed that the people that converted in those 
days had to suffer more. Some members of her family would not speak to her, 
especiaUy her brothers. Now things are different, "there are families where some 
members go to the temples to pray and others go to the Church and they do not fight 
because of that. There are even some people that go both to the temples and to the 
Church, and before that was unthinkable, the priest would not allow you to do that, 
and I think it was right because there is only one God ” The leader of a smaU temple 
compkuned that now very few people are coming to the temple but mentioned that 
thirty years ago everybody living in the neighborhood would come; "now they just 
care to go to the big ones." I could go on and on quoting, but the point I want to 
make is that the interviews show that there was a tuming point in the past, that the 
present situation differs from the one that existed thirty to forty years ago. Of course 
this can sound obvious, because in any country things are bound to change, to 
evolve. However, in the case of Macao it seems there has been a major change that 
affected the three ethnic communities~the Chinese, the Portuguese and the 
Macanese~~in the way they conceived themselves and in the way they positioned 
themselves in relation one to another. 
The combination of historical events of the late sixties and the beginning of the 
seventies profoundly affected Macao's society. The Second Vatican Council (1962-
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65), the 1966^7 riots, the Portuguese Democratic Revolution in 1974 the economic 
growth and the wave of immigrants from Mainland China led to the adoption of a 
new poUcy by the government, to the restructuration of the poUtical forces as the 
degree of intervention ofthe Chinese population increased, and to a new orientation 
ofthe Church. The idea conveyed by the interviews that this period marked a major 
shift in the way the different ethnic groups positioned themselves and related to each 
other was confirmed by the work ofPina Cabral and L0uren90. According to these 
authors, who researched for several years the dynamics of ethnicity among the 
Macanese community, the seventies were definitely a period of transition. In their 
analysis they constantly refer to the "breach of the seventies" (a cesura dos anos 
setenta) as constituting a tuming point in the construction of the Macanese ethnic 
identity (Pina Cabral and L0uren90 1993b:126). Since the repositioning of one ethnic 
group cannot be done without affecting the others, it seems logical to assume that the 
poUtical, economic and social changes in the seventies affected the whole patterns 
and dynamics of ethnicity construction in Macao. Therefore, from this point onwards, 
while concentrating on the way ethnic identities are presently constructed and 
deployed in Macao, and how religion is capitaUzed on (or not) in this process, I wUl 
contrast it with the situation that existed before the seventies. 
To inscribe the present situation in a historical continuum is not Hmited to an 
understanding of the way things have been evolving, it is also important to take into 
consideration the future changes in the poUtical, social and economic spheres. 
Although nobody can really predict the impact of the 1999 change of sovereignty to 
the P.R.C., most of the people are conscious that it will bring radical changes. So, to 
understand the way people position themselves presently we have to situate them in 
this continuum ofhistorical circumstances and consider their future perspectives. 
Macao ’s Present Situation 
Macao has a smaU territory of about seventeen square kilometers (see appendix 
1) and a multiethnic population of 355,693 according to the 1991 census, but much 
higher if we take into consideration the number of illegal immigrants, mainly Chinese 
and Filipinos. This can be attested by the huge number of illegal immigrants that were 
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deported or legaHzed. Between 1980 and 1991, around 125,000 persons were 
deported and 58,300 saw their situation legaUzed. In addition to the number ofiUegal 
immigrants living in the territory, there are around 47,000 persons that come daily to 
Macao, being referred to as the fluctuating population. Among these people are 
included both visitors and people from mainland China working, but not residing, in 
the territory. 
For the purpose of this research I wiU consider, as mentioned earUer, that there 
are three ethnic groups in Macao~the Chinese, the Macanese, and the Portuguese. I 
am conscious that the accuracy of this statement depends on the level on wbich one is 
focusing. In other words, each person has different layers of social identity and 
deploys them differently according to specific contexts. For example, one Chinese 
can emphasize his/her provincial identity when deaUng with another Chinese in order 
to stress either their common identity~if they were bom or have their ancestral 
origins in the same province~or their distinct identities. However the same Chinese 
person wiU not refer to himselfi^ersetf as Fukianese, but rather as Chinese, when 
he/she is interacting with a Portuguese person. Accordingly a Portuguese person can 
emphasize the fact that he^he was bom in Portugal in order to dififerentiate 
himseMiersetf from a Portuguese bora in Macao, but he/she would simply refer to 
himselfi^ersetf as Portuguese regardless of other considerations when confronted 
with a Chinese person, hi the case of a Macanese the strategies are vaster and more 
complex. He/she can identify himselfliersetf as a Macanese in the presence of 
Portuguese, as Portuguese in the presence of Chinese or even as Chinese when that 
proves to be rewarding in his/her interaction whh Chinese. For the purpose of this 
study I am concerned with trying to figure out how these three main communities 
construct their ethnic identity with respect to each other. 
StatisticaUy speaking Macao's population is predominantly Chinese^95.1 
percent of the total population (see appendix 2). This percentage refers to people 
whose parents and grandparents are aU Chinese, nevertheless it also includes a smaU 
percentage of people that although descending exclusively from Chinese, regard 
themselves, and are regarded by others, as Macanese rather than Chinese.^  From the 
total resident population, 50.3 percent were bom in Mainland China (mainly in 
Guangdong and Fujian provinces), and only 40.1 percent were bora in the territory. 
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Furthermore, 60 percent ofthe population aged twenty or above has been living in 
Macao for less than twenty years. These figures reflect the extreme fluidity of 
Macao's population. 
This fluidity results from the fact that Macao has been regarded, by both Chinese 
and Westem communities as a stepping-stone. Westerners, and in this case 
particularly the Portuguese, saw in Macao a strategic point of access to China, while 
Chinese people saw it as a key place in their migration strategy. Although different 
historical and political contexts led to variations in these strategies, Macao was 
generaUy regarded as a point of passage. Most of the Chinese immigrants came to 
Macao as economic refugees and as soon as they managed to achieve a certain 
degree of economic stability moved on to Hong Kong or to other countries such as 
the United States, Canada or AustraUa. Only a minority chose Macao as their last 
destination. The Macanese have also been very transient. According to Pina Cabra^ 
^ whenever there was a major crisis in Macao for example the Pacific War, the 1 2, 3 
riots, and so on, it was immediately foUowed by an outbreak of migration of the 
Macanese elite families (1993b:80). Jn what concems the Portuguese population, 
most of them come to Macao with short term contracts, stay for a few years, but in 
the majority of cases retum to Portugal. Jn brief, Macao is characterized by a plural 
and highly fluid society; however the mobility of the population does not imply a 
reduction in the organizational relevance of ethnic identities or in the coUapse of the 
boundary maintaining process. Each newcomer has to position himsetf in relation to 
the existing ethnic groups. Especially because of the continuous influx and outflow of 
population, ethnic identities have to be continuously reasserted. 






Church and Government 
Many studies have dealt with the relationship between poUtical powers and 
religion showing how reUgion can be drawn upon to legitimate the status of a 
pfflticular group and its mUng position (Duara 1988; Bocock and Thompson 1993; 
De Bemardi 1994), However, the nature of this relationship is sometimes regarded as 
being informal and subtle. This is not the case in Macao. One of the first things that 
caught my attention during the interviews was people's awareness of the close Unk 
between the government and the Church. One Chinese informant commented that 
"the government before only supported CathoUc institutions, but it is now supporting 
some Buddhist associations to please the Chinese population, and ultimately the 
PiLC. govemmoit." A Portuguese missionary argued that "because the diocese in 
Macao depends economicaUy on the government, they [the bishop and the priests] 
have their hands tied," meaning that an economic dependence necessarily entails 
potitical passivity. 
The relationship between the Portuguese government and the Catholic Church in 
Macao has been officiaUy institutionalized since the sixteenth century, through the so-
c^ed Padroado, 
The Portuguese Padroado in Asia can be loosely defined as a combinaticm of the rights 
and duties inherited by the Crown of Portugal as Patron of the Roman CathoUc missions 
and ecclesiastical estabUshments between the Cape of Good Hope and Japan. This 
institution was the outcome of a series of Papal Briefe and BuUs, conferring the Jus 
Patronatus on the Portuguese Crown, in consequence of Lusitanian enterprise in 
discovering the unknown regions of Africa and Asia with their myriads of potential 
converts to the Christian faith, [Boxer 1948:3] 
Macao's diocese was erected by the Bull Super specula militcmtis Ecclesia of 
Pope Gregory XHI, on January 23, 1576, and prevails until today although it has 
seen its geographical domain decrease with the estabUshment of new dioceses such as 
the one in Japan. 
19 
In 1910, the estabHshment ofthe Republic in Portugal and the implementation of 
m anticlerical poUcy led to a clear separation between the Church and the state. This 
was formalized through the publication^ on April 20, 1911, ofthe "Separation Law" 
(Lei da Separagao), However, surprisingly this did not apply to the Portuguese 
colonies in Asia since the section 190 of the law insured the maintenance of the 
Padroado (Silva Rego 1978:34). As a consequence, in 1995, we are faced with the 
following paradoxical situation~although Portugal is a country where the national 
pubUc Ufe and the state are completely secularized, in Macao, Chinese territory under 
Portuguese Administration, the Church is offidaUy tied to the government. The 
nature ofthe poUtical and economic ties between the government and the Church is 
established in the Diploma Missiondrio para a Diocese de Macau in which the 
legislation governing this relationship and stating the rights and duties of both 
institutions is compiled. Jn 1952 this Diploma was published both in the Boletim 
Oficial and in the Ecclesiastical Bulletin. Since no further legislation was published, 
this document has remained the legal basis determining the nature of the relationship 
between the government and the Catholic Church in Macao. According to my 
informants, however, some parts of the Diploma are now outdated, namely sections 
9 10 and 80 that estabUsh that both the bishop and the priests must have Portuguese 
nationality, and that the benefits introduced by this law do not apply to the membros 
iftdigetms (indigenous members) of the Church. It would be interesting to know 
when this ethnic clause has stopped being appUed, but changes seem to have been 
progressively introduced although no amendments to the Diploma were made. My 
informants were consequently unable to determine the specific date but suggested 
that this must have taken place during the beginning of the dghties when Chinese 
priests were appointed to some parishes. On the whole, however, the legislation 
compiled in this Diploma remains vaHd. According to this legislation the government 
has to include in its annual budget an amount destined to the diocese. It has to 
provide for most of its expenses, payment of the diocese personnel/ cost of 
maintenance, construction and restoration of its properties, donation of land when 
required, and so on. The 1995 budget for the Church approved by the government 
(see Boletim Oficial de Macau, no. 52, 30 December 1994) amounted to a total of 
10.2 miUion patacas. It is important to note that the Church does not depend 
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exclusively on this budget since it also has its own revenues that are administrated by 
the bishop. 
According to the Diploma, diocesan priests are a kind of privileged civil servants 
in the sense that they cumulate the benefits of the civil servants—for example free 
trips to Portugal every three years~"with the ones that are exclusively assigned to the 
"clergy staff.” Nevertheless, as it is stated in section 80 of the legislation, they are not 
regarded as civil servants because only the privileges of the civil servants apply to 
them, and not the disciplinary regulations, prescriptions and formalities imposed to 
the civil servants. 
The only requirement that the diocese has to fiilfiU in order to justify the 
government's "allowance" is to send, within the first three months of each year, a 
report stating the number and category of the people working for the diocese as weU 
as the total ofits expenses. This report, according to an informant who works closely 
with the bishop, is a very general one, it does not go into the details of the diocese 
finances and expenses, leaving little room for governmental control. Even within the 
diocese very few people know how this budget is being used and what is the 
economic situation of the Church. One Portuguese priest commented that he receives 
his monthly salary, but that the parishes themselves have to be economically setf-
sufficient. In case of exceptional need, and upon submission of a project proposal by 
the priest in charge, the bishop may decide to support one parish and grant it some 
funds. When asked on how the government allowance was being used, this priest 
replied that he did not really know, that most of the activities managed by the 
congregations in Macao, such as schools, hospices, elderly centers are economically 
independent from the diocese, though, in special cases the diocese can contribute 
with a small amount of money. He also said that he thought that the bishop's policy 
was to soMfy the Church's economic position due to current uncertainties regarding 
the transfer of sovereignty in 1999. This is a very common view put forward by most 
of the persons interviewed—all agreed that the bishop is mainly concerned with the 
management of the finances of the Church^  but the way people evaluate this differs. 
Some believe that it is a good policy to insure the Church's economic situation while 
others are more critical and claim that he is disregarding the pastoral mission of the 
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Church. Among the most critical of the bishop's poUcy were some Portuguese 
laymen and missionaries who believe that the Church should concentrate its efforts in 
"spreading the word of God." Furthermore they regard this poUcy as one of the 
reasons, jointly with emigration, for the decreasing number of Catholics in the 
territory. Chinese priests and one of the Portuguese missionaries that I interviewed 
said that they had high expectations when this bishop, the first Chinese bishop in the 
history of Macao, was appointed. They had hoped that this would lead to changes 
within the Church, and that the bishop would be more concerned with defending the 
interests of the Chinese Catholic population in particular, and of the Chinese 
population as a whole, which they think, did not exactly happen although some 
changes were introduced. 
As mentioned earlier the legal requirements imposed by the government for the 
appropriation of the annual budget consisted exclusively in the presentation of an 
annual report. However, this generous support provides an interesting return, in the 
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sense that although not officiaUy imposed, the government delegated to the Church 
the education and welfare fiinctions. The first hospital was built in 1575 by the Jesuit 
bishop D. Melchior Cameiro. Other hospitals and health centers were run by 
congregations. Only since the middle of the nineteenth century did both the Chinese 
community, through the creation of its own hospital (X%lXy-Keng Vu (Jinghu), and 
the government started organizing their own health system prompting the Church to 
concentrate on other areas of social welfare. Although the government has created 
the Instituto de Acgao Social de Macau (institution dedicated to social wetfare 
activities) in the sixties, the Church still plays the leading role in this sphere. As one 
Italian sister said to me: 
It is very convenient for the government to delegate to the Church these services, 
because even if it subsidizes some of these institutions, the Church can do a better and 
cheaperjob. We work with dedication, not for the money, and on the other hand, we are 
always doing extra hours without expecting any payment so as you can see this is a 
good deal for the government. When I was working in Hong Kong, I stayed there for 
fifteen years, the situation was the same. 
Another field where the Church has played a leading role is education. Presently 
the number of private schools is still greater than the number of state schools, more 
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than 50 percent of the schools are administered by religious congregations (Carmo 
1993). Though presently there is no university run by the Church it is important to 
note that the first university in Macao dating from 1594, the Colegio de Sao Paulo, 
belonged to the Jesuits. 
Since the establishment ofthe Portuguese in the middle of the sixteenth century 
until today, the relationship between the Church and the government has been based 
on a strong economic link. On one hand the Church has been economically supported 
by the government and on the other hand, the government assumed that this entitled 
it to delegate to the Church some of the services that it should be responsible to 
provide. However, relationships based on economic links usually lead to other kinds 
ofdependence. A major aspect of the nature of this relationship was the political one. 
As quoted earlier, the Church's economic dependence on the government's economic 
support neutraUzed its capacity of poUtical contestation. Some Chinese priests have 
voiced their concem with this situation and seek some degree of separation from the 
government. The Church is often regarded as supporting the existing political powers 
rather than providing a field for the contestation of institutionalized powers. Church 
and government supported each other therefore enhancing their specific powers, ln 
Macao's history, both bishops and priests have been frequent counselors of the 
government. In a recent article published in the Macau magazine (Coutinho 
1994:97) it was mentioned that Monsenhor Teixeira, probably the most charismatic 
figure of the Church in Macao, has been an indispensable adviser of Macao's 
governors. He arrived in Macao seventy years ago and has seen the succession of 
nineteen governors. 
Another fact that attests the Catholic Church religious supremacy and its 
closeness to the institutionalized power is the appointment of the bishop to draw up 
the section of the Basic Law concerning religious activities^ in Macao although he 
only represents 6.7 percent of the total population (percentage of Catholics living in 
the territory according to the 1991 census), the majority of the population being 
engaged in practices related to Chinese popular religion. As one priest explained to 
me "the bishop was the drafter of the Basic Law. A consultative committee was 
created, it was composed by ninety members of all the religious communities, 
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including priests (I was there), Buddhist monks, Protestant pastors, and so on. They 
expressed their opinions but the drafting committee, constituted just by one religion, 
that of the bishop, had the final say." 
Government and Catholic Religion—Changing Strategy 
Although the Church has had a remarkable degree of political influence, this was 
not a one-sided relationship. The government has drawn upon religion to legitimize 
its political power. Religion constituted the criterion chosen to erect ethnic 
boundaries and vaMdate its dominating position. In a certain way, according to 
political rhetorics, it was the Portuguese elite's Christianity and not its race or 
western cultural background that justified its supremacy and the entitlement to a 
ruling position. Many official documents until the beginning of this century refer to 
Cristaos e Chins (Christians and Chinese) rather than to Portuguese and Chinese. 
Though the relationships between the Church and the government in Portugal have 
been now and then shaken, for example during the persecution of the Jesuits 
instigated by Pombal in 1759, or after the establishment of the Republic in 1910, 
what also affected Macao~"overaU there was a close relationship. After the founding 
of the Republic, the state became secularized but since the establishment of the 
dictatorship in 1926 until the 1974 democratic revolution, the Church clearly sided 
with the government and had its total support. It was only during the seventies that 
Macao's government started to change its poUcy and progressively dissociate itself 
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from the Church, what was later reinforced during the negotiations that led to the 
1987 Joint Declaration. The government has been trying to show a certain fair play 
by subsidizing other Chinese religious institutions, residents associations, and by 
contributing financiaUy to the reconstruction of Chinese temples. This reflects a 
change of policy and an obvious attempt to appease the Chinese population as well as 
the P.R.C. government which has not gone unnoticed by some perspicacious persons. 
As one of my informants said: 
Fifteen, twenty years ago the government did not pay much attention to the local 
people's social welfare, so this was mainly done by the Catholic Church. However, since 
the Sino-Portuguese agreement the Macao government wants to build a new image. The 
same happens with neighborhood associations, which means pro-China associations that 
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are now engaging in this kind of activity, providing social welfere to the old people, 
nurseries, schools and so on. The Church is still working for the people but the political 
situation has changed, the power is shifting or in other words, the social influence is 
shifting. That is why neighborhood associations, in the eyes of the government, are now 
better partners. The governor wants to get a balance between the Catholic community 
and what we call the pro-China community, because both are quite influential in 
Macao's local affeirs. 
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Church and Ethnic Groups 
To understand the role played by the Catholic Church in Macao we have to take a 
closer look at this institution, the way in which it is internally organized and how it 
relates with the population. 
Diocese versus Congregations 
At the top ofthe structure we have the bishop, the leading figure responsible for 
both the diocese and the congregations established in the territory. I take diocese to 
mean the ecclesiastical“and highly hierarchical~"institution under the direct 
authority of the bishop. Although congregations are formally under the bishop's 
jurisdiction, they do not form part of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and they can be 
defined as fraternities that engage in charity and religious activities independently 
from the diocese. 
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There are a total of eleven churches and eleven chapels that are spread through 
the six parishes. It is interesting to note that the administrative division of the 
territory reproduces the ecclesiastical one; the six parishes constitute six 
administrative districts. The priest in charge of each parish is appointed by the bishop 
and has to report periodicaUy to him. For congregations the situation is sUghtly 
different. When a particular congregation wants to establish itself in the territory, the 
first thing that it has to do is to seek the bishop's agreement. If the bishop aUows it to 
establish in the territory, the congregation can start its activities, remaining under the 
bishop's supervision even though it is not financially supported by the diocese. 
Whenever the congregation wants to implement a new project, it still has to seek the 
bishop's approval and to present full reports of its activities. This is especiaUy so 
when it is running schools or welfare services. However, in a certain way, people 
working for the congregations have a higher degree of independence than the 
diocesan priests working in the parishes. As one French sister who has been working 
with the poor for more than twenty years told me "our work here has nothing to do 
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with the Church. Ofcourse we are here because the bishop authorized it, but he does 
not really know what our work consists in. He never came to this neighborhood." 
Another American sister was more cautious: "we do have a certain liberty since the 
bishop dissociates himself from some of the initiatives; he allows but states that he 
does not assume any responsibiUty. However, we are conscious that we are guests 
here which makes it harder to take positions." 
Although the Church, due to its strictly defined hierarchy, can be regarded as a 
cohesive whole, on practical terms it emerges as divided. On one hand we have the 
diocese that develops its work mainly through the parishes that ultimately deal with 
the Catholic population. On the other hand we have the congregations that through 
their social welfare work and schools are constantly in contact with the whole 
population regardless of their reUgious affiUation. Furthermore, until the late 
seventies the majority of the diocesan priests were Portuguese, as well as the bishop. 
Many of them did not speak Chinese, and others, though they have a certain 
proficiency in the language, refixse to use it. When I asked a Portuguese missionary 
how many Portuguese priests speak Chinese, he answered that it was difficult to say 
because “although some speak the language they do not admit it pubUcly. For 
example one priest that came to Macao when he was twelve years old and studied in 
the seminary with Chinese kids surely learned the language. Actually I already heard 
him talking in Chinese, but he never admits that he speaks Chinese. He works in a 
Portuguese parish.” On the contrary, most of the people working in the 
congregations are mainly Chinese and non-Portuguese westerners who, due to the 
nature of their own work, constantly in contact with the population, are forced to 
learn the language. 
The members of the congregations act as an important Hnk between the Chinese 
population and the Portuguese administration. During my interviews with priests and 
sisters of the congregations, we were repeatedly interrupted by Chinese people that 
came to look for help, especially with bureaucratic issues, such as documents that 
they did not understand, letters for administrative departments that had to be written 
in Portuguese to ensure a faster and more efficient answer, or some particular 
problem that they did not know how to handle or to whom they should address 
themselves. Li these situations the religious people acted as the go-betweens, the 
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ones who oriented and estabUshed the necessary Unks so that the problems might be 
resolved. 
One interesting example of the degree of integration and acceptance by the 
population that some of the congregation members achieve is given by a small group 
of sisters that live in Macao's poorest neighborhood, Ilha Verde. In this 
neighborhood the criminal activity is intense. The week before I went there to speak 
with the sisters, it had been raided by the police, some triad members had been 
arrested, and several weapons seized. When I made the appointment the sister 
suggested that it would be better if she would come and pick me up at the bus 
station. Since everybody knows her there would be no problem. We went into the 
slum, walked along some narrow passages until we arrived at their "house," two tiny 
rooms and one bathroom. After an interesting conversation and a cup of tea, the 
sister took me along in her daily tour through the neighborhood, paying visits to the 
old people, bringing them some food and helping them to clean the places where they 
live. While we were moving from one place to another, she started commenting on 
the poUce raid, showed me where the guns had been found, where the triad members 
I lived, and so on. Then, to my surprise, she said: 
I 
We know what is going on, where the places for prostitution are I even saw some of 
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them hanging the wires outside but at that time I did not know what it was for. I just 
found out when the poHce came that it was the cables of a video camera that they had 
installed at the entrance of the neighborhood to control all the people that came in. But 
you know, the thing is that I have known them all since they were kids, I saw them 
growing up, they had a difficult life. Besides they do us no harm and I even help them 
when they ask. You must find this strange, but you know we are not here to judge; when 
the sinners went to God he welcomed them. 
The close and continuous contact with the population that the members of the 
congregations have, their knowledge of the language and understanding of Chinese 
culture has led to two things~~on one hand they are perceived by the population as 
being closer to them and therefore more reliable, on the other hand the people 
working for the congregations have a better perception of Chinese culture and a more 
critical stand towards the diocese and the way it has been positioning itself. One of 
the common criticisms raised is that the diocese is too conservative, that it maintains 
pre-Vatican H values. As one Chinese priest observed: 
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hi 1962-65 the Church had an ecumenical council, the Vatican U. From this point 
onward the whole attitude ofthe Church changed, there was a new orientation. The main 
slogan was aggiomamento which means renewal, and the main activity should be the 
dialogue ofthe Church with the different communities and cultures in the world, instead 
I oftrying to impose on them their own culture. The Church sort of adopted a new poHcy. 
I However this new approach has been taking quite a long time to be implemented here 
i because Macao's Church started in the sixteenth century so we have been for a long 
time under the shadow of the Council of Trent. In a certain way we can say that the 
Church in Macao stiU Hves in the old days. This is in part due to the fact that most of 
! the priests, especially the Portuguese ones, are old and it is really hard to change their 
mentality. 
Or in the words of a Portuguese missionary: 
The Church in Macao is still quite old fashioned. The idea of evangeHzation was, in the 
nineteenth century, synonymous with civilizing. We went to Africa, to South America, 
ji 
poor countries in general, and besides taking the Gospel we took civilization with us. 
The old priests working here still have these notions. So they speak Portuguese and 
impose their own customs. Sometimes they hold the celebrations in Portuguese even if 
1 
the people do not understand what is being said. They believe that they should do so 
because the official language is Portuguese. 
Ethnic Differentiation within the Church 
I referred to a sort of horizontal division between the diocese and the 
congregations but it is equally important to note that it coexists with a vertical 
division, in the sense that there is an ethnic differentiation within the Church. On one 
level we have Portuguese priests and Portuguese parishes, on the other, the Chinese 
priest and the Chinese parishes. Portuguese tend to go to the Cathedral, Macanese to 
Santo Antonio, the Cathedral, and Sdo Lourengo, while Chinese go to Nossa Senhora 
de Fdtima, and Sdo Ldzaro churches among others. In some parishes there are even 
foreign priests that say the Mass in English or Tagalog for the large Filipino 
community. Ethnic differentiation is reproduced within the Church. Chinese priests 
run Chinese parishes, do the celebrations in Chinese for the Chinese population. 
Portuguese and Macanese priests, on the other hand, deal equally with both the 
Portuguese and Macanese communities. But when it comes to the celebration of the 
main festivities of the Christian calendar, such as Christmas and Easter, the Mass in 
the Cathedral is conducted by the bishop in both languages as an attempt to gather all 
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the community in the same celebration. However, on a daily basis, the celebration of 
the Mass in the Cathedral has a specific schedule to accommodate the different ethnic 
groups. As one Chinese sister observed: “In the Cathedral there is every morning at 
seven thirty a Mass for the Chinese. You know Chinese people always wake up early. 
But at five thirty there is a Mass for the Portuguese people because Uke that they can 
come after work. On Sundays the Mass for the Chinese is still at seven thirty but for 
the Portuguese, it is at eleven o'clock." 
The choice of church implies a statement of ethnic identity since people do not 
limit themselves to go to the church nearest to their residence. Especially carefiil in 
the choice of church are the members of the Macanese community. As mentioned 
earlier, two of the main criteria ofMacanese identity are religion and language, so it 
is particularly important for them that they choose a church where the Mass is 
conducted in Portuguese. By going there, they are periodically and publicly 
reaffirming their identity. Although it is possible to choose in which church to attend 
i 
the Sunday Mass, one is supposed, for example, to celebrate baptisms and weddings 
in the church of the parish in which one Uves. tf it happens to be a Chinese parish, 
then the Macanese insist on having the ceremony conducted in Portuguese. This is so 
even when they are not proficient in the language. One Portuguese missionary who 
speaks Cantonese and works in a Chinese parish referred to the Macanese in the 
following way: 
They are fervent, the Macanese are bom Catholics. Some of them barely understand 
anything in Portuguese but still go to the Cathedral to attend the Mass. I do not know 
why, but they insist, maybe it is just a question of status. Some come here and ask for 
the baptism to be conducted in Portuguese, then we do the ceremony in Portuguese and 
nobody answers because they do not understand what is being said. I get reaUy upset 
and ask them why do they want the ceremonies in Portuguese if they do not speak the 
language. They answer that they are Macanese so the ceremony should be in Portuguese. 
I reply that although I am Portuguese my Chinese is good enough for me to celebrate the 
baptism in Chinese since they would understand the ceremony better. But they feel 
ashamed to confess that they do not understand Portuguese. It is really a complicated 
situation. 
This statement reveals the symbolic value of language and religious affiliation in 
the construction of Macanese identity. Though reHgion plays a major role in 
differentiating the Macanese from the Chinese population, the Portuguese language 
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becomes essential when it comes to differentiate them from the increasing number of 
Chinese Catholics. If the ceremonies were not conducted in Portuguese, the 
participation in religious activities would lose its meaning as a periodical reiteration 
oftheir ethnic identity. By engaging in ceremonies conducted in Chinese they would 
be assimilated to the CathoUc Chinese and reUgion would lose its power as an ethnic 
boundary. 
The division ofthe parishes in Chinese and Portuguese is further emphasized by 
some segregative practices. For example, every month there are meetings for the 
priests that speak Chinese. Only one Portuguese priest attends these meetings. The 
explanation given for these meetings was that some priest only speak Chinese while 
others only speak Portuguese, language being a boundary difficult to cross. 
Consequently, very seldom do all the priests get together to discuss issues concerning 
the Church. The near absence of dialogue within the Church has been leading to the 
adoption of different postures. The "Portuguese parishes," often run by old 
Portuguese priests, have a more conservative approach and have kept unchanged, but 
the same cannot be said about the "Chinese parishes." Li fact, we can speak of a 
i 
I progressive localization ofthe Church in Macao. 
I 
i } 
Localization of the Church 
I 
i ‘ 
I To understand this process it is important to take into consideration some 
changes that have occurred in the recent past. One important factor was the change 
in the system of parishes differentiation from a colonial one to a territorial one, that 
took place between 1962 and 1967^ (Pina Cabral and Lourengo 1993b:122). Before 
that, all the Chinese Catholics were confined to the Sao Ldzaro church, but from 
1967 onward all CathoHcs, regardless of their ethnic identity, became related to the 
church of the parish in which they lived. These changes within the Church were 
further reinforced in 1976, when Arquimmio Rodrigues da Costa was appointed 
bishop of Macao. This Portuguese bishop had come to Macao at the age of twelve, 
had a better understanding of the Chinese culture, a more tolerant attitude, and a 
different notion of what the role of the Church should be. He started changing 
traditional customs, appointing Chinese priests to the parishes, and accepting some 
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practices from Chinese culture. It was also this bishop that for the first time in the 
history of Macao recommended to the Pope a Chinese priest as his successor. The 
Pope foUowed his advice and, in 1987, Domingos Lam was consecrated the bishop of 
Macao by his Portuguese predecessor and the archbishop of Canton, Domingos 
Tang. 
The progressive changes introduced by the bishop Rodrigues da Costa led to a 
transformation of the existing scenario. Although one faction of the Church has 
remained eminently conservative, an opportunity was given to those who had a 
different conception of the way in which the Church should relate to the Chinese 
population. 
Some of the practices in the Nossa Senhora de Fdtima church are a good 
example of the process of"indigenization" of the Church that has been taking place. I 
am particularly acquainted with the work in this church because I spent many hours 
there interviewing the people that work for the Church as well as Chinese Catholics 
I that attend the services. I have also attended many of its activities. This is the only 
church where the Mass is always celebrated in Chinese. As the priest Pedro Chung 
I explains, “when I was appointed the priest of this parish in 1988, I decided to finish 
I 
with the Portuguese Mass. Most of the people that live in this neighborhood are 
Chinese, there are also some Macanese but they do not speak good Portuguese, so I 
thought it was pointless to say the Mass in Portuguese." Furthermore, in this parish, 
\ I some ofthe most important Chinese festivals such as ChingMihng (QingMing) and f 
Chuhng Yeuhng (Chong Yang) are commemorated through the celebration of a 
I special Mass, while Portuguese parishes celebrate M Souls Day, the "western 
version" of the Ching Mihng Festival. Another major feature of this localization 
process can be seen through the changes in the annual calendar of the dates for the 
celebration of certain saints. For example, in this parish, Nossa Senhora de Fdtima is 
not celebrated in May, the time of the year in which her apparition is supposed to 
have taken place in Portugal, but in October because the Chinese priest of this parish 
considers that weather conditions in this particular month are more favorable for the 
celebrations~"it is too hot in May, in October we are sure to have more people 
joining us for the festivities." 
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These are only some examples ofwhat the Church has done in order to integrate 
more aspects ofChinese culture and to convey a Catholicism that can better reach the 
Chinese population. This process of localization has led to a less conservative 
approach to Chinese culture~people are allowed to keep several of their practices 
that are now conceived as part of their culture rather than manifestations of idolatry. 
However, the introduction ofthese changes is not only quite recent but also restricted 
to some parishes. A change in mentaUty usuaUy takes longer time than economic or 
political changes. Most ofthe Portuguese priests working in the parishes are old and 
faithfiil to their old convictions. The continuing renovation of the Church in Macao 
lies, according to some ofmy Catholic informants, in the progressive substitution of 
these priests by a younger generation of priests that were educated after the Second 
Vatican Council. 
, 
The idea of the Church as a quite conservative and "western" institution (in 
.1 
I contradiction to its claim of universality), is still very vivid in the minds of many 
Catholics interviewed, regardless of their ethnicity. One Chinese diocesan priest puts 
it this way: 
It so happens that the Catholic faith began in the West, so it reproduces in a certain way 
the westem culture. When the Church came to Macao, it forced the local people to adapt 
to westem culture and customs. People had to strip themselves of their own culture so 
that they could become Catholic. But it is not human to force the population to forget 
their cultural past and to adopt a completely new culture. You know how seriously 
Chinese people regard their own traditions; to force them to destroy their ancestors 
tablets was a brutal way of attempting to cut them from their past. But this is what 
happened until very recently and that is one of the reasons why the number of converts is 
not higher. I believe that Catholic faith does not have a specific form, it is universal, but 
we as human beings have different forms of expressing ourselves. So the Church has to 
adapt itself to each culture instead of trying to impose westem culture on us. Actually 
the implementation of this ideology was one of the major achievements of the Second 
Vatican Council. Li fact in the past there were some priests that already advocated this 
idea, especially the Jesuits. For example, Matteus Ricci, when he first came to China, he 
dressed himself as a Chinese, he leamed the Chinese language and culture. He accepted 
and integrated many of the Chinese customs. But afterwards there was the “rites crisis" 
and the conservative faction of the Church won. So the priests here in Macao were very 
strict, they made no concessions. Now this situation is finally starting to change. 
The fact that the Church in Macao remained quite conservative for such a long 
time was indeed mainly due to the outcome of the Chinese Rites controversy in the 
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eighteenth century. Jesuits had a leading role in the diocese and beUeved that the 
moral doctrine of Confucius did not conflict with Christian morality. Many ritual 
observances were regarded as being purely secular rather than having a reUgious 
significance. Based on this understanding, converts were allowed to pay respect to 
their ancestors, participate in fiineral rites and in Lunar New Year ceremonies. 
However, the Dominicans (mostly Spaniards) and some priests from other 
congregations, viewed the matter differently, and condemned the rites as acts ofpure 
idolatry. This dispute concerning the rites and other problems, such as the 
I appropriate translation for God in Chinese, were referred to Rome so that the Pope 
I 
would evaluate the situation and take a decision. The Pope proclaimed that those 
rites were acts of idolatry and therefore were condemned. “Neither the 
remonstrations of the representatives of the Portuguese Crown, nor the opposition of 
j the Emperor Kang-Hsi [Kangxi], deterred the Pope from reiterating his 
i 
S • 
I condemnation of the Chinese Rites, which he denounced more strongly than ever in 
1 
the Bull Ex illa die, published at Rome in March 1715, and at Canton and Peking in 
the following year" (Boxer 1948:17). 
The situation was fixrther aggravated by the persecution ofthe Jesuits initiated by 
Pombal in Portugal in 1759 and continued through the Papacy's formal dissolution of 
the Society ofJesus in 1773. The Jesuits, who until then had played a leading part in 
Portuguese missionary activity all over Asia, were replaced by other religious 
congregations that more obediently followed the position adopted by the Vatican. 
i 
The Church in Macao assumed a radical position condemning Chinese practices and 
j 
making no concessions. To become CathoUc, one had to stop paying tribute to his 
I 
1 ancestors and throw away the ancestors tablets, adopt a Christian name and many 
I 
aspects of Westem culture. It was only in the sixties that the Vatican changed its 
pobcy2. It was accepted that Chinese ceremonies were of civil rather than of a 
religious nature and most importantly the Church reviewed its positioning and 
emphasized the need to engage in a dialogue with the different cultures, as it has 
already been mentioned. 
It is interesting to note that at the same time that the Church hardened its 
position in the eighteenth century, the Chinese authorities were becoming more 
suspicious of the Church's activities and forbade the conversion of Chinese. In their 
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report on Macao to the toperial authorities during the period of Qianlong (more 
precisely between 1751 and 1789) (Zhao 1994:100), two Chinese magistrates noted 
that there was an increasing number of Chinese that did not follow the law 
converting to the foreigners' religion, adopting a foreign name, using the foreigners' 
language and customs, and therefore slowly becoming barbarians. They suggested 
that the law should be strongly enforced, that all those who did not comply with the 
I law should be apprehended, and that the "temple of the converts" should be 
I! 
destroyed and the idols and books returned to the foreigners (Gomes 1950:129). In 
this report, Chinese converts are portrayed as having betrayed their own culture 
( through the adoption of a foreign name and foreign customs and therefore as having 
crossed the boundary between the two communities; they had stopped being Chinese 
I and had become barbarians (ibid.: 127). 
Since the radical position of the Church prevailed until the seventies, Chinese 
i converts kept being regarded by the Chinese community as having betrayed their own 
culture and were therefore ostracized. Stories about persecution, being mocked or 
having aU their relations cut with their family are quite common. One Chinese 
Catholic priest clearly recalls being snubbed by his peers: "When I was studying in the 
seminary I used to go home every month, for eight hours, to visit my parents. 
Sometimes I would play with my brothers outside our house but the other kids made 
fun ofme, once I was even beaten” Another kind of story that I frequently heard can 
be illustrated with what an old Chinese lady, who had converted to Catholicism fifty-
six years ago, told me: 
I got married with a Portuguese policeman. It was he who introduced me to the Church; 
when I was living with my family, I used to go to the temple with them. But before I was 
married, I was baptized and I leamed about God, so I stopped praying to Kun Iam 
[Guan Yin] and to A Ma. My family got reaUy upset because during the Ching Mihng 
festival, I would not go to the temple with them. Besides they did not like my husband so 
they stopped seeing me. I reaUy suffered. My sister sometimes came to see me but 
without the knowledge of my parents. . . . Later, when my father was dying I went to see 
him, but until this day I have never spoken again with my brothers. 
I heard similar stories from other people, but all of them were women, which 
might be related to the fact that there is a higher percentage of women that convert 
than men, but I wiU retum to this issue later on. 
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Conversion and Ethnic Identity 
Patterns of Conversion 
After having conducted interviews with several Chinese Catholics I started 
noticing that the process of conversion of the older generation seemed quite different 
from the one described by people in their twenties and thirties. The accounts of 
elderly people were fiUed with traumatic experiences and conversion impUed a 
difficult and drastic decision. By conv^in@ they had in a certain way cut with the 
past and engaged in a new life. However, people in their twenties and thirties speak 
I 
I oftheir reUgious affiliation more as a private option that does not affect other spheres 
i 
oftheir Ufe and that does not compel them to my kind of segregation. Many referred 
the fact that other members of their family kept going to the temples and that 
sometimes they would join them, especially when it was for the celebration of some 
I 
festivals or during the Chinese New Year. The fact that they are CathoKc does not 
I interfere with their daily Ufe and does not have major implications, it is merely the 
I result of a personal conviction and option. 
I 
I As akeady mentioned, the Church reform started in the seventies and a process 
of bcalization has since then been taking place. This, together with other factors, has 
led to a change in the process and impact of conversion. Before, in order to convert, 
a Chinese person had to adopt a "Christian name" and in some cases even a 
sumame/ This person was then registered for the first time in the parish~~^ the rest of 
the Chinese population was not registered. Some of the converts (mainly rich 
Chinese) even became mturalized Portuguese. Until the first decades of this century 
many of the people that converted dressed like westerners and wore a Western hair 
style. Conversion implied the adoption of a new identity; converts were forced to 
give up their Chineseness in exchange for a new identity that involved the 
renunciation of tnuch of what other Chinese regarded as fundamental for their ethnic 
and cultural identity, bi general, they were forced to display an assimilative attitude 
towards the values and the Ufe-styles of the Portuguese community. Once they had 
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done that, they had crossed the ethnic boundary and were no longer regarded by the 
Chinese population as belonging to their community. On the contrary, they ww*e 
ostracized and regarded as having betrayed their owti cultur^ heritage and people. 
Although religion was instrumental, it is important to stress that from the 
Chinese perspective it was not conversion per se that compelled to the change of 
ethnic identity. As I discussed earlier, Chinese do not have an exclusivist approach to 
reHgion. It was then the implications of conversion, namely the abandoning of 
cultural pattems that prompted converts to be perceived as having crossed the ethnic 
boundary. 
hi this context there were, broadfy speaking, two pattems of conversion. First 
we had the so>caUed rice-bowl converts. Social welfare activities were nuunly in the 
j hands of the Church. Immigrants from Mainland China that usua% arrived in the 
I territory without any kind of resources often depended on the support provided by 
these institutions. The diocese and congregations offered social resources and 
services to the poor Chinese, who in order to repay, had to attend church services. 
Many of them converted since it was conunon that, in order to receive economic 
support, one had to be baptized, ln most cases this was co^cive m the sense that if 
the person did not agree to convert, he or she was not eligible for institutional 
I 
support. For example, hospitals, elderly centers and other institutions nm by the 
diocese would not admit them unless they agreed to be baptized. This poUcy has 
I stopped being applied in Macao's Catholic institutions but still prevails in most 
f 
i Protestant institutions in Hong Kong. According to several informants who worked 
j for congregations in Hong Kong but were later transferred to Macao, Protestant 
I 
institutions are quite strict, only accepting people that agree to be baptized while 
[ 
Catholic institutions accept everyone regardless of religious affiliation, bi certain 
i 
ai^ >ects though. Catholic institutions in Macao are more conservative; for example, 
I 
I thdr ethnocentric definition of&nily makes it impossible for someone with relatives 
to be accepted in a hospice, while in Hong Kong the household is defined as “a group 
of people that eat rice together." Thus, in Hoi^ Kong, if a person is not being fed by 
relatives’ he/she will be accepted by the institution (ifhe/she converts). 
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Until the seventies, it was v«y conrnK>n that in ord^ to have access to the rice 
distributed weekly by the Church, poor Chinese fanriUes had one of thdr m&aA>ers 
convert, btformants usuaUy referred to this practice as "sacrificing the grandmother 
to Christianity ' "Grandma was the one who had to go and get the rice so she was 
the one who had to tisten to the doctrine. First ^ e would Mm to the doctrine then 
she would get the rice to brmg home" This reveak that conversion was a strategy to 
have access to rescHirces. From the po"spective of the "grandmas," conversion did 
not reaUy take pkce. They did not embrace the new religion. Tbey simply complied 
to what was required, namely accepting to be baptized, in order to guarantee 
f econotmc support to their households, hi fact, old women were the privileged 
‘Victims"; by converting th^ insured that the fmnily periodicaUy recdved a certain 
portion of rice mi they did not jeopardize the continuity of reUgious practices such 
ancestor worship, and ultimatdy the patrilineal system. Jf there w ^ no dderiy 
women in the family, th^ a young woman would be chosea I interviewed fifteen 
i' 
persons that fit in this pattern, they were all femak md over fifty years old. 
Furthermore when I questioned members of the congr^ations on this subject, they 
were unanimous in sa3ang that most of the poor converts were female. 
According to my observations, I would argue that women are more prone to 
convert than men. The great majority of the Chinese CathoKcs interviewed were 
women, because of the simple fkct that whenever I went to a church or CathoUc 
center, the number of Catholic women present was a!ways significantfy higher than 
the number of men. Furthermore, in aU the activities that I have attended in one 
Chinese parish, the majority of people involved were women of aU ages and young 
children. On one occasion, on October 23 the priest of this parish organized a speciai 
celebration; a show was put on by the parishioners in the auditorium ofthe church. In 
total, counting both the people that participated in the show and those who attended, 
there were 212 persons, ofwhich only 42 were male (representing 20 percent of the 
total). 
This ^ gnificant gender difference is not due to a single factor. First, this might be 
Unked with the traditional pattern of greater religiosity among Chinese women than 
aflKHig Chinese n^n. M I wiU discuss in the next chapter dedicated to Chinese 






m0ced wedtogs m Macao tmd to occur between a Chinese woman and a Portuguese 
{or Macai^e) man, which results, in many cases, in the conversion of the woman. 
Third, women t^d to resort to social wetfare more often than men, being therefore 
nK>re exposed to contacts with retigious peopte and their doctrines. Fourth, and 
maybe foremost, Chinese culture with its emphasis on the patriUneal system and on 
practices ofancestor worsMp makes it harder for meo to convert. Whfle a woman's 
conversion, or rather, as argued earBer, the abandoning of cultural patterns 
concomitant to conversion, is generaUy regarded as a minor problem, a man's 
"conversaon" is considered to jeopardize the continuity of the family and, th^efore, a 
chaSenge to the patriUneal ideology. 
The combination of all these aspects explains, in my opinion, the higher 
percentage ofwomen that convert. However, the localization of the Church and tte 
accq>tance of some practices, such as ancestor worship, has now opened a way for 
more men to convert. They can keep thdr obUgations to their ancei^ors while 
^multaneou^y embracing the Cathofic reUgion. 
A second type of converts consists of rich Chinese. The advantages provided by 
Christianity in their cases was not primarily economic. Convats had access to a 
wider range of opportunities for ascension into positions of authority and prestige. 
Becoming Christian allowed them to assimilate with the Macanese comnuinity and 
gave th«n access to important social networks. It could also provide an important 
means ofdeveloping commercial relations. As Pina Cabral and L0uren90 note m thdr 
study ofthe Macmiese community, it was always possible for a Chinese convert to be 
compieteiy integrated into the Macanese community as iong as he had some westem 
education and was a prestigious person~~the more prestigious the better protected he 
was from possible acts of discritnination (1993b:132). Conversion, then, was the 
result of a strategy to achieve social mobiUty. There were other possible strat^es 
like, for example, matrimonial strategies. However, matrimomal strategies wa*e not 
as attractive since rich Chinese tended to consider mter-ethnic marriages as tessening 
prestige» a fact that m i ^ have led them to select religion and conversion as the 
preferential strategy ofintegration into the Macanese community. 
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This pattern ofconvemon led to the adoption ofati etteric identity distinct from 
the one attained by the “rice-bowr converts. AlAough conversion per implied the 
adoption of a new identity since one had to abdiatfe from one's cultural pattms, this 
did not mean that those became Christiam w^e automaticaUy integrated into the 
Macanese community. Oriy rich Chinese had that privHege. As a matter offact, "rice-
bowF' converts constituted a specific community of their own, thcy were in between, 
they had lesh the Chinese community and were not assimilated by the Macanese 
community, ln a certain sense they were not Chinese because they had converted but 
at tte same time they tacked the other assets that would have allowed them to merge 
into the Macanese community. This unique community was described by Reverend 
Cari Smith as "Chinese, yet Christian, CathoHc, yet not Macanese" (Smith 1995:367). 
This community had hs "Hminal" situation reinforced by the fect that it became in a 
certain sense a dosed community which, in the beginning, was even geographic^y 
situated "in4>etween." hi Macao's territory there was a waB ddimitrng the dty where 
the Portuguese Uved, and where the Chinese could go to work but could not reside. 
Outside this wall was the area designated for the Chinese. In 1808, a settlement of 
Chinese CathoUc refugees was estabHshed close to the waUs of the Portuguese city. 
Although many ofthem left due to the pressure of th^ Chinese imperial authorities, 
this area later became the Sdo Lazcwo parish, the Chinese parish. Since, until the 
transformations ofthe seventies, ail Chinese Catholics were confined to this parish, 
we can see a distinct poUcy of segregation. By not being allowed to belong to other 
parishes, they were being refused the ri^t to integrate the CathoUc community as a 
whole. This discrinunative attitude towards Chinese Catholics is reflected by the 
derogatory term still currently used—they are frequently referred to as “Cris0os 
mvosT (new Christiam). 
A prominefit feature of the Chinese Catholics from Sdo Ldzaro was that they 
retained their Chinese sumames while the other Chinese that converted adopted a 
Portuguese sumame and became integrated in the Macanese community. Although 
conversion necessarily imptied the adoption of a new identity, it is also true that 
different pattems of conversion led to the adoption of distinct identhies. One person 
that was introduced to me as Macanese later confirmed that both his parents were 
Chinese, but stressed the fact that they were Catholic m i that he himself was not 
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ody CathoUc but had also been to a Catholic school and had married a Macanese 
woman. Other Chinese Cathotics interviewed, although referring to themselves as 
Chinese constantly emphasized their difierences from non-Cathofic Chinese. This 
was partioiiarly &equent Wen the persons interviewed were over fifty years old. 
The fect that there were different levds of integratioft-^me managed to be 
absortjed by the Macanese community while others, although giving up the social 
markers of Chinese culture, were never completely integrated and formed a 
community of their own~~reveals that the offidal rhetoric that emphasized the 
distinction between Cristas e Chins served distinct purposes. First, it legitimized the 
I • . , . j government's ruHng position; second, it enabled the govemnwnt to have jurisdiction 
j over the Chme$e converts, since by converting they had crossed the ethnic boundary 
1 and were therefore no !onger under the jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities. The 
i poHtical rh^oric created the iUusion that those who converted would be regarded 
j (and treated) as one of "them" ln reality, they became subjects of the Portuguese 
s 
! authorities but were never con^>letely assimilated. This demonstrates how reUgion 
;i 
piayed an instrumental role in the exclusion of Chinese converts from the Chinese 
commumty but conversion per se was not sufficient to make them Macanese; oth^ 
j assets were also required 
Wf^ and How Comersion Patterns have Changed 
Macao has seen major changes from the late sixties onward. There has been a 
progressive shift in the configuration of the political and economic powers, an 
"indigenization" o i ^ e Church, and a more tolersmt approach of the congregations, 
Jn what concems the congregations it is important to underBne the fact that people 
working for the congregations were unanimous in stating that they helped anyone 
regardless of their reUgious affiliation and that, in most cases, they accepted 
behaviors that can be described as being religiously syncretic. A perfect example of 
this kind ofapproach can be ^ven by quoting m American MaryknoU sister that is in 
dmgQ of a cent^ for the dderiy in the Nossa Senhora de Fdtima district. 
We wlc<»ne anyone, we do not discriminate anybocfy. . . . We are here to serve these 
people.... Outside we bave tfae statue oiNossa Senhora de F<itima. Sometimes pararts 
come here with their children and tfeey a^ who is that? I say “Sirtg mou, the Holy 
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MofliCT ” asd Aey reply “ mou Kiw fem?" Wett, I say more or tess Same of 
tihe M Chinese converts tec have a v©ry rigid approach to reUgkm, much ofit is pre-
Vatican H, tiie strict God, the judgm^tal (k>d, . . maybe because in the oW times diey 
had to ^ve up ev^yto^ to beccmie Christian. They had to bum Aeir ancesfewr tabkts 
and so on. So sometimes they have a sort of “I am better thaa you" attitude, a 
si^rkmty cm l^cK, There is a kA of "if you have not bem b r^tized you cannot be 
saved." Sometimes there are even som bostiMties betwe i^ those vs^ o are hs^ ptized and 
^ s e who are not or Aose that aWbou^ being baptized stiU ke^ son» of thdr Chinese 
practices. We try to fight against these attitudes and to convey a different message... 
As I teU my own fdks, vihea they wiU go up to Heavai they will find the Blessed 
Mother Kun Iam, and Tin Hauh {Tianhou) aii waiting for them to tnake tbe fourtfa in 
mahj<H^ . Asd my mm>Catbolics think it is great, whik some of my CatMcs are 
scandalized. I think it is reaUy good to have Kun Iam, the Bkssed Motfaer and Tin Hauh 
playing mahj<mg,just waiting for the fourtii 1^. It is abo interesting to see the number 
ofmy non^hristians who go over and say a prayer for the Blessed Mother. Sometimes 
they go Aere in the moniing and even bring some flowers to her because tiiey tiank that 
she wiU hks it. 
This Maryknoti s^er conveys with humor what seems to be the general attitude 
of people workifl^ in the congregations. This more tolerant approach together wkh 
the otto factors ahready refored has prompted patterns of convo-sion different from 
those that were common before the seventies. The pattOTi of the "rice-bovd" convert 
prevaik but has now diff^ent impUcations. To convert does not mply anymore the 
adoption of a new id^tity. A sigi^cant perc^itage of the people converting are 
those that are in contact with, or depend on, c^tain reUgious institutions that are 
engaged in social wdfare activities. However, today people do not have to be 
baptized in order to have access to these services. Furthermore, if they do convert 
they are not forced to abandon most of their form^ practices. In fact, several ofthem 
keep those practices. During interviews, converts would at first, because they were 
speaking with a Westerner and they tend to equal Westerner with CathoUc, deny 
engaging m Chinese reUgious practices. As the time passed, some would confess that 
m fact sometimes th^ went with family members to the temples. One old lady ofthe 
elderly center told me once when we were alone that she thought that: 
aU gods can hdp us ifwe are good and sincere in our prayers birt sometimes some gods 
vwwk better for s<Hne people than Ihcy <k> for others. I mysetfhave prayed to Kun fam 
siBce I was a little giri and now that I am CathoUc and pray to Fdtima^ I have not 
stopped saying my prayers to Kun lam. I do this and I do not think it is wrong but I do 




crkicize The sister knows and ^ tfeiriks that tjtee is no prMem so I keep oa ckwf^  
it. LHce this I feel better with myself. 
Those who are presently more critical ofthis kind of attitude are not, as it might 
be expe(^ed, the priests, ^sters and misaonaries (although t l^e are a few 
exceptions), but some of the old Chinese converts that advocate a strict religious 
orthodoxy. They display a totd intolerance towards the persons that have a more 
syncretic approach to reiijpon, that eitha* integrate elements of Chinese culture in 
thdr reUgious practices or maintain both reHgk>us practices. One explanation for thdir 
orthodoxy giv^ by some members of the Church (Chinese and non-Chinese) was 
that, in most cases, this is the resarft of a traumatic process of conversion. Most of 
these people were ostracized by their &mily and community and had their 
connections with them cut. Th^efore, they tend to regard those who did not go 
under the same process, and who have kspt their links, as bemg, in a cmain sense, 
less good Catholics than themselves. 
The Church in Macao, besides being engaged in sodal welfare activities, has also 
played a key role m the education field. In the past, the majority of schools were run 
by the different congregations and presently 50 percent of t h ^ are still in the hands 
ofthe Church. At this level, the priority of the Church is to enhwice the standard of 
education rather than to "spread the word of God" but sclK>oIs have, nevertl^ess, 
provided a medium for conversion. They offer quite a good education in different 
languages; soti^ of the schools even lmve a Chinese, a Portuguese, and an EngHsh 
section. Furthermore, of these schools have connections abroad which 
^ciUtates obtaining schoUirships to conduct undergraduate and ^duate studies in 
other countries. It is important not to forget that the University of Macao is quite 
recent, provides a iimhed choice of courses, and has a Umited quota for students. 
Prestigious universities in Portugal, the United States, Enghnd, or AustraKa, and 
fonnaiy in Taiwan^ are u$ually preferred. At the same time the Church provides 
afterschooi programs that assist children with thdr homework and have a high degree 
of attendance since parents umiaUy have no spare time to go over the huge load of 
home work with their children and prefer that they rmain in the schools or in the 
institutions that provide these services rath^ than having them staying at home alone. 
The Church also offers other programs such as Youth Fellowship, Sunday schoob 
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and Bible study. Ttese pr(^rams reinf<^ce important academic amJ professional 
s j 
skills. 
Althmi^ it is not reqiured to be a Christian to €«roflmthese schools or to take 
part in most ofthe programs, in some cases (for example to obtain scholarships), it 
can prove to be heH)fiil. Very HttIe emphasis is put in evangeOaation in these schools 
but it is important not to forget that teachers phy an important role in the 
sodaHzation process and quite often constitute role models. Most of the your^ 
Catholics I have interviewed, the majority being uruversity students, had converted 
because they had attended Catholic schools and one of their teaches with whom they 
had a special relationship had introduced them to Cathoticism. hi one case a student 
ofa CathoBc school had not only conv^ed but also initiated her grandmothca* bmg 
both baptized ^ultaneousiy. 
The institutional support provided by the Church offers Chinese CathoUcs an 
kqx>rtaBt educational altorotive, one ttet appears to confer t l ^ a certain 
educational advantage over the children who attend schools that are not mn by ti^ 
Church.^  Some %nities that plan to emigrate or that wish that their sons and 
daughters furth^ a* thdr education abroad tend to enroU their children in tte schools 
run by the Church. Some of these students eventually end up beii^ baptized, 
although they represent a smaM percentage of the total number of students enroUed in 
these institutions. 
Nowadays, as before, conversion grants an opportunity for upward social 
md)iKty. The kind of conversion that we witness now thou^ does not imply 
anymore the adoption of a new ethnic identity. Of course, changes in reUgious 
affiUation are bound to lead to a redefinition of the se^ to a new personal identity. 
Bul, as long as they are conceived as the result of a mere personal qpdon that does 
not conflict with ongoing cultural practices, when converts are allowed to r^ain thdr 
cultural backgrmmd and, a certain way, to project it into those practices then it 
does not iead to the adoption ofa new ethnic identity. To adopt a new ethnic identity 
as a result ofconversion 'm^es that otie person, by converting, adopts new cultural 
patterns and dismisses the former ones. Furthermore, it impUes that this is perceived, 
not only by him/hersdf but most importantly, by the others, as resulting in the 
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crossing of an ethnic boundary. This was, until quite recently, certainly the case in 
Macao, where, as one of my Catholic informants stated, "one had to become 
Portuguese before one became Catholic"~"implying that one had to adopt some 
Portuguese cultural practices before one was regarded as a CathoUc. 
Catholic Religion and the different Ethnic Groups 
:i i • 
5 
I hi Macao's multiethnic cont^d:, the way in which Catholic religion relates to and 
is used by each ethnic group differs. Portugal, as it is well known, is a Catholic 
country, and the majority of its population is constituted by either practicing or 
nominal Christians. However, since most of the other Southern European countries 
such as Spain and Italy are also Catholic countries, reHgion does not play a major role 
in terms ofethnic identity. For example, when Portuguese people want to emphasize 
their specific identity as being distinct from the Spanish, they have to rely on other 
cultural aspects to assert their own ethnic identity. However, the same Portuguese 
that in Portugal do not draw upon religion as a major aspect oftheir ethnic identity, 
are likely to do so in Asia. This demonstrates how flexible and contextual ethnic 
identities are. One ethnic group does not systematically draw upon the same cultural 
features to differentiate itselffrom others. On the contrary, it is in each contact with 
another ethnic group that it evaluates which are the distinct features that it can draw 
upon to differentiate itself 
When the Portuguese first arrived in China, the population practiced Chinese 
popular reUgion and there was, in genera^ no knowledge about CathoUcism. As a 
matter offact, one of the main reasons that led the Portuguese to come to China and 
to establish themselves in Macao was the desire to evangeUze the Chinese population. 
The missionary project existed from the beginning of the estabUshment of the 
territory and due to the Padroado, the government played a major role in the 
development and implementation of this project. Simultaneously, religion provided 
not only the legitimization of their political power but also the basic criterion for 
ethnic differentiation. After aU, as was stated in official documents, they were the 
"Christians" while the others were the "Chinese." This situation remmned relatively 
unchanged for more than four hundred years. It was only in the last two to three 
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decades that things have started to change, that Macao has seen a progressive 
secularization of the government that was reinforced by the poUtical changes 
associated with the negotiations for the transfer of sovereignty in 1999. Although the 
majority of the Portuguese population is stiU CathoUc, religion has stopped being 
deployed as a major asset ofthe Portuguese ethnic identity. This is mainly due to two 
different things. First, the government has been trying to dissociate itself from the 
Church. Second, the majority ofthe CathoUc population is now Chinese rather than 
Portuguese or Macanese (more specifically, two thirds of the twenty five thousand 
CathoUcs in Macao are Chinese) (Leal 1994:84). 
Since Portugal is a CathoUc country, it is commonly assumed that a Portuguese 
person is Catholic this being something impUcit and that is not necessary to reassert 
continuously. For the Macanese, however, CathoHcism, together with Portuguese 
language and culture, and Eurasian ancestry {mestigagem), constituted the most 
important criteria ofethnic identity. It had, therefore, to be systematicaUy reiterated. 
The emphasis put by Macanese on their religious practices has led them to project an 
image ofthemselves as rather orthodox. According to one priest: 
The Macanese are more CathoUc than the Pope, they are bom CathoUc. They even think 
that they do not have to leam more about the Bible and so many of them do not enroU 
their children in catechism classes. For them what is reaUy important is to have their 
children baptized, to go to the church on Sunday, and to have a CathoUc wedding. They 
seem to be more worried with foUowing the rales in a strict way rather than with 
understanding the meaning behind them. 
The relevance ofreUgion, CathoUcism, relied not only in the fact that it created a 
common ground with the Portuguese community, but also in the fact that it allowed a 
continuous integration ofnew members into the Macanese community. ReUgion is by 
far the most flexible of the criteria that define Macanese ethnic identity. Conversion 
was, for the Chinese, a viable means of integrating the Macanese community. If the 
person that converted possessed other resources, such as prestige, wealth, and^ or a 
certain familiarity with the Portuguese culture and language, this person would be 
regarded as a member of the Macanese community. However, even if this did not 
happen because that person did not hold those assets, the next generation, being 
brought up in Catholic schools and more exposed to a western environment, might 
then become fuU members of the Macanese community. 
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Inter-ethnic marriage was another way of absorbing extemal elements into the 
Macanese community. These marriages were asymmetrical in the sense that they 
usually entailed a wedding between a Macanese man and a Chinese woman/ the 
reverse being quite unusual. Chinese women were generaUy baptized before the 
wedding and in most cases had their relationship with their family, and Chinese 
society in general, severed. The children of the couple were raised within the 
Macanese community rather than within the Chinese one. Among the fifteen old 
Chinese CathoUc ladies that I have interviewed, there were four such cases. 
According to Pina Cabral and Nelson L0uren90, there have been major changes 
in the relationship between the different criteria that define Macanese ethnic identity. 
This has been taking place since the seventies due to a readjustment of ethnic 
positions resulting from a change in the political forces. This shift has consisted 
basically in the abandoning ofexclusivist attitudes towards the Chinese concomitantly 
with a diminishing identification with the Portuguese culture. The authors beUeve that 
Macmiese ethnic identity now relies on an increasing valorization of the resources of 
intercultural communication rather than in the promotion of a certain 
"Portugueseness" (1993b:238-39). This implied a radical change in the role played 
by religion. The importance of CathoUcism has diminished, though it has not 
disappeared. The majority of the Macanese are still CathoHc but some now openly 
engage in Chinese reUgious activities. Catholicism has lost the reUgious exclusiveness 
it tried to enforce. Some Macanese persons "confessed" that although they were 
Catholic they went to the temples in certain festivals and that they frequently 
consulted fengshui experts. 
Another aspect that reveals the diminishing significance of Catholicism is the 
change of matrimonial practices. Until the seventies it was common for a Chinese 
bride to be baptized before she got married with a Macanese. However, presently this 
practice has declined and as a result there is an increasing number of "inter-faith" 
weddings. From 1987 to 1990, "inter-faith" weddings between Chinese and 
Macanese constituted 66.67 percent of the total of weddings between the two ethnic 
groups (Pina Cabral and L0uren90 1993b:134). This change in matrimonial practices 
is actuaUy interpreted by Pina Cabral and L0uren90 as a new trend for the Macanese 
that want to be integrated in the Chinese middle class. 
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It seems that there is a tendency to de-emphasize aspects such as Catholicism 
and Portuguese language and culture, that used to play a major role in the 
construction of the Macanese ethnic identity. Simultaneously, the Hnks with the 
Chinese population are being reinforced. This change of strategy is a result of the 
poUtical situation and ofthe increasing proximity of 1999. It is important to note that 
this "survival" strategy is not uniformly adopted. According to my interviews, the 
Macanese that plan to remain in the territory after 1999 are more prone to do so than 
those who are already planning to join one of the "Macanese Diaspora Communities 
in North America, AustraHa or Portugal. Those that wiU leave seem to remain 
orthodox in their practices and less likely to integrate new practices and values. One 
Macanese woman that has akeady bought a house in Portugal and that plans to move 
there in the near future said to me that both her sons were in Catholic schools and 
that she did not aUow them to speak Chinese at home though they are more fluent in 
this language. However, another Macanese woman that does not have economic 
resources to emigrate decided to attend courses in oral Mandarin and has enroUed her 
children in Chinese courses so that they do not feel ashamed, like her, of not being 
able to write in Chinese. 
Although my research did not have as its main object the Macanese community 
and this issue deserves forther research, it seems probable to me that if the present 
trend continues~~in the sense of the Macanese in Macao opening to the Chinese 
community although emphasizing their intercultural background, while the Macanese 
of the Diaspora keep emphasizing their links with Portuguese culture and language 
and their Catholicism—we wiU see a progressive schism within the Macanese 
community. This would not be surprising since the construction of ethnic identities is 
intimately connected with the context within which they are generated. With the loss 
ofthe poUtical dominance of the Portuguese and with the drastic diminishing of the 
Portuguese population in the territory after 1999, it becomes more "profitable" to 
emphasize one's "Chineseness" rather than one's "Portugueseness." This change of 
emphasis being possible for the Macanese due to the flexible bases on which their 
identity lie. 
The political changes of the last two decades and the major transformation 
constituted by the transfer of sovereignty in 1999 are bound to affect not only 
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Macanese ethnic identity but also to lead to a redefinition of Chinese ethnic identity. 
Chinese constitute the majority of the population and the transformation of the 
poHtical situation wiU definitely afFect them and the way in which they perceive 
themselves as an ethic group. 
This imminent poUtical change will afFect the role religion played in the 
drawing of ethnic boundaries. In what concems CathoUcism, as was extensively 
discussed before, religion affected the construction of Chinese ethnic identity by 
compelling those who converted to adopt a new ethnic identity, hi the last two 
decades, changes in the political and economic environment, a decreasing 
governmental support of the Church and a progressive localization of the Church 
have led to a decrease, if not complete eradication, of the importance of religious 
affiUation to determine ethnic identity. In my view, only those who became CathoUc 
before the seventies, and experienced a traumatic conversion process having severed 
their ties with non-CathoUc members of the Chinese community, will continue to 
perceive themselves as possessing a distinct ethmc identity. 
Presently, conversion has started to be sociaUy regarded as the result of an 
individual option that does not entail the loss of one's own ethnic identity. Chinese 
people who converted recently maintain, to a high or low degree, their previous 
cultural practices. They maintain their relations with the rest of the Chinese 
conununity. It is even quite common to find families that have different religious 
affiUation without that causing any kind of distress in the family. Converts now 
maintain their cultural practices, Catholicism has stopped being drawn upon by both 
government and the Church as the criterion that defines ethnic affiUation. 
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PART 2 
CfflNESE POPULAR RELIGION 
4 
Chinese Popular Religion and the Political Power 
In the former part I have discussed the role of the CathoUc Church in Macao, 
analyzed the nature ofits relationship with the colonial government and demonstrated 
the way in which religious affiUation can be used in the construction of ethnic 
identity. However, keeping in mind that 95 percent of the population is Chinese, a 
clear picture ofthe intricacies ofthe relationship between reUgion and power and the 
way in which reUgion can constitute a major asset of ethnic identity can only be 
obtained by also looking at Chinese popular religion. This part will thus provide the 
complement of the former part. 
As argued earlier, I seek to combine the anthropological approach with an 
historical perspective in this study of religion. I will, therefore, attempt to 
demonstrate how the role of Chinese reUgion has changed during the period of 
Portuguese rule. I will then focus on public practices, more precisely on temple 
management and temple activities since temples constitute some of the most 
prominent institutions of Chinese religion. I will also draw a profile of the 
worshippers based on the data provided by a survey conducted in one temple. By 
looking at how the role played by temples has evolved and adapted to new 
circumstances and how they respond to the changing needs of the Chinese 
population, we can better perceive the role played by Chinese religion. But I will first 
analyze the nature of the relationship between Chinese popular reUgion and the 
political power. 
Chinese PopularReligion and the Colonial Government 
Since, as mentioned earlier, the territory remained under double sovereignty until 
the middle ofthe nineteenth century, the Portuguese had jurisdiction exclusively over 
the Christian population while the non-Christian Chinese were under the authority of 
a Chinese magistrate. It was therefore out of the reahn of the Portuguese authority to 
regulate Chinese religious activities. This, though, did not mean that there were no 
scattered attempts to interfere with those practices and to Hmit the construction of 
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new temples and expansion of existing ones. As a matter of fact, the governor and 
the Senate were systematically under the pressure of the Catholic Church to control 
and eradicate those practices but they had their hands tied due to the power exercised 
by the Chinese magistrates. The ambiguous political situation led to numerous but 
unrewarding rows between the Portuguese and the Chinese authorities. There are, in 
the historical archives ofMacao, several official letters dating from the middle ofthe 
I eighteenth century documenting these disputes, for example letters from the 
i 
Commissioner ofthe Holy Office (Inquisition) and the bishop to the Senate urging 
the prohibition ofrites and ceremonies of the "pagans" as weU as the construction of 
temples.i There is also a letter from the governor to the Senate regarding the request 
for a license to build a mat shed (barraca) for a procession that the Chinese planned 
to hold. He argued that the Procurador had advised him that it would not be possible 
to stop the erection ofthe mat shed since the Chinese had ab-eady decided to do it. 
But he reminded the Senate that these things had to be controlled since it is a 
common practice ofthe Chinese to start building smaU things and then progressively 
enlarge them (Macao 1971:127-28). This letter shows that the Portuguese 
authorities were conscious of their limited capacity of interference in the Chinese 
activities. This was in fact stated in one of the letters from the Senate to the 
Commissioner ofthe Holy Office dated July 1758. It said that it had been agreed by 
the bishop, the governor and the members of the Senate to oppose, as much as 
possible and without violence, all the religious activities of the Chinese {pagodices de 
Chinas). However no new measures should be taken without the determination ofthe 
"Holy Tribunal" S Tribuncd) and the King since, as it was well known, the 
Portuguese had little or no power over the Chinese (Macao 1965:190). As a matter 
of fact, whenever the Portuguese attempted to implement some coercive measures, 
they were forced to retract their position by the Chinese authorities. 
tfthe ambiguous political situation that prevailed during the first centuries ofthe 
Portuguese presence in the territory explains the lack of effective control and 
regulation of the Chinese reUgious activities, one would expect that with the 
consolidation of the colonial power in the middle of the nineteenth century the 
situation would have changed. That certainly was the case in Taiwan during the 
Japanese occupation~^especially in the late thirties when assimilationist poUcies were 
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implemented (Feuchtwang 1974). In Hong Kong as weU, the British government 
started controlling Chinese religious activities a few decades after the establishment 
of the colony through the regulation of temples. In 1928, the Hong Kong 
Government Chinese Temples Ordinance was passed requiring all temples to register 
with the government and to submit an accounting report of their ownership, 
management, property, revenues, and the use of these revenues. Furthermore, a 
Chinese Temples Committee^ was created, whose function was (and stiU is), among 
others, to control temples' activities. This Committee has the power to expropriate 
those temples which it considers are operating exclusively for private profit (see 
Stevens 1980; Sinn 1989; Lang and Ragvald 1993). 
Jn Macao, the government never created a similar regulation and there has never 
been an institution similar to the Hong Kong's Chinese Temples Committee. Colonial 
officers, ignorant of Chinese customs, practices and language, usually adopted a 
laissez-faire policy. They preferred to leave the Chinese to their own devices rather 
than to interfere as long as public order and their own interests were not threatened. 
Without any government supervision, the power of the temples' lay committees grew 
and they became richer. In the twenties some of these committees decided to create 
benevolent associations and have them registered. That, among others, was the case 
ofthe Ma Kok Miu {Mage Miao) and the Kun Iam Ku Miu associations (see Boletim 
Oficial dated respectively, 17 July 1926 and 22 September 1928~~documents 
reproduced in appendices 8 and 9). One possible explanation for this sudden urge of 
the lay committees of the temples to register as benevolent associations may be the 
fact that echoes of the ongoing situation in Hong Kong had reached Macao and they 
were fearful that the government would adopt similar measures. 
In what concerns the funds and the way temples are managed, the government 
did not have, and does not have, any kind of control or even knowledge. As the 
leader of one temple argued: 
We manage the temple the way we want, it is the temple committee that decides what to 
do. The government does not control anything, they do not know about our investments 
or the way we nm the temple, this is how it has been and how it should remain. . . . We 
never submit reports of our activities or our accounts and we never pay taxes. Well, Ma 
Kok Miu pays land tax because the bnd belongs to the government, but that is the only 
case that I know. 
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Furthermore, the government has no idea of the real estate that each temple 
possesses. As is true for the Catholic Church in Macao, many of the properties 
donated to or acquired by, the temples are stiU not registered and, consequently, only 
I 
! the people that run the temples know the extent of their possessions. This situation 
j has generated some controversies. In one of my interviews with the monk that is 
running the Kun Iam Tong, he said that several of the properties of the temple are 
I rented out^  and because they are not registered they have faced some problems in the 
past. For example, when the person that was paying the rent to the temple died, the 
inheritors sometimes refused to keep the contract and claimed the property for 
themselves. Since there was no legal document and some of the tenants had been 
paying the rent for several generations it was difficult to prove that the property 
belonged to the temple. 
The fact that most properties are not registered has also led to some disputes 
between the temples committees and the government. One example is the case 
described in a Chinese language newspaper {Ou Mun Iaht Bou! Aomen Ribao, 17 
July 1992). According to an article published in this newspaper, the leader of the 
Taipa Kun Iam temple complained that the Melancia Government (Mekncia was 
Macao's governor between 1987 and 1991) had sold some land belonging to the 
temple to a developer that planned to build a factory. According to the leader of the 
temple, that piece of land had been sold by a local peasant to the temple more than 
thirty years earlier. Since, as it was highly common in those days, there was no 
official document for this transaction, the temple committee could not legally claim 
possession of the land. In an attempt to have the matter settled the leader of the 
temple invited the new governor and some of the secretaries for a vegetarian lunch. 
He used this circumstance to voice his feelings~he complained about the previous 
governor's action, emphasized that the temple was a tourist site that would be 
destroyed if a factory was built on that site. The Secretary for PubUc Works, 
Machado, replied that now it was almost impossible to solve the problem but that he 
would look into this case, hi this newspaper article, it is also stated that since the 
present leader got in charge of the temple in 1953 he managed to buy, with the 
money coming from donations, six thousand square meters of land. This is quite a 
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substantial extent of land considering that it is a smaU temple and that few 
worshippers go there. 
^ . 
The relationship between the temples and the government could be considered 
one sided in the sense that although no taxes are paid to the government and no 
^ control is exercised over the revenues of the temples, the committees can apply for 
governmental economic support. The majority of temples in Macao are considered 
historical monuments and as such, they are entitled to receive financial support. The 
I 
Cultural Institute ofMacao {Instituto Cultural deMacau) is the institution supported 
by the government that is responsible for the preservation of the historical buildings 
ofthe territory. The allocation of a subsidy for maintenance work depends on several 
I 
criteria and are determined by this institute. According to the architect that is 
responsible for these projects in the Institute, the restoration of temples raises several 
problems due to the fact that there is no legislation compeUing owners to the 
preservation and maintenance of the buildings. Consequently, even if the funds are 
available they cannot proceed with the restoration works if the owners object to 
them. Each time that it is decided to restore a particular temple, the Institute has to 
have negotiations with the committee of that tempte and sometimes disagreements 
occur. This has led, in extreme cases, to the impossibility of conducting the 
restoration of the temple. 
One example of a complicated negotiation was the one the bistitute had with the 
leader ofthe Kun Iam Temple. At first he refiised to allow the works. When he finally 
agreed, he demanded that the fixnds be aUocated to him and that he then would be 
responsible for the works. However, this is against the policy of the Institute which 
has its own construction company and conducts the work itself under close 
supervision. After several meetings the leader of the Kun Iam Tong finally allowed 
the restoration work to take place. When I first interviewed the leader of the temple I 
was not aware of this and I asked him whether the temple had received any kind of 
economic support from any governmental or cultural organization and he replied that 
it did not. On our second meeting I showed him the list of temples that had been 
restored by the Cultural Institute of Macao since 1992, where the amount of money 
spent in the works is listed. According to this list, in 1992, MOP$807,800 were spent 
on work in the Kun Iam Temple. He finally admitted that some work was done but 
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that he knew little about it since nothing had been discussed with him. He fiirther 
I argued that: 
•^  
cl 
1 they just painted a few things and substituted some bricks and some doors. They did not 
spend as much as they say, at most they have spent MOP$600,000. These are very old 
buildings and the reconstruction work is always very expensive so the government 
^ 
should support these costs. After aU this is a tourist site and when tourists come to 
Macao they have to pay taxes to the government so it should be the govemment’s 
responsibility to maintain these buildings. 
The leader's attitude reflects an unwiUingness to acknowledge the government 
economic support. He ultimately attempted to legitimize the government's 
I involvement by arguing that since the temple is a touristic site, it is the government's 
I . 
responsibility to finance its maintenance. The leader's reluctance to confirm having 
i 
accepted governmental subsidy might be Unked to the fact that this distorts the image 
I 
he is trying to portray ofthe temple as an independent institution. 
In the past few years several temples have been restored by the Listitute and the 
money spent in each temple averages one million patacas. In certain cases, however, 
it exceeds this sum. According to one article pubUshed in the Va Kio {Huaqiad) 
newspaper (Va Kio, 25 March 1992) the Ma Kok temple had been partiaUy 
destroyed by a fire. The extent of the damage was considerable and the cost of the 
reconstruction works high; MOP$1,869,000 were granted by the Cultural Institute of 
Macao for its reconstruction. 
The allocation of a fund for restoration works depends on several criteria but 
since the main purpose of these actions is to preserve the historical monuments of the 
territory, one would suppose that any temple that had been built several centuries ago 
and had historical and architectural value would be eligible to get this kind of 
support. It seems though that this is not always the case. The Kun Iam Ku Miu is one 
of the oldest temples in Macao; although the exact date of its construction cannot be 
determined, it is believed that it was built in the first years of the Ming dynasty 
(1368-1644) (Amaro 1967). This temple needs to be restored and its leader argues 
that he has applied several times for a subsidy from the Cultural Institute of Macao 
but that until now, no financial support has been granted. According to him, "only 
temples that attract many tourists, such as the Ma Kok Miu and the Kun Iam Tong, 
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are being subsidized by governmental institutions and that does not make sense 
because they are the ones which need less help since they are rich temples." In fact, 
I the two temples mentioned have funds that could cover the restoration work 
. expenses. However, since the government is willing to subsidize the works, the 
I money saved by these temples can be directed to other purposes. A paradox results 
from this situation. Temples that need economic support are less prone to receive 
r subsidies and risk disappearing, while affluent temples see their financial situation 
consolidated since they can rely on the government to cover those expenses. 
Temples constitute a major touristic attraction in Macao. All the tours, even 
I when they consist in a single-day trip to the territory and their main purpose is to take 
i 
I the tourists to the casinos, often include a brief visit to one temple. Although the 
Macao Government Tourist Office pamphlets advertise several temples, it is clear 
that a greater emphasis is put on the Kun Iam Tong and the Ma Kok Mu. During my 
j fieldwork each day that I spent in the Kun Iam Temple was marked by a constant 
flow of tourists. A bus parked in front of the temple almost every half an hour, a 
group of tourists would flock into the temple and spend a few minutes taking 
pictures. Asian tourists usually lingered at the temple for a longer period since some 
of them spent some time Ughting incense and making some offerings. The fact that 
the two temples mentioned are major touristic sites could be one of the explanations 
why the government is more willing to spend money on restoration works. 
Government intervention, through free advertisement and participation in the 
maintenance of these two temples, seems to havQ affected and inflated the level of 
prestige of these temples by comparison with others temples of the territory. There is 
a cleavage in terms of prominence, number of worshippers, and total revenue 
between these two temples and the remaining temples in the territory. 
Chinese temples in Macao can be regarded as a symbol of the Chinese 
community. Whenever there is a visit to the territory by leading Portuguese officials, 
their busy agenda always includes a visit to one major temple. Temples, in contrast 
with other institutions such as Chinese associations, constitute privileged symbols for 
the Portuguese authorities due to their apoUtical nature. They represent the Chinese 
community and the visit of a leading official is regarded as a public acknowledgment 
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eofthe importance ofthis community. However, during their short stay, Portuguese 
officials also pay a visit to the Sao Paulo ruins. The church of Sao Paulo was built 
during the first decades of the seventeenth century and is commonly regarded as a 
master piece and the apogee of Christian art in the Far East (Couceiro 1994). In 
I 1835 the church was almost completely destroyed by a fire; only its facade survived 
and has been maintained as a symbol of the evangelization mission in the East. The 
1 
i fact that a visit to both the ruins of the Sao Paulo church and one major temple (the 
1 
Kun Iam Tong or the Ma Kok Miu) is systematically included in visiting officials' 
busy agenda seems significant. While the mins of the Sao Paulo church symboUzes 
I the Christian, and by extension the Portuguese, presence in the territory, temples 
represent the major ethnic group, the Chinese. ReUgion is drawn upon to 
emblematize ethnic identity. By visiting both places, Portuguese political officials are 
symbolically recognizing both communities and acknowledging their responsibiMty 
towards both of them. 
i 
Chinese Popular Religion and Chinese Authorities 
In China, during the late imperial period, many viUages had no viUage-wide 
organizations other than religious ones. Religious institutions provided the 
framework for organizing authority in rural areas, and temples were the center of 
religious and secular functions (Duara 1988). Macao was no exception; on the 
contrary, Chinese religious institutions in the territory acted as a bridge between the 
local community and the Chinese authorities. 
Until the consoUdation of the colonial power in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, Chinese residents in the territory were still subjected to Chinese law and 
Chinese jurisdiction and were under the authority of the Guangdong province 
officials. When these officials went to Macao they chose temples and monasteries as 
their temporary residences. Macao is a peninsula joined by a narrow isthmus to the 
Guangdong province and the Lin Fong Miu is situated near the gates that were built 
by the Chinese in the isthmus. Due to its privileged location, enabling the control of 
the circulation between Macao and China, this temple was chosen as the residence of 
the Chinese officials. The P'ou Tchai Sin Un {Pujichan Yuan) monastery located 
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right next to the Kun Iam Tong, center of social and administrative activities, was 
also used to accommodate Chinese authorities. In 1731 an assistant judge nominated 
to supervise and administrate justice to the Chinese population and to deal with 
affairs concerning the Portuguese, had his permanent residence in the Kun Iam 




\ Although there was an appointed judge lodged in one of the major temples, the 
Chinese often submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of persons other than the 
representatives ofthe state, namely to the lay committees of their own neighborhood 
temples. These neighborhood temples were established and supported by the local 
communities. They were managed by a committee that was responsible for the 
j 
restoration and maintenance of the temple and organization of activities such as 
festivals. This committee also administered the possessions of the temple which often 
included vast extensions of land. As mentioned earlier, this land was usually leased 
out to residents of the neighborhood. The temple committee, besides deaHng with 
religious issues, also responded to the collective needs of the neighborhood. It dealt 
with public matters, administrating justice and providing wetfare (Porter 1990). 
To become a member of a committee provided status. In general, only those who 
donated land or contributed large amounts of money were eUgible to this position. 
Consequently, the temple committees were often, but not ahvays, formed by the 
local elite. Another aspect that might have enhanced the power of the temples was 
the fact that Chinese merchants, generally among the most powerful and rich persons, 
chose temples such as Lin Fong Miu and Ma Kok Miu to meet and discuss business 
matters. Temples were commonly regarded as also constituting administrative 
centers rather than exclusive religious sites. One example is the case of the Three 
Streets Association (Sdm Kdi HuHSan Jie Hui) described by Gonzaga Gomes (cited 
in Teixeira 1979:512-14). The Three Streets Association was the earliest Chinese 
association established in Macao. It was founded by the shop owners of the first three 
commercial streets. The first president of the association managed to raise one 
thousand patacas that were spent in the construction of the temple that became the 
headquarters of the association. He also donated two apartments to the association 
so that their rent would become a fixed income ofthis association. 
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It seems that the reUgious sphere provided the arena for the local elite to express 
their leadership. The temple committees' political and economic power resulted from 
the fact that they did not limit themselves to manage the temples' properties and 
income, but went as far as administrating the afFairs of the local community. 
Religious institutions were extremely important at two levels: first, they constituted 
j the only organizations that effectively responded to the needs of the Chinese 
I community in Macao and provided a sphere for the local eUte to exercise its power; I 
•;i 
j second, they constituted the link between the population and the Chinese state, 
j 
Chinese officials resided in the temples and since these were the centers of both 
5 
I religious and secular authority they constituted an important means of control over 
I 
I the Chinese population. 
By the end of the eighteenth century the Chinese merchant community saw its 
power grow and decided to move out of the temples and establish their own 
commercial trade-haUs. In the middle of the nineteenth century a monopoly system 
was established by the government. A few wealthy Chinese and some Macanese 
controUed the trade of salt, opium, meat and had the monopoly of gambling and 
lottery.^ This system provided the government with a significant amount of fixed 
income and enabled the Chinese eUte to consoUdate their position. They earned a 
great amount of capital that was then invested in other areas. They became major 
property owners, some created a "family" banks, and invested in trade. 
With the consolidation of the economic power of the Chinese eUte, the 
constitution of new associations, and the relocation of older associations from 
temples to new headquarters, temples saw their leading economic, political and 
administrative role decrease. They were no longer the path to power that they once 
were, both in terms of a privileged connection to the local elite and to the Chinese 
state. The fact that local temples lost their role as the link between the Chinese 
community and the state is not exclusively related to the consolidation of the colonial 
power. The reason behind the temples' loss of political preponderance has also to be 
sought in the policy and political changes in China, namely in “the attack directed 
against religious institutions during the late Qing modernizing reforms; . . . in the 
period immediately following the establishment of the Republic; during the May 
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Fourth era; and during the antisuperstition drive of the NationaHsts in the late 
twenties" (Duara 1988:148). 
These changes in policy since the beginning of this century in Mainland China led 
to a transformation of the religious domain~"it ceased to incorporate the political 
element. Village elite refocused on more secular organizations that dealt with pubUc 
affairs. The income from the temples lands was taken over by village councilors and, 
in 1931, a Nationalists proclamation required all temples lands to be registered as 
public property and permitted their use for official purposes (Duara 1988). The 
combination of these factors led to a decrease in the number of temples in China and 
to a diminishing role for religion in the villages social life. Li Macao a similar process 
of appropriation of religious property never took place which aUowed temples to 
keep some of their economic influence. However since the late Qing modernization 
reforms, Chinese officials no longer regarded religious institutions as their privileged 
interlocutors in Macao. To become a member of a temple committee did not entail 
direct access to power but was still regarded as a prestigious position. 
In the early fifties the first residents associations, or kaifongs (jiefang), were 
created in Macao, These associations varied in size and importance, encompassing a 
single street or an entire neighborhood. They initially concentrated their efforts in 
providing welfare to the community and relief services in emergency situations such 
as the ones resulting from typhoons and fires. However, during the Cultural 
Revolution and especially since the so-called 1 2, 3 riots in the late sixties, they 
assumed a political and administrative ro le . Together with the Chinese language 
newspapers, they became instrumental for the Chinese communist authorities to 
influence local politics. Jn one of my interviews with the president of the Mong Ha 
kaifong, he proudly stated that he had met Lu Ping in one of his trips to China. 
According to him "all the kaifongs presidents make an annual trip to China paid by 
the Chinese authorities. We present a report of our activities and discuss plans for the 
following year. 
Present-day kaifongs are, however, predominantly concerned with wetfare and 
recreational activities, providing centers for the elderly and the youth, with settling 
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local disputes, and with helping to resolve individual problems. According to the 
president of a kaifong: 
people come to look for help whenever they have problems. Sometimes they need help 
with bureaucratic issues because most of the documents are in Portuguese and they do 
I not understand. They do not know the procedures so we help them. Other times they 
need help with personal matters. We try to help everyone but we do not give financial 
support. If the person is unemployed we try to find him a job but we do not give any 
money. Besides this, we provide services to the neighborhood. We have an elderly center 
and we also organize recreational activities. 
In a certain way, kaifongs now function as a bridge between the Chinese 
f population and the Portuguese administration. Though their degree of poUtical 
influence has diminished in the last years, in part due to the establishment of the New 
China News Agency {Xinhua She) that assumed this role, kaifongs still have a certain 
degree of poUtical influence, especiaUy through the Residents Associations General 
Union (Uniao Geral das Associagdes de Moradores). This union represents the 24 
kaifongs of the territory. The political power of this organization Ues mainly in two 
aspects: first, in the fact that the Portuguese administration privileges contacts with it 
rather than with individual kaifongs; second and foremost, due to the fact that its 
president is concurrently a deputy in the legislative council. As the secretary of the 
Union argued, “because Mr. Leong is simultaneously the president of the Union and a 
deputy, if the Union has any problem he can help because he has an easier access to 
the government." 
The transfer of political power from religious institutions to secular 
organizations such as kaifongs was eluded, in some cases, by the creation of 
neighborhood associations that were run by the neighborhoods' temple committees. 
Even now several associations are partiaUy financed by a temple's income. One 
example is the Kun Iam Ku Miu. 
The president of the Kun Iam Ku Miu committee is simultaneously the president 
of the Mong Ha Residents Association, the neighborhood where the temple is 
located. I first discovered this when I decided to know whether there were any kind 
of relation between both Kun Iam temples located in this neighborhood and the 
residents association. I made an arrangement for an interview with the leader of that 




interviewed as the president ofthe Kun Iam Ku Miu and that during our interview he 
had strongly argued that the temple committee did not have any connections nor 
received any support from the Mong Ha Residents Association, I could not help to 
express my surprise. The president argued that the temple and the association were 
I two different things and it just happened that they had the same president but they 
j were not related in any way. When I asked whether other members of the temple 
committee also belonged to the residents association, he replied aflfiraiatively but, 
i 
once again insisted that they constituted two institutions with different purposes and 
different sources of income. But the emphasis on the dissociation between the temple 
and the kaifong is contradicted by the fact that they are being managed by the same 
body. Furthermore both institutions are perceived as intimately related. For example 
the leader of the Kun Iam Tong argued that the Kun Iam Ku Miu was managed by 
the Mong Ha kaifong and that there were other similar cases in Macao. 
The former president of the Kun Iam Ku Miu also managed both the temple and 
the association. This might indicate that the powerful people of the neighborhood 
decided to control a secular institution at the same time that they secured the control 
of a religious one. This accumulation of power allowed them to maintain their degree 
of local influence as well as their relationship with the P.R.C. officials. After aU, it 
was the current president of the Kun Iam Ku Mu that claimed to have met Lu Ping 
and that he went annually to China to present reports of their activities. The need to 
stress systematically that the temple and the association are distinct institutions might 
be related to the awareness of the posture of the Chinese Communist Party towards 
reUgion. 
The analysis of historical data reveals that the role played by the temples in 
Macao has been progressively altered due to transformations in the political, social, 
and economic context. Both in the colony and in Mainland China, temple committees 
were voided from their political power and saw their sphere of interference 
progressively restricted to the reUgious domain. This though did not always imply a 
transfer of power in terms of leadership. Temple committee members, aware of the 
poUtical changes, opted in some cases to maintain their ascendancy towards the local 
population by simultaneously joining other organizations that saw their political 
power consolidated through the sponsorship of the P.R.C. officials. 
63 
5 
Analysis of Two Temples 
In the former chapter, I analyzed the historical background and recent political 
and economic changes that afFect the role played by Chinese popular religion in 
Macao. A better understanding of the present situation, though, requires a more 
detailed analysis of religious activities and temple management. I conducted my 
I research in two temples dedicated to Kun Iam that are located in the same 
neighborhood (see appendix 4). The reason that led me to choose these two temples 
was that, although dedicated to the same goddess, one temple's popularity has 
increased and it is now one of the, if not the, most important temples in Macao, while 
the other temple is decaying. The fact that temples, like businesses, can flourish or 
decay is not a particularity ofMacao; it has been documented in Taiwan (Feuchtwang 
1974; Sangren 1988) and Hong Kong (Hayes 1983) among other places. In Macao, 
the changes in the popularity and the role played by these institutions should be 
regarded as responses to specific poUtical and economic changes. I chose these two 
temples because I consider that they are illustrative cases of the present situation in 
Macao. 
eKun Iam Ku Miu~^ Decaying Neighborhood Temple 
The Mong Ha area is located in the northern part of the peninsula and now 
belongs to the Nossa Senhora de Fdtima district. The Mong Ha viUage was one of 
the oldest populated areas of the territory and even at the beginning of this century 
constituted one of the largest Chinese neighborhoods. The Fukianese were the first to 
establish themselves in Mong Ha, but it is difficult to determine with accuracy the 
time of their arrival. Some scholars argue that it was during the Yuan dynasty (1279-
1368) (Porter 1990) while others beUeve it was during the first years of the Ming 
dynasty (1368-1644) (Amaro 1967). 
Although there is disagreement in terms of the exact period in which this viUage 
was established scholars agree that in the first decades following the founding of the 
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village a shrine was built in honor of Kun Iam. According to the legend, a small 
wooden statue ofKun Iam was found floating in the river. The statue was brought to 
the village and a smaU shrine was buik. This smaU shrine was later substituted by a 
proper temple that still exists in Macao~the Kun Iam Ku Miu. Over the centuries the 
temple was restored several times, especiaUy when it was partiaUy destroyed by 
natural disasters such as typhoons that abound in the region. By the end of the 
eighteenth century the temple was enlarged and two trees, that stiU exist, were 
I planted on each side of its door. In 1867 the temple was once again enlarged with 
| 
money donated by the residents of the neighborhood, as is testified in an engraved 
stele on the temple waU. 
At the beginning of this century the governor Tamagnini Barbosa (1918-1919) 
decided to implement a project of urbanization of the Mong Ha area. The governor 
got the support of influential Chinese and the project went ahead against the protests 
oflocal residents. Several properties were expropriated and not even the Kun Iam Ku 
Miu escaped. The building remained but its large courtyard was sacrificed to the 
construction of the Coronel Mesquita Avenue initiated in 1922 (see appendix 5) 
(Amaro 1967). 
The Kun Iam Ku Miu was, in the first decades of this century, the center of the 
Mong Ha neighborhood activities. All the people that were born in the neighborhood 
were more or less involved in its activities and were eligible to become committee 
members. Outsiders, people that had moved into the neighborhood but that were not 
bom there, were automatically excluded. The temple was regarded as belonging to 
the neighborhood and donations for the temple restoration and maintenance were 
soUcited from aU the natives of the neighborhood. The temple committee besides 
running the temple and its properties was also involved in other activities such as 
providing wetfare and other services to the local population. They were also involved 
in settling local disputes. 
The present chairman of the temple committee is over eighty years old and has 
been running the temple for more than twenty years. According to him: 
in the past the temple was very important and all the people of the neighborhood came 
here to worship. Whenever there were problems, the committee would help the people to 
resolve them. Even now that less people come to the temple, we stiU have charity 
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activities every year we visit the poor people and distribute clothes and ifa poor person 
dies we pay for the cofFm; besides we also run an elderly center for the people of this 
neighborhood. 
The chairman was elected by the temple committee but the committee itsetfwas 
elected by the local people. According to the chairman, "to be member of the 
committee they have to be residents in this area. They even have to be bom in this 
neighborhood, A committee member has to be familiar with the local problems and 
I the needs ofthe residents. He has to have a lot of experience." The process through 
which committee members are chosen by the residents is the following: 
We make announcements and then people come to the temple to vote. They write down, 
on a piece ofpaper the name of the person they choose and then aU the pieces ofpaper 
are collected. The people who get more votes then become members of the committee. 
Before, more than one hundred years ago, the committee members were selected by 
tossing "moon-blocks," two pieces of wood that look like a moon but are round on one 
side and flat on the other. Those who got the right side, that is one flat and one round 
side down, more often, were elected. But this is not done any more. 
In 1954 the Mong Ha Residents Association was created. Some of the issues 
previously handled by the temple committee started to be dealt with by the 
association. While charity activities remained a major concern of the temple 
committee, issues concerning the settlement of disputes and other politicized matters 
started to be handled by the residents association. The association's aim was to 
represent the population and defend its interests. What is interesting is that this 
association was formed by the committee members of the Kun Iam Ku Miu. This, I 
argue, resulted from the diminishing political power of the religious organization and 
the perception that a residents association would constitute a more efficient way of 
mobilizing this power and, very importantly, of obtaining the support of the new 
Chinese authorities, the Chinese Communist Party. 
During my interview with the chairman of the association he openly stressed the 
poUtical role of the association. He argued that they were "pro-China" and were there 
to defend the interests of the people of the neighborhood. He commented on the 
meetings he attends annually with the Chinese authorities but he claimed that “now 
the association is not so important because there are other more powerful 
organizations and there is the Residents Association General Union. The government 
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prefers to deal directly with the Union. Now we only have three hundred members, 
but in the sixties and the seventies we had many more members and were more 
active." Evidence ofthe poUtical nature of this involvement can be found in the Hong 
Kong Miu {Kang Gong Mao)) This temple was closed down a few years ago 
because of the low number of worshippers and the lack of fiinds to proceed with 
] restoration work. The temple is managed by the Mong Ha Residents Association and 
! 
since its closure it has served as a storage room. When the temple was shown to me 
S 
by the president it was filled with placards with pro-China slogans piled up against 
the waUs. These placards had been stored in the faciUties ofthe association but were 
moved to the temple when it closed down. According to the president these signs 
belong to the residents association and were used during the late sixties and early 
seventies, especially during the period ofthe 1, 2, 3 riots. 
The diminishing relevance of neighborhood organizations such as the 
neighborhood temple and the residents association might be linked, among other 
factors to the enormous migration wave that affected the territory since the sixties. 
In 1960, there were 169,299 residents in the territory. In 1970 this number had 
increased to 248,636, which represents a growth ofnearly 50 percent. Li 1991 there 
were, according to the census, 355,693 persons, meaning that in thirty years the 
number of persons residing in Macao has more than doubled (see appendix 6). This 
wave of newcomers was bound to affect neighborhoods that were previously 
populated by people bom in Macao and that, for the most part, had lived aU their 
lives in the same area. The number of newcomers, instead of constituting a marginal 
part of the population, rose to a significant number. Neighborhood organizations saw 
their roles questioned. They would cease to be regarded as legitimate representatives 
of the neighborhood if the new residents were not represented. This led some local 
organizations to change their poUcy and to eliminate the clause claiming that only 
people that were bom in Macao and had lived all their life in the neighborhood could 
become members of the organization. This happened with the Mong Ha Residents 
Association. While in the beginning the acceptance of membership was tied to the 
fact that one had been bom in Macao and Uved in the Mong Ha neighborhood, in the 
sixties the association started to accept as members some mainland Chinese 
immigrants that had established themselves in the neighborhood. 
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Such a rapid increase in the population deeply affected local organizations. They 
had to adapt themselves to the new circumstances. But they were faced with the 
impossibiUty, even when they tried to adapt and integrate the new residents, of 
maintaining their influence. Newcomers were less concerned with local issues and 
less prone to seek help from these organizations. Furthermore, the growth of the 
population plus the increase in the standard of living has led to a higher degree of 
mobiUty within the territory. Whenever people secure a better income they tend to 
move to more prestigious neighborhoods. According to the residents association 
president: “before people bom in this neighborhood remained here aU their Ufe. They 
had their family and friends here. But now it is different, people move a lot. Most of 
the present residents were not bom here." 
Institutions whose power relied on the management of local afFairs and on the 
support of the local residents saw their foundations shattered. This also applied to 
neighborhood temples. First, they saw their sphere of influence circumscribed, they 
were no longer the center of the local political, administrative, and economic 
activities. Second, they saw the number of worshippers decrease which entailed a 
significant loss ofincome thatjeopardized some temples' survival. 
The case of the Kun Iam Ku Miu illustrates this situation. The number of 
worshippers has steadily decUned in the last decades. According to the president of 
the temple committee an average of only ten to fifteen persons go daily to the temple 
when an estimated forty thousand people live in the Mong Ha area. The majority of 
the worshippers are old women that have been going to this temple all their life. The 
total revenue of the temple hardly covers its expenses, namely the salaries of the 
workers. The remaining income is not enough to cover the costs ofrestoration work 
and it is spent in charity activities. Another factor that shows the lack of 
neighborhood support and involvement with this religious institution is the temple 
committee's incapacity to raise locaUy the fimds needed for the restoration work. 
This temple has therefore to rely on the government's willingness to subsidize the 
work. The government, though, has its own agenda; as explained earlier, although 
this temple was one of the earliest built in the territory (and is therefore labeled 
historical building and eligible for subvention), major temples come first. 
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The future of the Kun Iam Ku Miu does not seem very bright. The majority of 
the committee members are over sixty years old, its president is over eighty years old. 
The temple keeper, the fortune-teller and the other two workers of the temple are 
also elderly people. When these people pass away who is going to take their places? 
The number ofworshippers is continuously declining. Jfthe new generations find the 
Kun Iam Tong more appealing, who is going to worship Kun Iam in the old 
neighborhood temple? If there are no worshippers where will the temple's revenue 
come from? Ifthe government does not assume as its responsibility the preservation 
of the temple who is going to prevent it from falling apart as has already happened 
with other temples? 
Kun Iam Tong—a Flourishing Temple 
The Buddhist monastery P ou Tchai Sin Un was built in the beginning of the 
seventeenth century^ a few hundred meters away from the Kun Iam Ku Miu. The 
monks ofthis monastery decided to build a small temple dedicated to Kun Iam. The 
first "leader" of the temple was the Tai San monk, bom in Jiangxi province (Huang 
1991). According to Huang, it was under his supervision that the temple was built to 
its present size. In the following centuries the temple was restored several times but 
its characteristics remained similar. The last restoration work was conducted in 1992 
and was subsidized by the Cultural Institute ofMacao. The temple however employs 
permanent workers that, together with the monks, perform minor works and are 
responsible for the daily maintenance ofthe temple. 
As mentioned earlier, the Kun Iam Temple was the center of religious and 
secular activities. An assistant judge was lodged in this temple and whenever other 
Chinese officials visited the territory they sojoumed in the monastery. This official 
endorsement of the temple contributed to enhance its status among the Chinese 
commumty. Another evidence of its secular role is given by the fact that the temple 
was chosen as the site for the signature of the first Sino-American treaty that became 
known as the Wang Xia^  treaty (Teixeira 1979:187). This treaty followed the Anglo-
Chinese treaty ceding Hong Kong to Britain. The Americans wanted to secure 
commercial rights similar to the ones obtained by the British in the Nanjing treaty. 
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The treaty was signed on July 3, 1844, on a stone table that can stiU be seen in the 
temple's garden, by the Viceroy of Canton, Ki Ying, and the Extraordinary Envoy 
and Plenipotentiary Minister ofthe United States of America, Caleb Cushing. 
The role played by the Kun Iam Tong exceeded the limits of the neighborhood, 
being of importance to all the Chinese residents of the territory. On the other hand 
the Kun Iam Ku Miu was definitely a neighborhood temple, serving the local 
population and being administered by an elected committee of local residents. The 
Kun Iam Tong is also managed by a committee constituted by prestigious Chinese, 
but the majority ofthem are not residents in the Mong Ha neighborhood. Li practice, 
to become a committee member of this temple entails a honorary status rather than an 
effective participation in the management activities. As the monk that is running the 
temple strongly states: "yes there is a committee but I am the president and I have 
been running this temple for sixteen years. I became the president when my master 
died, but actually I have been in charge of this temple for thirty years. When my 
master was old he delegated everything to me. 
While the committee president of the Kun Iam Ku Miu does not have the power 
to take decisions single-handedly, the monk running the Kun Iam Tong seems to have 
concentrated the decision-making power into his own hands. The monk's power is 
further reinforced by the fact that this temple, in contrast to the Kun Iam Ku Miu, has 
a considerable number of worshippers and a considerable source of income. The 
temple has twelve permanent workers and ten monks. Each member of the temple's 
staff is in charge of a specific activity. In the main hall there is one counter for the 
fortune-teUer and another counter where an old man seUs paper offerings and incense. 
There are also two other persons in charge of cleaning the room and assisting the 
worshippers. Four members of the staff are in charge of the other two secondary haUs 
and the rest of the staff is dispersed around the memorial halls that contain ancestral 
tablets. 
According to the leader of the temple, "there are ten monks Uving in the 
monastery. Some of them do not live here all the time because according to the 
tradition, monks should travel around and stay in different monasteries or temples. So 
some ofthem do that, but at the same time we also receive monks for a short period 
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i oftime” Each day the monks do their morning and evening prayers and read scripts 
on their own. But they also help in some activities such as maintenance work. During 
the open hours of the temple there are one or two monks assigned to perform 
religious rituals when required. In the words of the leader of the temple, “there is 
always, at least, one monk on duty” When a devotee requires a service that cannot 
be accomplished by either the fortune-teller or one of the temple keepers, the fortune-
teller caUs the monk on duty using a loudspeaker. As one monk explained to me: “we 
perform rituals in the memory of ancestors, make blessings and pray on birthdays and 
weddings” Special celebrations, such as the four festivals in honor ofKun Iam/ are 
conducted by the monk that is running the temple. 
The temple's sources ofincome are varied. One steady source ofrevenue comes 
from the temple's properties that are leased out and from temple's investments. 
Another source of revenue comes from worshippers' donations. Besides that, 
whenever the services ofthe fortune-teller or of one monk are required a fee is paid. 
This fee can amount to a few patacas, in the case of the fortune-teller, or go up to a 
few hundreds when a special ceremony is performed by a monk. Memorial halls, 
where ancestral tablets are placed, also constitute a major source of income that 
should not be disregarded. In the Kun Iam Temple there are three rooms destined for 
ancestral tablets. I do not know the exact amount that is paid for the privilege of 
depositing ancestral tablets in the temple. Whenever I inquired about this subject, or 
issues related with the temple's income, the answers were always evasive: “I do not 
know," “it depends," “I am not sure." According to one article pubUshed in a Hong 
Kong daily (Eastern Express, 7 April 1995), the Mahn Mduh (Wen Wu) temple in 
Hong Kong charges between HK$8,000 and HK$180,000 for one slot for ancestral 
tablets. Increasing prices seem to be proving part of the attraction for the status-
conscious descendants. As the Chinese Temples Committee assistant secretary said to 
the journalist, prices are linked with prestige: "[Chinese people] want to buy ‘face, 
for themselves . . . ifthey buy a cheap place they would be scolded by relatives saying 
they are trying to save money from the dead" 
The increasing demand for slots in the temple halls is, according to this article, 
also linked to the fact that the services provided by the temple guarantee worship for 
families who are emigrating or who lack space or time to pay daily respects. Another 
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aspect that should be taken into consideration is the fact that burial grounds in Hong 
Kong have become extremely scarce and expensive. In Macao, although the cost of 
living is lower and burial grounds do not reach the price of those in Hong Kong, to 
acquire one still requires a large sum of money. This affects the price of a place in the 
temple to deposit the ancestral tablets. This would mean that the ancestral halls ofthe 
Kun Iam Tong constitute a rich source of revenue for the temple since, it is important 
to emphasize, this money does not go to any charity fund, ln Hong Kong the fees 
•s 
charged by most temples for depositing ancestral tablets are donated to the Tung 
Wah Group ofHospitals. 
• The selling of reUgious paraphernalia is stiU another source of income far more 
I 
significant than one might suspect. From the information that I could gather, the 
profit made on each of the items sold is around one hundred and fifty percent. For 
example, one piece of"coiled incense" that costs the temple MOP$40 is sold to the 
worshippers for MOP$100. 
In this temple there are several counters where the workers of the temple seU a 
huge diversity ofarticles. One can buy "coiled incense,’’ "lotus flower-shape candles," 
paper money, joss sticks, statues ofKun Iam and other gods, Buddhist bracelets, and 
so on. One day I decided to count some of the items that had been bought and 
offered to the gods. I counted the number of "coiled incense" hanging from the 
ceiUng ofthe temple and the number oflotus flower-shape candles displayed in front 
of the altars and ancestral tablets. I multiplied the total number of items by their 
respective price and found out that the total sum of money spent amounted to 
MOP$21,720. Taking into consideration that these items take several hours to bum 
completely (in average forty-eight hours) and supposing that the number of items 
donated throughout the month are approximately the same, this would mean that the 
total income exclusively generated by the selling of these two items would round 
MOP$320,000 per month. 
I must confess that what first led me to count the number of items was pure 
curiosity. Though, when I added up and realized the amount of money involved and 
that it only constituted a minimal part of the total monthly revenue of the temple, I 
was astonished. The relevance of this particular data is debatable and a more 
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I thorough study is needed as well as access to the temple's accounts. However, this 
data indicates that the Kun Iam Temple monthly income amounts at least to several 
hundred thousand patacas. 
As mentioned earlier, there is no institution in Macao with similar functions to 
the Hong Kong Chinese Temples Committee. Macao's temples are not under 
government control. The way their revenue is used concerns exclusively the temple 
conunittee. This liberal policy has allowed particularly popular temples to thrive 
economicaUy. hi some cases, like the one of the Kun Iam Tong, we could even say 
that they resemble profit-making enterprises since income is not being directed to 
charity activities. According to the monk running the Kun Iam Temple, they are not 
supporting any kind of charity activities, they have not opened centers to assist the 
population (as the Kun Iam Ku Miu did) but they opened a Buddhist school in Hong 
Kong in 1989, the Buddhist Wai Yan Memorial College. The expenses of the temple 
cannot be very high since most of its staff is constituted by elderly people receiving a 
low salary. Furthermore, since this temple is considered an important historical 
building (it is frequently referred to in tourist brochures as the largest and most 
significant temple in Macao), it can always rely on governmental support when it 
needs costly restoration works. This subject deserves a more extensive analysis. An 
exact evaluation of the temple's finances would require access to the temple's 
accounts, list ofproperties and temple's investments, in other words to aU sources of 
income and temple's expenses. 
Temple management seems though to be involved in great secrecy. Temple's 
accounts are confidential information and access to it seems to be limited to the 
people directly involved in the management activities. This would not be surprising if 
we were speaking of a privately held company but it is important not to forget that 
this is a religious institution. When I first met the leader of the Kun Iam Temple I 
asked his permission to conduct research in the premises of the temple. His first reply 
was that I could do it but whenever I had questions I should ask him directly and not 
the members ofthe staff I argued that since he was a very busy person, he probably 
would not have the time to explain me the ceremonies being performed and to answer 
all my questions. He finally acceded to let me interview the stafFbut only on religious 
issues. When I first interviewed the fortune-teUer, I asked him, among other things, 
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whether he was bom in Macao and he immediately repUed that this was not a 
religious issue and therefore refused to reply. After I spent many days in the temple, 
.j 
1 some members ofthe staff became more friendly and cooperative. They told stories 
oftheir past, explained their work and some ofthe ceremonies being performed, and 
commented on some ofthe issues I raised. But I always had the impression that they 
had been told of my presence by the leader of the temple and instructed on the kind 
of information they could provide. 
The level of secrecy involved does not only affect the management of the temple 
but also the degree of power of its leader. When I mentioned the leader of the Kun 
Iam Tong to several persons, their immediate reply was that he is a very powerful 
person. Two persons interviewed even commented that he is a “jiu rou heshang,,, 
arguing that "he is not a real monk, he is more like a businessman." His being 
commonly regarded as a very powerful person is further attested by the fact that he 
was invited by the P.R.C. ReUgious Affairs Bureau, together with six representatives 
ofother religions, to attend the commemorations of the National Day on October 1 
1994 {VaKio, 28 September 1994). 
When one discusses temples and Chinese reUgious activity in Macao, the temples 
that immediately come to one's mind are the Kun Iam Tong, the Ma Kok Miu and 
the Lin Fong Temple. M of them have a long and significant history and they 
constitute the largest temples in Macao. Two of them, the Kun Iam Tong and the Ma 
Kok Miu, attract the highest number of worshippers in the territory. Surprisingly 
though, few people know that all these temples are managed by the same person— 
the monk that is running the Kun Iam Temple. Although he usuaUy presents himsetf, 
and is referred to, as the leader ofthe Kun Iam Tong, in practice all three temples are 
under his leadership. 
I discovered this accidentaUy, since none of the persons that I had interviewed 
ever mentioned this fact. In one of my visits to the Lin Fong Temple I explained to 
the temple keeper the nature of my research and asked to speak with the person in 
charge ofthe temple. He replied that he was not there and that it was easier to find 
him in the Kun Iam Tong since he was also in charge of this temple and spent most of 
his time there. Later, in one of my meetings with the leader of the Kun Iam Temple, I 
74 
asked him whether he had any relations with the Lin Fong Temple. He repUed that "in 
1 Macao all temple are managed individually, there is no general organization but we 
all know each other. The only relation between the Lin Fong and the Kiin Iam is that 
both are Buddhist temples" I then asked whether he was the leader of the Lin Fong 
Temple. He seemed very surprised but confirmed that he was in charge of the Lin 
FongTemple. On the course ofthe conversation I commented on the importance of 
both temples and inquired whether he was the leader of any other temple. To my 
enormous surprise he said that he was also the leader of the Ma Kok Miu. 
If the Ma Kok Miu, the Kun Iam Tong and the Lin Fong Miu {Lianfeng Miao) 
are being managed by one single person this means that this person has the 
monopoely ofthe profitable and historically most significant temples in Macao. Why 
is it then that this is not common knowledge? Why did the monk not want to disclose 
this important information? Why is the temple management involved in such secrecy? 
One possible explanation is that first, the monk does not want to be perceived as the 
powerfiil person he is. He might be concerned that this would raise suspicion or lead 
the government to interfere somehow in the way these temples are being managed. 
Second, and most important, he seems to be aware that if these temples are perceived 
by the worshippers as profit making, they risk to loose their popularity. Discretion, 
then, is the best policy and this would explain his refusal to allow temple workers to 
discuss non-religious matters with me. 
The fact that the leader of the Kun Iam Tong is managing two other temples 
must be according to historical data, relatively recent. When the committee of the 
Ma Kok Miu decided to register as a benevolent association on July 17, 1926 (see 
Boletim Oficial in appendix 7), it stated in section 10 of the statute of the association, 
that a monk would be hired. This monk should come from the Kun Iam Tong to 
perform reUgious services and be responsible for the maintenance of the temple. It is 
also determined that this monk is under the authority of the committee and that his 
services can, at any moment, be suspended if the committee disapproves of his 
conduct. This means that it was only in the mid-twenties that monks from the Kun 
Iam Tong started to have access to the Ma Kok Miu. In the beginning, though, their 
power was Umited and they had to comply to the authority of the committee running 
the temple. A reversal of power, when the monk became more powerfiil than the 
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committee itself, must have taken place either when the monk Kei Tai Si was running 




Although it is not possible to determine with certitude who was the first monk to 
1 
1 secure the management of the three temples, I am inclined to believe that this 
occurred under the present leadership. This seems to be indicated by the fact that, 
although the committee of the Kun Iam Ku Miu has registered as a benevolent 
association in 1928 (see Boletim Oficial in appendix 8), it was only in 1993 (see 
appendix 9) that the temple was registered in the Lands Department {Conservatdria 
\ 
do Registo PrediaP}. The decision to have the Kun Iam Ku Miu registered resulted 
from the perception that the increasing power of the leader of the Kun Iam Tong 
constituted a menace to the temple committee. To have the temple registered as 
property of the Kun Iam Ku Miu Piety and Benevolent Association {Associagdo de 
Piedade e Beneficiencia Kun-Iam-Ku-Mio) was the only official means available to 
try to secure the committee's leadership. According to the president ofthe Kun Iam 
Ku Miu committee "that monk is too powerful and he could have tried to become 
also the president of the Kun Iam Ku Miu. He could even attempt to control the 
Mong Ha kaifong. People would oppose him but he is very powerful." 
In brief we can find in present-day Macao two types of temples. On one hand 
we have the small neighborhood temple whose role as the center of the community 
activities has steadily diminished but stiU responds to the needs of a smaU percentage 
of the community, primarily elderly people and neighborhood natives. On the other 
hand, we have three major temples that are being managed by one single person. As 
mentioned earlier, two ofthese temples, namely the Kun Iam Tong and the Ma Kok 
Miu, attract a high number of worshippers and are, seemingly, highly profitable 
temples. 
What are the reasons behind the cleavage between neighborhood and major 
temples? Why did neighborhood temples saw the number of worshippers decrease 
while the two major temples become more and more popular? I contend that the fact 
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that neighborhood temples have lost their preponderance results from a combination 
of factors. First, they no longer constitute the center of the social, political, and 
economic activities. Second, the enormous wave of immigrants that has reached the 
I territory since the sixties and the increasing standard ofliving which has led to higher 
j mobiUty within the territory lessen the relevance of neighborhood organizations. 
•) 
') 
This, per se, does not explain, though, the popularity of major temples. The 
decreasing saliency of neighborhood communities coincided with the emergence of a 
pan-Macao identity. Neighborhood affiliations are no longer relevant. Temples like 
the Kun Iam Tong and the Ma Kok Miu that are not bound to neighborhood 
communities came therefore to symbolize a territory-wide identity. A similar 
phenomenon was reported to be occurring in Taiwan. According to Jordan 
(1994:157): "higher mobility in Taiwan brought a diminution in the importance of 
district divinities, once the mainstay of popular cults. As this occurs, we are probably 
seeing the emergence of island-wide cults that, being both restricted to Taiwan and 
general to it wUl come to symboUze a cultural identity distinctive to residents of 
Taiwan” In Macao, the fact that major temples are becoming symbols of a pan-
Macao identity was indirectly fiirther reinforced by the government. The Macao 
Government Tourist Office uses images of the Ma Kok Miu and the Kun Iam Tong 
as symbols of the territory. 
Neighborhood temples no longer fiiffiU the needs of the population and their 
continuity in the ftiture is surely in jeopardy. Major temples see their number of 
worshippers increase and with the collaboration and direct support of the government 





Kun Iam: Worshippers, History and Belief 
Until now I have dealt with temple organization and management. But to M y 
understand why some temples thrive and become popular while others see the 
number of worshippers and public support decrease, it is also important to look at the 
community of worshippers. What are the characteristics of worshippers? Why do 
they go to the temple? What do they pray for? What is their knowledge about Kun 
Iam? 
Kun Iam Tong Worshippers 
I conducted a survey to draw a profile of the worshippers and to attempt to 
answer these questions. Together with a research assistant, I interviewed sixty 
persons in the courtyard of the Kun Iam Temple during the month of November, 
1994 (see questionnaire in appendix 10). The survey was carried out both on 
weekdays and on weekends. This kind of survey has its limitations: first, the people 
interviewed were chosen casually and were not part of a carefirfly drawn sample. 
Second, the interviews were carried out during one single month, which means that 
some ofthe people who only go to the temple during major celebrations, such as the 
Lunar New Year, were not represented. Due to these limitations it is not possible to 
make generalizations on the total population of worshippers in Macao. Despite all 
these problems, this kind of survey gives us important information and helps us to 
draw a profile of the worshippers. Further, the results obtained were in most cases 
consistent with the information provided by different temple keepers when 
1 
characterizing the worshippers that visited the temples where they worked. 
Since this study deals with issues of reUgion and ethnic identity, I wanted to find 
out whether religion played an important role in boundary building between the 
Chinese natives from Macao and recent immigrants. According to the results of the 
survey, 52 percent of the people interviewed were born in Macao, while 40 percent 
were bom in Mainland China. Of the people bom in Mainland China, 52 percent 
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came to Macao less than fifteen years ago. Since 40 percent of the overall population 
of the territory were bom in Macao while 50 percent were bom in Mainland China, 
'i 
) the results indicate that people born in Macao tend to go more to the temples than 
mainland immigrants. However, the percentage ofimmigrants that engage in religious 
activity is also high. That coincides with the perception of the people interviewed, 
regardless of whether they were worshippers, temple leaders or temple keepers. The 
common response was that going or not to temples was the resuh of an individual 
choice that had nothing to do with fact that the person was or was not bom in 
Macao. So, contrary to my expectations, reUgion is not drawn upon as a feature that 
differentiates Chinese bom in Macao from those bom in Mainland China. 
In terms of place of residence, the survey shows that 69 percent of the 
respondents live in the Mong Ha area. This can be explained by the fact that the 
majority of the interviews were carried out on working days. Jf we look at the 
interviews made during weekends the proportions are reversed; 70 percent of the 
people interviewed come from other neighborhoods. Furthermore, only 38 percent of 
all the respondents cited proximity as the reason for going to this particular temple. It 
can be argued that the temple is not exclusively the focus of worship of the Mong Ha 
residents. Although a similar survey was not carried out in the Kun Iam Ku Miu, the 
information gathered points to the fact that neighborhood residents constitute a large 
majority of the worshippers in this temple. According to the temple keeper of the 
Kun Iam Ku Miu “the people that come to the temple are people who have lived in 
Mong Ha for a long time, their mothers and even their grandmothers used to come 
here so they also come. I know most of them because I have been working here for a 
long time. Sometimes a tourist comes, but not very often." This information was 
fiuther confirmed by the president of this temple, s committee. 
In terms of socio-economic status, 55 percent of the people interviewed were 
either housewives (35 percent), students (12 percent), unemployed or retired (8 
percent). The other respondents were either skilled or unskilled workers (20 percent), 
or white-coUar workers (13 percent). The remaining 10 percent (six persons) of the 
interviewees said it was "not convenient" to reveal their occupation. They were all 
male and their age varied between twenty and forty-seven years old. They constituted 
27 percent of the male population interviewed. The exact significance of this data is 
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difficult to determine; more in depth research is needed. But, keeping in mind that 
gambling and gambling related activities are the m^or source of income of the 
territory, and the fact that the majority of these men were weU dressed and wore gold 
sS 
j or jade jewelry (it is, therefore, unlikely that they belong to the group of illegal 
I 
I immigrants) we can speculate that these people might be involved in less legal 
I 
;j j activities. However, this is an issue that definitely requires fiirther research. 
The survey indicates that women are more likely to go to temples than men, 
which is in accordance with the findings of similar studies (see Lang and Ragvald 
1993). Sixty-five percent of the people interviewed were female. This is in conformity 
with my own observations and with the opinion expressed by several temple keepers. 
The fact that more females go to the temples than males is explained by a variety of 
factors. First, only 20 percent of the women interviewed have ajob, while 54 percent 
ofthe male do. Since a high percentage of the women are housewives they have more 
time available to go to the temple and engage in religious activities. Second, women 
tend to worship on behatfof their households; some specificaUy said that they ask for 
success in studies for sons and daughters, for help in the work of their husbands, for 
the health oftheir parents and in-laws and for the prosperity of the family as a whole. 
In a certain way we could say that the responsibility of carrying out the religious 
activities both within the household and in the temples seems to be delegated to 
women, usually the wife. Third, since the temple is devoted to a female deity,^ it 
appeals more to women. Kun Iam is the goddess of mercy and compassion, and 
though she works for the salvation of all beings, she is often perceived as concerned 
with pregnancy, childbirth and the health of children. Thirty-three percent of the 
women, and 19 percent of the men, interviewed claimed to worship only Kun Iam. 
The proportion of male worshippers goes against the conception of Kun Iam as too 
speciaHzed and predominantly worshipped by women (Lang and Ragvald 1993:87) 
Let us now turn to another feature of the worshippers' profile~age. In this 
survey aU ages are represented, with an equal proportion of young people (those 
aged 25 or below) and older people (those aged 50 or above), both representing 18 
percent ofthe respondents. Those aged between 25 and 50 represented 63 percent of 
the respondents. The percentage of people above 50 years of age in this survey is 
remarkably low compared with the data provided by two surveys conducted in Hong 
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Kong (see Lang and Ragvald 1993:80-81, and appendix 11). In Hong Kong, the 
percentage of people over 50 years old going to the Wong Tai Sin temple are in one 
survey 35.2 percent and in the other 27.7 percent. The reason why people over 50 
are less represented in Macao's temple worshippers can be partiaUy sought in the fect 
: ' 
j that this group age is less represented in Macao's overall population but also in the 
fact that elderly people in Macao prefer to go to their neighborhood temple, bi many 
j 
cases they have been going to the same temple for several decades and are reluctant 
to change. According to the temple keeper of the Kun Iam Ku Miu, the majority of 
the worshippers are middle age and elderly people. This seems to point out a major 
difference, in Macao, between neighborhood temples and major temples in terms of 
age group representation. 
Another important issue is how often beUevers go to the temple. According to 
this survey more than hatf of the worshippers go quite frequently to the temple: 27 
percent reported going to the temple at least once a week and 33 percent once a 
month. The other worshippers interviewed claimed to go two to four times a year (28 
percent) or just once a year (12 percent). When I compared these results with the 
ones provided by the surveys conducted in Hong Kong's Wong Tai Sin temple (Lang 
and Ragvald 1993:83), I was astonished by the dissimilarity I found (see appendix 
11). While more than hatf of the worshippers interviewed in the Kun Iam Tong go 
frequently to the temple, 76 percent to 83 percent of the Hong Kong worshippers 
surveyed only go to the temple three times per year or less. It is not easy to explain 
this finding based on the data available. However, I would Hke to suggest that the 
highest degree ofengagement in religious activity (revealed by the frequency of visits 
to the temple) might be linked to the fact that Ufe in Macao is less busy than in Hong 
Kong and consequently people have more time to go to the temples. Another related 
aspect is the fact that the smaU dimension of the territory enables people to have easy 
and rapid access to the temples. Most important, though, this data suggests that in 
Macao temple-visiting plays an important role in the life of the worshippers. A 
significant percentage of them will go to the temple whenever they have problems, 
need advice or want to thank the gods and not only during the Lunar New Year or 
other major celebrations. 
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I Another related question raised in the survey was: "Why did you choose this 
) particular temple?" Thirty-eight percent of the people cited proximity, 27 percent 
claimed that friends or family members had recommended this temple 20 percent said 
because it was big and 17 percent because it was famous. The fact that 
recommendation, by family members or friends, is the second cited reason suggests 
that this is a popular temple. Further, the claim that one goes to a specific temple 
because it is big can be interpreted differently: by big one might mean physicaUy large 
or one might employ big as a synonymous of famous~as some of the respondents 
argued that "it is a very big temple, everyone knows it and most people come here to 
worship or go to the Ma Kok Miu." All these factors suggest that the majority of 
people choose this temple because it is regarded as "famous" or "popular," and not 
because it is the temple in their neighborhood or the temple that they, and their 
parents, have been visiting to worship for decades. 
The majority ofthe people interviewed reported going to the temple to worship 
(78 percent) while 12 percent claimed to go to consult the fortune-teUer. 
Worshippers ask and petition the gods for different things. The most common appeal 
concems health (58 percent) and is immediately followed by the request for peace 
(sometimes specified as peace of mind) and happiness (42 percent). Twenty-eight 
percent ask for luck; luck in their studies, careers, love relations and gambling. Nine 
persons, representing 15 percent of the respondents, claimed that they petition the 
gods for wealth. Three ofthese said that they petitioned Chdih Sahn {Cai Shen), the 
god ofwealth, another three claimed to petition all the gods while two mention that 
they petitioned Kun Iam. It is interesting to note, though, that several of the 
respondents emphasized that "Kun Iam helps the poor and the needy, she can answer 
their caU for health and peace, but not for money ” In order to better understand 
believers' petitions to Kun Iam, it is important to know more about this goddess and 
how she is perceived by the worshippers. 
Kun Iam: History and Belief 
To those enmeshed in litigation 
Or trembUng in the midst ofhosts 
There comes the thought of Kuan Yin's power. 
Whereat ali hatred is dispersed. 
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The mysterious sound of Kuan Yin's name 
Is holy like the ocean's thunder~ 
No other like it in the world! 
I And therefore should we speak it often. 
I 
CaU upon it, never doubting, 
Kuan Shih Yin~sound pure and holy; 
To those who stand in mortal fear 
A never-wavering support. 
To the perfection of her merits. 
To the compassion in her glance. 
To the infinitude of her blessings. 
Worshipping, we bow our heads! 
[Blofeld 1977:108] 
Kun Iam is the most popular Chinese female deity and has been worshipped in 
China for more than one thousand years. Several temples in Macao are devoted to 
this goddess and those that are devoted to other gods frequently have a side altar 
dedicated to Kun Iam. Further, her image can also be found in many domestic 
shrines. Her proper name "Kuan Shih Yin [sic]. . . means She-Who-Hearkens-to-the-
Cries-of-the-World, and is a translation of the Sanskrit name ofher chief progenitor 
Avalokitesvara (or Avalokita)" (Blofeld 1977:17). Kun Iam was originaUy identical 
with Avalokitesvara and therefore conceived as possessing male characteristics. 
Some scholars beUeve that the change in sex—the transformation of the M i c male 
divinity Avalokitesvara to the Chinese female divinity Kun Iam, occurred only after a 
legendary Chinese princess Miao Shan became associated with this divinity around 
1100 years ago (Sangren 1983)? 
There are several versions of the Miao Shan legend but, with a few variations, 
they tell the same story. Briefly the Miao Shan legend is the story of a king who had 
three daughters and no male descendent. He sought husbands for his three daughters, 
but the youngest princess defied his wish and refused to marry. She retreated to a 
Buddhist monastery to engage in a life of contemplation. Her father became very 
angry, accused her of lack of fiUal piety and (according to some versions of the 
legend) had her killed. The princess Miao Shan descended into hell where her tme 
identity as Kun Iam was revealed (according to some versions it was only later that 
her identity was revealed), and by the power of her purity succeeded in having the 
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suffering souls released. She then returned to earth and assumed the guise of a 
mountain recluse. 
From this point onward different versions of the legend recount distinct events 
I 
(Blofeld 1977). According to one version, she received a visit from Amitabha Buddha 
i and he advised her to seek safety on the island of P'u-t'o (sic). During the following 
{ 
nine years, the princess spent her time meditating and performing deeds of 
compassion which, together with the merit previously achieved enabled her to attain 
the status of Boddhisattva. Some years later, she returned to her country and 
converted her father and mother. Another version tells a different story; after 
returning to earth, she heard about her father's iUness. She made a magic potion with 
her arms and eyes which saved her father. However, she became miraculously whole 
again and entered nirvana. 
It is not possible to determine whether the appearance of this legend is Unked to 
the gender transformation of the deity. According to Blofeld: “It is possible that 
confiision in the popular mind between Bodhisattvas and local gods or goddesses 
permitted Miao Shan, a legendary Chinese princess with extraordinary compassion, 
to become assimilated to Kuan Yin pCun Iam], but personaUy I doubt if this 
assimilation took place until after the Bodhisattva had come to be regarded as 
female" (1977:39). He further argues that: 
The Chinese have always been disposed to envisage friendly divinities in ideaKzed 
human form . . . they do not feel at home with the multi-armed and multi-headed 
representations so dear to the bidian heart. . . . To the humanistic Chinese, such forms 
were alien and unsuited to the portrayal of the yearning compassion a mother feels for 
her child. The lovely Tara, appearing now as a sweet-feced matron, now as a winsome 
maiden, would seem infinitely more appealing to the Chinese mind. For religious 
reasons, Chinese Buddhists could hardly reject (!) worship of the Boddhisattva 
Avalokita; on the other hand, since the forms taken by deities depend somewhat upon the 
meditator and the artist, there could be no objection to visualizing Avalokita in a form 
similar to Tara's; and, ifthat were done, what need of both embodiments? So the two 
became one, thus preparing the way for the assimilation of Princess Miao Shan~a 
compassionate being enjoying the rank of goddess, [ibid.:41] 
Blofeld further consolidates his argument by demonstrating that early Kun Iam 
iconography presents features that are commonly associated with Tara. But, 
regardless ofthe reasons that are behind the gender transformation, Kun Iam is now 
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perceived as a female deity. Kun Iam is the embodiment of pure compassion and 
I wisdom, her miraculous powers can instantly avert danger and affliction from any 
human being that calls upon her. There are several passages in the sutras which claim 
that those who caU upon her name with great sincerity and recite her mantra from 
j their heart will surely be reborn in her sacred Potala and there they will be taught how 
to achieve enHghtenment. 
Kun Iam is worshipped by miUions of people but the way in which she is 
perceived, and the devotees' knowledge about her, vary. Many Kun Iam devotees 
belong to the Pure Land Buddhist Sect; they know that she is a Boddhisattva and 
they study the Mahayana sutras. However, the great majority of the worshippers 
knows Uttle about the doctrines, revere Kun Iam as a goddess rather than a 
Boddhisattva, and love her in an uncomplicated manner. They see in her the 
protective power and rewarding nature of the compassion. 
During the interviews the fact that struck me most was the respondents' general 
lack ofknowledge about the goddess. I asked the foUowing questions: "What do you 
know about Kun Iam?” "What kind of help does the goddess provide?" To my 
surprise, 37 percent ofthe worshippers (48 percent of the male respondents and 31 
percent of the female ones) replied that they knew nothing specific about this 
goddess. The other respondents gave simple responses such as: "Kun Iam is very 
kind, she helps the needy people," "she teaches us to love and help the others," “my 
mother told me that before she was a man but then she became a kind goddess," 
"Kun Iam became a goddess because she was so kind to her wicked father. She 
helped him when he needed it, and she helps aU those in need," and so on. When 
speaking about the goddess, the most common attributes or facts mentioned were: 
kindness (mentioned 23 times), helpfukiess in general, and in particular to the needy 
(17 times). Five persons referred that Kun Iam was a male, and three that she was ill-
treated by her father. Among the respondents, nine persons emphasized that Kun Iam 
was an ordinary person before, but due to her good actions and kindness became a 
goddess. 
It is interesting to note that the great majority of the respondents argue that the 
goddess will help everyone, though some stress that she will not help people to earn 
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money, for example giving tips for the races or other gambUng activities. The fact 
that she is generally perceived by the worshippers as the "listener-of-all-cries", the 
helper ofthe needy and the poor, contradicts Lang and Ragvald's presupposition that 
Kun Iam is a specialized goddess, appealing to women and being particularly 
i _ 
I efficacious in cases linked to pregnancies, health of mother and child, and so forth 
(1993:87). Although it is most probable that a believer who wishes to have a male 
son, for example, will seek the help ofKun Iam and appeal to her power, Kun Iam is 
commonly portrayed as a goddess who has devoted hersetf to the rescue of aU 
suffering beings. As one of the worshippers stated: "she wiU help all those who 
appeal to her with a pure heart." 
Worshippers perceive the goddess as providing supernatural aid and protection 
and as a source of advice whenever they face problems. However, there is also a 
moral dimension in the worship of Kun Iam. Most of the worshippers insist on the 
fact that Kun Iam advocates certain moral principles, she teaches people to be kind 
and help the others, and those who follow her teachings will attain peace of mind. 
Worshippers' relationship with the goddess is unconstrained and easy, they beUeve 
that there are no specific requirements and that one does not have to know the 
doctrines to have access to the goddess, tfone appeals to Kun Iam, the goddess wiU 
surely listen to his request. 
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I After several interviews I started to realize that the lack of knowledge about the i 
goddess could not be exclusively ascribed to a few individuals. In fact, it seemed to 
be common to the majority of the worshippers. Each beUever had its more or less 
individual perception ofthe goddess and her powers. They did not feel embarrassed 
to state publicly that they knew nothing or very Uttle about Kun Iam, just that she 
was kind and would help those who need it. For them, what was really important was 
to worship her and present their offerings of incense and food. The emphasis Ues on 
doing the rituals in the proper way. During the time I spent in the temple, I often saw 
some people instructing others on how to accomplish the rituals properly. One time it 
was a grandmother explaining to her granddaughter how to shake the fortune sticks 
out ofthe container; another time it was a Chinese lady explaining to a foreigner how 
to properly place the incense; another a father telling his son how many times he 
should bow. What each person knows or believes about the goddess does not seem 
to be as important as the necessity to perform the rites in a proper way. 
We could say that, in contrast to Christians, the emphasis is put on ritual rather 
than belief. The majority ofthe Chinese in Macao have shrines in their houses and in 
working places such as shops or factories (Brito Peixoto 1988). Some go frequently 
to the temples, others only for major celebrations such as the Lunar New Year. Ritual 
practices such as lighting incense for ancestors and the kitchen god, burning paper 
money, and so on, are an integral part bf daily life. As one Chinese explained to me, 
"First we feed our ancestors and then we can eat." These ritual practices are so 
blended with their daily activities that they are perceived as cultural rather than 
reUgious. When one inquires why something is done in a specific way, they often 
reply "this is the way we Chinese do it” 
This diffused character of religion, as C. K. Yang (1961) calls it, might explain 
some paradoxes that occur when surveys deaUng with religious issues are carried out 
among a Chinese population. In the case ofMacao the 1991 census reported that 64 
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percent of the Chinese population (more precisely those who do not hold a 
Portuguese passport and are of Chinese origin) answered that they did not have any 
religion. However mere observation suffices to deny the accuracy ofthis data. Every 
I little store one enters has a small shrine. We can frequently see people make offerings 
1 . 
j and buming paper money at the entrances of their houses, major temples are packed 
with worshippers, and so on. It seemed to me that the results of the census were 
biased. It was a multiple-choice question; people had to state whether they were 
Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, "other," or had no religion. I decided to conduct a 
smaU survey where two different questions were asked. I interviewed 57 Chinese 
persons, at random, in the streets ofMacao. First, I asked the same question that was 
raised in the census-"Do you have any reUgion? {Neih yduh mduh junggaau 
seunyeung?). Though I left it open-ended, 77 percent replied negatively. Then I 
asked: "Do you have a shrine at home, do you baai sahn {bai shen) at home or in the 
temples?" To which 73 percent replied yes. There are two possible explanations for 
this apparent paradox. One is that respondents perceive the question “Do you have 
any reUgion?" as referring either to a "foreign" reUgion such as CathoUcism, 
Protestantism or Islam, perhaps also including Buddhism. The majority of 
worshippers do not consider themselves Buddhists though their religious system 
integrates aspects of Buddhism. Therefore what they do—baai sahn—according to 
them does not fit any ofthese categories, which leads them to argue that they do not 
have any religion. Baai sahn is not conceived as being religious but rather as an 
integral part ofbeing Chinese. 
James Watson argues (1993) that societies that display a high degree of internal 
integration achieve cultural unity either by nurturing a unified system ofshared beliefs 
or by foUowing a set of common practices or rites. Societies of the latter type 
emphasize primarily the performative domain. This seems to have been the case in 
late imperial China (and stiU is the case in some rural areas) where the construction of 
a unified culture relied on nurturing a system of shared rites and where less emphasis 
was placed on common beUefs. According to Watson: "Orthopraxy (correct practice) 
reigned over orthodoxy (correct belief) as the principal means of attaining and 
maintaining cultural unity" (1993:84). 
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The situation has changed in the P.R.C. and there seems to have been a 
movement from "orthopraxy" to "orthodoxy," where greater emphasis has been 
placed on an ideological system of beUef. This, though, did not happen in Macao, 
j where people kept their ritual practices. Following Watson's line of thought, we 
i 
j could say that it is the participation in the rituals punctuating people's life that 
confers, to the Chinese in Macao, their sense of cultural unity. This would explain the 
general tendency to downplay the relevance of the system of beUefs and 
concomitantly stress the importance of engaging in ritual practices. It is not so 
relevant what one believes as long as one participates: "cynics, agnostics, and active 
non-believers participate in these rites along with those who profess strong faith in 
the efficacy of the acts. Those who refuse to foUow accepted procedure are 
consciously isolating themselves from the community and hence withdrawing from 
the dominant culture." (ibid.:88) 
The emphasis in the ritual dimension at the expense of the system ofbeUefs is not 
a Chinese particularity. As Demerath (1994) argues, we can distinguish between 
"religions ofthe word , and "reUgions ofthe act” Although Chinese would fit better 
in the latter label, they are not the only ones. Japanese too tend to place a greater 
emphasis on a set ofcommon practices and rites rather than in shared beUefs. This, it 
is important to stress, does not mean that the Japanese or the Chinese lack a shared 
system of beUefs. We can not say that some cultures are exclusively "rituaHstic" or 
that some exclusively emphasize the "belief dimension. Religious ideas and 
practices, in other words belief and ritual, always come together. What is meant is 
that while some cultures tend to stress the importance of shared beliefs, others lean in 
the opposite direction, emphasizing the ritual domain. 
This dual approach seems to be reflected in peoples discourse on religion, 
whether they tend to maximize or minimize its importance, tf I ask any Portuguese 
person whether he or she has a religion, the response is most probably affirmative 
even ifthis person, though being baptized, has only been once or twice to the church 
and pays little attention to religious matters. To engage in ritual activities is not 
perceived as being significant. What is important is that one shares a common set of 
beliefs. The same would be true of French or even Americans. The result is that 
although the different Churches in these countries experience a low number of 
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practicing believers, statistical data suggest the opposite—a high percentage of 
people declare that they have a religious affiUtion. This leads us to hold that people 
affiliated in the so-called "reUgions of the word" tend to maximize their religiosity 
while the opposite tendency occurs with those affiliated with "religions ofthe act." 
T^  
I Some scholars have noted the tendency ofthe Chinese and Japanese to minimize 
their religiosity O^atson 1993; Demerath 1994). This tendency to minimize one's 
religiosity was further demonstrated in my research. Before reading the above cited 
works, lset out to do research expecting to find empirical support to my hypothesis 
that religion played an important role in the construction of Chinese ethnic identity. 
After a few interviews, I was disconcerted by people's answers: "religion is not an 
important part ofChinese culture" “we come to the temple ifwe have time, but ifwe 
do not come it does not really matter," “I do not know whether the gods respond to 
our requests, but we might as well try" or "everyone does baai sahn, so I feel that I 
should do the same." After hearing these kinds of answers, my impression was that I 
had chosen the wrong subject to research. After aU, people's discourse downplayed 
the relevance of religion, the core of my research. I considered choosing a new 
subject, but I was intrigued by what at that time seemed the incongruity of people's 
actions and discourse. They were, in fact, engaging in the ritual practices and 
simultaneously claiming that these were not that significant. 
The analysis of the data collected during the survey conducted in the Kun Iam 
Temple courtyard confirmed the impression created during the first interviews. A 
significant percentage ofthe worshippers (28 percent) strongly argued that reUgion 
was not such an important matter. This position was more strongly held by male 
worshippers (43 percent of the male respondents) than by female ones (only 21 
percent ofthe female respondents shared this opinion). One possible explanation for 
the latter is that religious activities are frequently delegated to women. They worship 
not only for the sake ofthemselves but also for the welfare of the household. 
The discrepancy between practice and discourse, the lack of emphasis on 
systems of belief and doctrines that at first seems paradoxical can only be fully 
grasped ifwe put aside our western perception of reUgion that emphasizes the notion 
ofa shared system ofbelief. By looking at religion as composed ofbeliefs and rituals, 
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each of which are either emphasized or underplayed in different cultural contexts, 
Chinese religion can be better understood. 
There are several cultural features that define the Chinese as Chinese and 
I 
I differentiate them from the “others” ReUgion, through the engagement in ritual 
1 
practices is one of them. Those involved have a strong feeling of participating in 
Chinese culture. As Watson observes: "the process ofbecoming Chinese involved no 
conversion to a received dogma, no professions of belief in a creed or set of ideas. 
One became Chinese, in essence, by acting Chinese, by behaving Uke Chinese; and 
perhaps the clearest indicator that this cultural transformation had been accomplished 
was the performance ofkey rituals in the accepted manner" (1993:93). 
I contend that, in Macao, the engagement of the Chinese population in ritual 
practices promotes the cohesion of the Chinese community as a whole. I am not 
implying that individual worshippers engage in those practices with that intention in 
mind. What I am arguing is that, as Sangren puts it, "primarily, existential and 
subjective concems of individual worshippers have the largely unintended 
sociological effects of reproducing social solidarity and differentiations at local, 
regional and higher levels of coUectivity" (1991:69). Jn the case of Macao, the 
sociological effects of one's participation in ritual activities is the expression of 
Chineseness and simultaneously the definition ofboundaries between the Chinese and 
the other communities in the territory. Both Chinese bom in Macao and those who 
immigrated from the Mainland take part in ritual activities as was previously shown 
by the percentage of worshippers bom in Mainland China that visit the temple. 
Furthermore, there seems to be a clear perception of the degree of involvement in 
religious practices by the Mainland Chinese resident in the territory. Fortune-tellers, 
temple keepers, temple leaders and worshippers bom in Macao, aU agree that 
migrants from Mainland China constitute a significant part of the worshippers. 
Although there is an awareness of subethnic divisions, religion, in Macao, promotes 
an overarching sense of belongingness to Chinese culture, regardless of divisions 
based on place of origin, dialect or other features that are commonly drawn upon to 
legitimize discourses that emphasize distinctiveness. To stress the importance of 
subethnic groups is only relevant in very specific situations. As we are deaUng with a 
multiethnic context ruled by an ethnic minority, it becomes strategically more 
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significant to unite under a common category—being Chinese, rather than assume 
more restricted identities, such as Chinese bom in Macao, Fukianese and so on. In 
this context, reUgion provides the field where this unity can be expressed. 







I Religion and Ethnic Identity in Macao: Past and Present 
•i ( 
In the former chapters I have attempted to demonstrate how different ethnic 
groups have deployed religion and how the role played by religion has evolved due to 
poHtical, economic, and social changes. Since the beginning of the Portuguese 
domination in the territory, the official endorsement of the Catholic Church served 
the purpose of legitimizing the Portuguese mHng position and therefore reinforcing 
their power. Portuguese authorities have drawn on religious affiliation to build ethnic 
boundaries; to be or not to be Christian defined, according to official discourse, one's 
ethnic identity. In practice, during the period of double sovereignty, the Chinese who 
converted to Catholicism became subject to Portuguese jurisdiction. This did not 
imply that they were integrated in the Portuguese community. Although having 
crossed the ethnic boundary, they constituted a community of their own. A few 
exceptions were those who, although not integrated with the Portuguese community, 
were assimilated by the Macanese community due to other assets they possessed. Li 
the seventies, changes in the political scenario led the Portuguese authorities to revise 
their policy and promote a progressive dissociation from the Church. Today, 
although the Church is still financially supported by the govermnent~due to the 
Padroado agreement—and it stiU has some degree of influence in the political sphere, 
we could say that there has been a gradual secularization of the government. The 
government has adopted a discourse that emphasizes the citizens ofthe territory, the 
people ofMacao, rather than one than emphasizes ethnic differentiation. 
The late seventies marked the turning point in the Church's posture in Macao. 
The newly appointed bishop Arquiminio Rodrigues da Costa adopted a more open 
attitude in conformity with the new direction of the Church established in the Second 
Vatican Council. He further supported the locaUzation of the Church through the 
appointment of Chinese priests to some of the parishes and through the suggestion, 
accepted by the Pope, to have a Chinese nominated as his successor. The process of 
localization of the Church is being gradually implemented and seems irreversible. 
Some Chinese priests, concerned about the Church's involvement with the 
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government, now seek some degree of separation, namely to move off government 
support and sponsorship, in order to maintain an autonomous voice. 
•i 
j Changes in the posture of the Church towards both the government and the 
•| 
i Chinese community and culture have led to changes in the patterns of conversion and 
i 
I its impUcations. As it was described in chapter three, until a few decades ago Chinese 
converts were forced to deny their Chineseness, which involved the renunciation of 
much of what other Chinese regarded as fiindamental for their ethnic and cultural 
identity. They had to display an assimilative attitude towards the values and life-styles 
of the Portuguese community. To convert implied the adoption of a new ethnic 
identity. Only in the last decades did conversion start to be socially regarded as the 
result ofan individual option that does not entail the loss of one's ethnic identity. 
Changes in the political situation, in the posture of the Church, and the fact that 
the majority ofthe Catholic population is now ethnicaUy Chinese makes it no longer 
possible to draw upon Catholic religion to establish an ethnic boundary between the 
Portuguese and the Chinese communities. Even the Macanese community whose 
ethnic identity strongly relied on the promotion of an orthodox Catholicism, in a clear 
attempt to emphasize their "Portugueseness" and to set themselves apart from the 
Chinese community, are now drawing on other social markers to promote their 
distinct ethnic identity. 
Catholic religion and Chinese popular religion played distinct roles in ethnic 
identity. Catholicism was drawn upon to establish a boundary between the Christians 
and the non-Christians. However, within the community of Catholics, other 
distinctions between ethnic groups also existed~there were the Portuguese, the 
Macanese and the so-caUed new Christians, the Chinese CathoUcs. Although 
Catholicism dissociates the latter from the Chinese community as a whole, the 
Church never implemented a policy that enabled the unification of these groups. On 
the contrary, ethnic differentiation was reproduced, and in a certain way reinforced, 
within the Church—there were distinct parishes for each group. Chinese popular 
reUgion through ritual practices is on the other hand, instrumental in the 
reinforcement ofthe cohesion of the Chinese community. By enabling the expression 
ofa Chinese identity, it also differentiates Chinese from non-Chinese. 
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In Macao, the changes in the political and social context led to changes in the 
role played by the temples. Until the beginning of this century they were the linking 
j 
I element between local Chinese and the Mainland Chinese authorities, therefore 
contributing to reinforce a natural inclination of the Chinese population to pay 
allegiance and loyalty to the Chinese Emperor, rather than to the Portuguese 
government and to preserve their ties with China. At the local level, temples, besides 
being religious institutions, had secular functions which led to a consolidation ofthe 
neighborhood communities where they were located. This latter role has prevailed 
until recently, though its significance has definitely decreased since the sixties. 
Neighborhood affliations then stopped being relevant. The process ofthe decreasing 
significance ofneighborhood communities led to a decline of neighborhood temples. 
Simultaneously, major temples saw their popularity increase becoming symbols of a 
territory-wide identity. 
Religious Policy in the People ,s Republic of China 
A central part of this study consisted in focusing on historical changes and 
demonstrating how religion is bound to social, cultural, and political processes—how 
religion affects and is affected by these phenomena. Therefore this study must discuss 
the major political change that wiU occur in 1999 (the effects of which are akeady 
being felt), and that will greatly affect the role played by both Catholic religion and 
Chinese popular reUgion in this territory. On December 20 1999, Macao wiU become 
part of the People's Republic of China with the status of Special Administrative 
Region. The policy of"one country, two systems" promoted by the Chinese leaders 
as weU as the agreement on the Basic Law presuppose that the poUcies enforced in 
the territory will be distinct from the ones applied to the rest of China. In what 
concerns religious matters, Macao's reHgious leaders have been reassured several 
times by members of the Bureau of Religious Affairs of the State Council who are 
responsible for the implementation of the Chinese Communist Party's religious 
policy, that no changes will be introduced and the Basic Law will be respected. In 
agreement with this law, the government of the Macao Special Administrative Region 
will not interfere in the internal afFairs of religious organizations and believers as long 
as these do not contravene the laws of the Region. 
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During the Mao Zedong era, religion was strongly persecuted. However, since 
Deng Xiaoping's "open-door" policy, religious activities became relatively tolerated 
and there was a relaxation of religious control. Jn 1982, Document No. 19 on the 
• I 
Party's policy on religious afFairs was issued. It presents the Party's detailed 
] 
I interpretations on the policy of freedom of religious beUef and sets the Umits for 
religious activities, differentiating the "administrative control" ofthe Religious Affairs 
Bureau from the strictly religious fiinctions of each organization (Leung 1993:65). 
This document states that the Party tolerates the existence of religion, concedes to 
the citizens freedom of internal religious beliefs, but only a certain freedom in their 
external manifestations. Furthermore, all religious organizations have to be registered 
and are administrated by patriotic organizations that are under the direct control of 
the Religious AfFairs Bureau and the Department of the United Front. 
Another important aspect is that the Party defines what constitutes "legitimate" 
religious beliefs. "Superstition" is radically distinguished from “reUgion,” the latter 
referring exclusively to institutionabzed reHgions such as Buddhism, Taoism, 
Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam. Aside from these five beUefs, the Chinese 
government does not concede either the right to believe or to practice other religions. 
Chinese popular religion faUs under the label of “superstition; it is considered 
dangerous to the society and, consequently, is not officially recognized. Some 
scholars argue that the reason behind the differentiation between popular reUgion and 
"normal religious activities” emphasized in the law does not lie in the fact that these 
behaviors derive from “ignorance and are "disorganized" as official Chinese 
discourse claims. According to Feuchtwang and Wang (1991:262), it is precisely the 
organized aspects ofpopular ritual activities which may lead popular ritual to run out 
ofthe control of official administrative and security organizations, that is considered 
threatening. Chinese officials are concerned about the risk of "superstition" 
constituting a means of promotion ofillegal counter-revolutionary action. 
The spirit of"controlled tolerance" that was the undertone of the Document No. 
19 has been recently substituted by a certain degree of ideological intolerance 
reflected in state interventions whenever the state feels threatened. This has been the 
case after the events of Tiananmen in 1989. Religious leaders have been arrested, 




in order to prevent reUgion to spin out of official control, the prime minister Li Peng 
has promulgated new laws that introduce further restrictions on religious activities. 
Macao 1999 
As mentioned earlier, the reUgious policy adopted in Mainland China does not, at 
least according to the Sino-Portuguese treaty, apply to the Macao Special 
Administrative Region. However, the article 128 of the Basic Law for the M.S.A.R. 
concerning reUgious affairs seems too brief, consisting only of three short paragraphs. 
The way the article was drafted leaves space for different interpretations. 
Furthermore the statement that the government will not "restrict reUgious activities 
which do not contravene the laws ofthe Region" creates loopholes in the law. The 
lack of a clear and reassuring legislation contributes to an atmosphere of anxiety and 
uncertainty. This was expressed by the different religious leaders that I interviewed. 
Regardless of their reUgious affiUation, aU agreed that it is not possible to predict 
what is going to happen after the transfer of sovereignty in 1999. 
One aspect ofthe legislation that I would Uke to underline is the fact that one out 
of a total ofthree paragraphs ofthe article 128 is exclusively dedicated to financial 
matters. It states that "religious organizations shall, in accordance to law, enjoy the 
rights to acquire, use, dispose of and inherit property and the right to receive 
donations. Their previous property rights and interests shaU be protected by law” 
Although a solid financial situation enables religious organizations to play a more 
active role, the article also states that these organizations can maintain relations with 
their counterparts outside Macao which could mean that their financial support may 
come from abroad. The need felt by the drafting committee to secure their "previous 
property rights" derives from the awareness that the time of the laissez-faire policy 
implemented by the Portuguese government may be drawing to an end. 
Religious leaders voiced their concern regarding two issues related to property 
rights. First, the fact that the majority of churches and temples are considered 
patrimony ofthe territory implies that the government will be able to dispose ofthem 
according to its own interests, in other words, they can be expropriated and utiHzed 
for non-religious purposes. Second, the fact that a significant percentage of the 
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i properties belonging to reUgious organizations are not officiaUy registered makes it 
I 
impossible to prove their ownership. This situation has led, for example, the bishop of 
t Macao to pay particular attention to the financial foundations of the diocese. Some 
properties have been sold and the money was invested more safely. 
The total absence ofgovemmental control of reUgious activities has enabled one 
single person to have the monopoly of the profitable temples in Macao. It seems 
probable that from 1999 onwards some control over temple's activities wiU be 
exercised. But how these activities will be regulated and the degree ofinterference in 
the management of the temples by Chinese ofi&cials is presently unpredictable. It is 
f 
not possible to foretell what the real impact ofthe political changes will be, but they 
could affect the nature of the role played by reUgion in Macao. 
Although I have demonstrated how Catholic religion was deployed to establish 
ethnic boundaries, and how, on the other hand, Chinese popular religion contributed 
to reinforce cohesion within the Chinese community, I have also shown that ethnic 
identities are contextual. This is further confirmed by the fact that while reUgion has 
been an important tool to emphasize ethnic distinctiveness in a colonial setting, it will 
lose its instrumental role with the retrocession of the territory to the PRC; ethnic 
identities will then be defined in other terms. From 1999 onwards, new ethnic 
identities will emerge since the "other" by reference to which "one" defines oneself 
will change. Chinese from Macao, in their attempt to promote a specific identity 
distinct from the Mainland Chinese, wiU have to resort to new social markers. The 
awareness of the risk ofbeing assimilated and of loosing their previous identity has 
led to a search for a specific "Macao people" identity. The process of peaceful hand-
over of Macao (as well as Hong Kong) by a colonial power to another sovereign 
nation is unique in the world history. Furthermore, the fact that the vast majority of 
the population of this territory is Chinese makes it a particularly interesting case to 
the study of ethnicity dynamics; whether and how the "Macao people" will manage to 
create their own identity and based on which criteria is something that deserves the 
attention of social scientists. 
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NOTES 
1 Notes to Introduction 
i 
I 1. Here I follow the definition of this ethnic group that is provided in the most 
\ recent study done on this community. According to Joao de Pina Cabral and 
Nelson L0uren90, Macanese (tdu sang in Cantonese) identity is based on three 
^ social markers, though the relative significance of each one of them has been 
‘ changing. Briefly language (Patois/Portuguese), religion (Catholic) and race (in 
the sense that the person, or someone in his/her family are the result of 
miscegenation between a European and an Asian) are the criteria drawn upon to 
, create a Macanese identity. However, any of these social markers on its own can 
be sufficient for one person to identify himself and be identified by the others as 
belonging to the Macanese community (see Pina Cabral and L0uren90 1993b). 
2. If one particular community differentiates itself from another based exclusively 
i or predominantly in the aspect of religious affiliation, it becomes clear that the 
only requirement to cross the ethnic boundary relies in the conversion to, or 
I affiliation with the "other's" religion. Religion, therefore, as a criterion of ethnic 
I differentiation provides the advantage of being more flexible than other aspects 
such as race, language, or place of origin. These social markers though can also 
be regarded; in certain contexts as referring not to objective realities but to 
cultural constructions that are therefore socially manipulated (see Honig's [1992] 
study ofthe Subei people in Shanghai). 
3. On religion and ethnicity see also Bowman (1993) Brown (1989) Fenn (1980) 
Rutledge (1985) and Smith-Hefner (1994). 
4. Monsenhor Teixeira has already published more than 120 historical works. In 
what concerns Macao and its diocese, one major work consisting of sixteen 
volumes was published between 1940 and 1979. 
5 Popular religion refers to a system that blends Buddhism, Taoism, and ancestor 
worship. This system is characterized by its own forms of expression in cult and 
worship that centers on family altars and village temples. 
6. I take class to mean social differentiation based on political and economic 
functions and control of resources. 
7 Catholicism is the main religion in Portugal. Other religions, such as 
Protestantism or Islam, are only marginally represented. In Macao, the Protestant 
Church had great difficulties to establish itself as the Jesuits forbade the Christian 
community from contact with Protestant priests. It was only in the last decades 
that this religion has been developing its activities in the territory, but the 
percentage of Protestants is still quite low (1.7 percent according to the 1991 
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census). Consequently, when I mention the Church in Macao I am referring to the 
Catholic Church. 
18. Whenever the fragile equilibrium gave way to conflict, the Chinese authorities , resorted to suspending the supply of food to the territory therefore neutralizing 
the power of the Portuguese. This practice became a recurrent and efficient way 
\ of assuring that their interests would prevail. 
1 
._i 
9. It is important to keep in mind that Macanese ethnic identity also relies on other 
J criteria such as language and religion. This was not taken into account in the 
\ census and therefore some people considered as Macanese were combined with 
the Chinese population. 
* 10."Most Chinese immigrants are economic migrants who are pulled to an overseas 
I destination by the prospects for higher incomes, better jobs opportunities and 
vocational training. In this respect, they prefer Hong Kong to Macao. Unlike for 
Hong Kong, China did not set a monthly quota for emigrants to Macao until 
1984. Until January 14, 1979 the majority used Macao as a stepping stone to get 
j to Hong Kong; after that date Hong Kong closed its door to Chinese immigrants 
I from Macao except for tourist purposes Only after 1979 did Macao begin to 
I receive large number of Chinese immigrants in its own right” (Yuan 1993:267). 
I 
f 
i Notes to Chapter 1 
1 According to one of my informants who works for the diocese, the government 
subsidizes the work of sixty-two missionaries, but presently there are only sixty 
persons in this position, forty of whom are diocesan priests and the remaining 
twenty being people working for the congregations. Each one of them receives 
monthly his cdngrua (ecclesiastical revenue) that usually varies from grade 100 
to 180 (according to the official tablet of salaries—one grade equals to forty-one 
patacas). It is interesting to note that the bishop's annual income according to the 
1952 Diploma should equal the one attributed to the highest official, the one just 
I below the governor himself. However, according to the same source this does not 
apply anymore. It seems that, in a certain sense, he has been demoted to the 
category of "department head" {Director de Servigo). My informant did not know 
when this change has occurred. 
2. It is commonly said that the bishop is selling many of the Church's properties to 
invest the money abroad, namely in Hong Kong's stock market. He also plans to 
open a big hotel in Macao and the project has already been approved. 
3 There was even one case, that I know of, in which the bishop assumed 
governmental functions. In 1849 when the governor Ferreira do Amaral was 
assassinated, a government committee was created and one of its members was 




4. The decree concerning religious activities in Macao included in the Basic Law 
(April 1993) whose final drafter was the bishop of Macao Domingos Lam reads 
as follows: 
Article 128 
The Government ofthe Macao SpeciaJi Administrative Region, consistent with the 
principle of religious freedom, shall not interfere in the internal affairs of religious 
organizations and believers in Macao to maintain and develop relations with their 
counterparts outside Macao or restrict religious activities which do not contravene 
the laws of the Region. 
Religious organizations may, in accordance with the law, run seminaries and other 
schools hospitals and welfare institutions and to provide other social services. 
Schools run by religious organizations may continue to provide religious education, 
including courses in religion. 
Religious organizations shall, in accordance with law, enjoy the rights to acquire, 
use, dispose of and inherit property and the right to receive donations. Their 
previous property rights and interests shall be protected by law. 
Notes to Chapter 2 
1. It was at this time that the Nossa Senhora de Fdtima parish was created. This is 
an eminently Chinese parish since this is an area mainly inhabited by Chinese 
2. In reality, it was in 1938 that the Vatican reversed its position concerning the 
Chinese Rites. However the old stand prevailed in most of Macao's parishes for 
several decades. Even now two old Portuguese priests interviewed told me that 
Catholics should not pay respect to the ancestors. 
Notes to Chapter 3 
1. According to Rubie Watson, "In Chinese society names classify and individuate, 
they have transformative powers, and they are an important form of self 
expression" (1986:619). Furthermore, "Names classify people into families, 
generational sets and kin groups" (ibid.:622). The adoption of western names in 
present-day Macao and Hong Kong is quite a generalized practice though these 
western names are used only in certain situations. However to adopt a westem 
surname is commonly regarded as unthinkable, especially in the case of men. 
“For Chinese men, names have a transformative power that binds them as 
individuals to society" (ibid.:629). By adopting a western surname, a man is 
publicly severing his relations with the community and is regarded as having 
betrayed his own people as well as his ancestors. In Macao, Chinese converts that 
adopted a Portuguese name and surname clearly denied their Chinese ethnic 
identity. 
2. It is important to note that many students from Macao have done their 
undergraduate and graduate studies in Taiwan. Until the seventies the Church was 
in favor of the maintenance of ties with Taiwan and had established contacts 
there. Students that had conducted their studies in Chinese, in the schools run by 
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the Church, and had obtained a scholarship or those that could afford to subsidize 
their own studies went to Taiwan universities. 
I 3. Portuguese students tend to enroll in the Portuguese public school and then to 
I further their studies in Portugal. There is a special quota in the universities there 
: for students that come from the territory. Since the majority of Chinese parents 
opt for schools that lecture either in Chinese or English, very exceptionally would 
a Chinese student choose a Portuguese university to continue his studies. 
* 4. When a Portuguese man married a Chinese woman their children became 
members of the Macanese community. In Hong Kong the children of inter-ethnic 
marriages or inter-ethnic sexual relations were regarded as half-cast and 
considered by the British as belonging to the Chinese community. 
i 
^ Notes to Chapter 4 
1. See, for example letter dating from 1758 published in Arquivos de Macau, ser. 3 
vol. IV, no. 4, 1965, p. 252. 
2. The Chinese Temples Committee allocated surplus funds from the operation of 
^ the temples to charity organizations. One of the organizations that received part 
of those funds was the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, a Chinese institution that 
played a central social and political role in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century in Hong Kong. In Macao, the Keng Vu Hospital seems to have played a 
similar role but never achieved the prominence of the Tung Wah Group of 
Hospitals nor, as far as I could find out, was it directly or indirectly subsidized by 
the temples. 
3. In Macao not only the temple's real estate but also the temples themselves are not 
registered. I went to the “Lands Department" {Cartdrio do Registo PrediaJ) to 
: inquire whether some temples were registered. I found out that of the four 
temples I was interested in, Kun Iam Tong, Kun Iam Ku Miu, Ma Kok Miu and 
I Lin Fong Temple, only one, the Kun Iam Ku Miu, was registered. However this 
I temple had only been registered in November of 1993. From what I was told by 
the leader of the Kun Iam Ku Miu, the reason why the committee of the temple 
j decided to have it registered was that, since the leader of the Kun Iam Tong was 
getting too powerful, it was afraid that he would attempt to take control of the 
Kun Iam Ku Miu. 
4 According to Reverend Carl Smith, in the middle of the nineteenth century 
I several people in the area of Patane and San Kiu were paying rents to the Kun 
Iam Tong, Ma Kok Miu and Lin Fong temple. 
5. For example, Macau magazine (May 1994) published an article on the visit of the 
Portuguese Prime Minister Cavaco Silva to the territory. This article was 
illustrated with pictures of the Prime Minister in the Kun Iam Temple, 
surrounded by the governor and the monk that runs the temple (see appendix 4). 
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I 6. The variation in the inclusiveness of these committees, can still be clearly seen in 
the statutes governing specific temple associations that were published during the 
twenties. For example, the Ma Kok Miu association only accepts as members 
j those who are descendants of the founders of the association while the Kun Iam 
Ku Miu considers eligible not only those who are descendants of the founders but 
also those who have resided in the Mong Ha neighborhood for more than three 
1 years. Nevertheless, members of these committees were commonly prestigious 
local people who had wealth and influence. 
:: 
'• 
7. Information provided by Reverend Carl Smith. 
8. Information provided by Reverend Carl Smith. 
. 9. In Hong Kong these associations existed since the nineteenth century (Sinn 
I 1989). In a first stage they played an important social and political role but saw 
their power decrease due to the establishment of official structures and officially 
endorsed institutions, such as the Tung Wah Hospital, that provided similar 
j services (Santos 1991). 
^ 
lO.One ofthe important activities of the kaifongs was the issuing of documentation. 
Until the seventies they issued residence and civil status certificates requested by 
the Chinese authorities. From the eighties onwards the Portuguese authorities 
took over this activity. 
Notes to Chapter 5 
1. This temple situated in Mong Ha is colloquially known as Hong Kong Miu. 
There is no relation though with the British territory as the Chinese characters 
used are different (see glossary). 
2. According to the monk Jihk Jaahk, the monastery was built in the Ming dynasty, 
between the years of 1621 and 1628 (Amaro 1967:361). Some scholars argue that 
the temple was built in 1627 (Teixeira 1979; Porter 1990). 
3. WangXia is the Pinyin romanizatipn for Mong Ha. 
4 The main festivities are celebrated on the nineteenth day of the second, sixth and 
ninth month of the lunar calendar, as well as on the eleventh day of the fourth 
month. 
5. It is interesting to note that neither the Kun Iam Tong, not the Ma Kok Miu nor 
even the Lin Fong temple are registered in the Lands Department. 
Notes to Chapter 6 
1 I interviewed six temple keepers from the Kun Iam Tong, Kun Iam Ku Miu and 
the Lin Fong temple. 
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i2. For an interesting analysis of Chinese female deities see Sangren (1983). 
3. Another possible and interesting explanation for the deity's change of sex 
suggested by Blofeld is that the Chinese combined Avalokitesvara and Tara 
(revered by Mongols and Tibetans as a female emanation of Avalokitesvara) into 
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General Characteristics of the Population of Macao 
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Visit of the Portuguese Prime Minister to the Kun Iam Tong 
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Boletim Oficial de Macau 
Registration of the Benevolent Association of the Ma Kok Miu 
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, 1 . . ‘ . t o n g i > d e . M o j i g - H d , p a r a ^ d i r i g i r . o a s e r y i f q s . d o - ^ ^ e c u i d a r d a o b r a . i u b U u ; s , 5 6 0 , 
-.;;.v-': comer+i^jU^'‘,te^plo^.qj^j}!:t;—^ i;ppeit^arosj"eguhm?uto3(|a Em Timor ‘ - .. -
” ‘ n s ^ c i a 5 ^ ^ . p 6 ^ n % ^ ^ j l ^ r ^ j ^ ^ ; : ^ i ] ^ ^ , d e 0 ^ 8 < ; i ^ n ^ z k : ( ; „ , „ o c o n . l u f o r . l c 2 - c l a s s o d a D k c c Q : i o d a s ^^ • ‘ . : ' : : , 
• ‘ w r f o r r a a c e n s u r i i v e l , a p r c s e n t a r q i i e i x a f a n d a m e n t a d a a c o m i s s 5 o o b m s l ' u b i i c a s , ; i c 0 - i - 9 i 2 a 2 8 - 3 - o i 3 . . . . . . . i . ‘ J . i ir ' - v '^ - - ' ' -»; . . - ; -M'^- - ^• ' ' ' '" ^  Lf«a ¾ \ '^^nV /^, V v••H^ Como chefe dos scrvi9n3 c las Obras rubhcas , . . . - . ? • :&rec^ ija cijieo^ ?bstitui ?<^  fi5ifT^9,=4]^?i^ pLj?i^ o. rS% ae22-5-i.ir>a3i-7-uio ……….…..^^ .....‘:.. , t . : :: A.vr 
:. - 6^1“: —: : - ^ . " "[: . Como-condutor de 1 .^  cla^ e da nicsma D1rcc9.vo, . . _ T.'.(.: 
•^ :? :®^9^”b:( . ” , ' ' . . ‘ : : , J^--ii:--'"l.'v delG-C-920 a2-4-022 1 291 -
:-l-^^irtil.' Ao bonzo encavregadp ao;pasodc d f^eso admitir ^  . ” ° •« 
:,J-.vVr',^-.,r:V. '. -.^r.,.< •• -.,,v-? <>^1JV--U .¾;,¾^<¾/^- '^- -* "••!.— . . . . i ' i i Macau, .- ...., . ...' •,: . . . . . , 1: onolqucr pessoa para Yiverno edificio do templc. . „ , ', ,.,„ , . . : : ‘ . • . • “ ; ’ . . 
i l A; . :^^c^s^S^ : ~ r ^ ? S o ^ ^ ? ^ ^ ? ? - : :. ::;.-
• ' < . . - ' " r c u n i 5 c s n b > a i f i c i 6 d o ' t c m p I o t o d a s a s v c z c s q u e ; o e u t e n d e r . - • : . i 7 - i i - 9 i i a 2 5 - i 2 - i ) i i . . … … . ,.:... - ^®® . : . • - : . . . . 
' . ^ ^ > - . - ; ^ . . . , - . K ^ - . . ^ w > - - V ; . ; i f 7 . ^ ^ ^ t W r ; ^ ^ ' . M - r - ^ . ^ ( n i ; ^ ! ^ j ! : : ; n ^ M l A ' r - ' : ^ C o n i o c n c a r r c f j r x d j < l a m c s n m D i i - e c < ; a o , t l c . ’ . . , - . 5 . . . - - . . -
....'’’ . Arfc l -^^ -Parnhueas resolucoes da ,coraissSo, .du-ectoni sejara 2G-G-910 a ir>-n-9Li ‘ '^‘^ ‘ . . . • • ' • , . . , . . 
• . •• .. v.^I inecS.^^qae•¾ tr.s ou .ais moa^ ros.. '--tS^^ll^^^^=^^^^ “ . :’ .;:: Os QUG fa l tnrcm k aessao terao nne s e snbraeter a deUbern5u0 d a Como condutov de 1 .» c iasse idem, d c l :8 - 'J iy „ . , . . ’ 1 ..'“[: -" : : - : } . , . ' '. -, '.. . - -.;.'.1!.- -“.. -;. ;: .-.”, .:' ..< a i5-G-y20 c dc 3-4 022 a U-4-02j. ._3 o3Z ‘. • • . mnioria dos quo estiveram presentes. . ' ,^  , ., ,. - , , ,‘ .. 7- 291 
. . . . . , . . • ‘ , > , .-i^;,. ^ v , ^ , . - . . ,• . • • ., ' , . - - - , - ' ^ - J • • ! ' , - ' ’ . ’ . . . " - . ' “ ‘ . 
, -*'Art. U.° 0 2Jwn<in'pafa aa reuni6es da nssemblea gei;aL d de soMA 27 . 352 
setc s6cios, nfio podendo a assemblca rcunii-se vhlidamente com Adedu:ir:. -
u r a n u m e r o i u f e r i o r . O s s 0 c i 0 3 q u e n 5 o e s t i v e r c m p r e s e n t c s i s p ^ „ s c f d t o s ( b ( l _ . s t o n o ( l c c r c t o " . ° 5 : S 2 4 . ' 
r c s n e c t i v a s r c u u i o c a d e ^ a s s e m b l c a - g e r a l t e r n o q n o s o s u b m c t c r a , i c 3 i d e J l a i o d c i 9 i 9 , i d o t e m p o < l e s c r v i -\ . , . • - CO uietroiiolitrtno, nos Lonnos <lo nrt. 3. iio \-< -’ dccis<io da maiona. (lcci.ctou.= .5:73i,dciio-.i-9ifl.".: — — 1 215 
Art.l3. :A,s^  ?^»tf^^i5 = ^^c^ ,$=» ia l ^ = ^ ^ = ^ q T=Si ^ 6 1 " : , 
dc Macan quauto^io r ee imen da propnedade e aqa1s15:10 de bens. tempo <le servi90 metropoiitnno 3 oi 
..-1 • .. 0 tempo dc £crviQO como auxiliar da uircc^-ao ’' .. .. 
, Secre tar ia Gera l do Governo- era Macaa , 7 ^e Ju lho de 1026 .— __ das Obras Publ icas dc S . Tomc c i 'dr .c ipc . . . .— ^ ^ . 
0 SecreUivio Gcral do Gov4rno, Manuel.Jo$odcMenczes Bcmandes _fl 
Co,la. ,'‘\=“““ , ’ \ ” .,. , ‘ li^ ^ADo......... 22 ,.113 
____: C'"sto desta publica(;a6 $7,S0) ' ‘ • ‘ '•'.- . Pam 03 cfeiios clo disposto 110 decreto n.° r, M:l 
. • • ‘ -::; . . - : : . ; . : * " . : . : •":•. .. -:. . •• - . ilc3l-5-!M9: . 
. •- . : . ; ; : " . . ‘ " ’ .”- '..,,: . : : ..'' - : •- Tempo total do servico prcstudo ao Estado, -
““ ‘ • como 'atras se contoi i — — “ . 3o2 
• . - • .:‘ . ' . : . • ‘ .. . . •• • , , . . . . • . . . , • ‘ ‘ • • • : : - - : . : 
• ” “ ., . ‘ .. A ile.luzlr: -,i ‘ ,. • “,. 
• . " • • • - • • 1 - • ‘ “ . : . . - - , ‘ ... ‘ • . . - . - . . • • • ‘ ‘ . . . . • . • • • • • . 
-•- ’• .. • J <lo tcinpo <le scrvi<;o metropolitftno, nns tcr-N 1 1 7 — 0 G o v e r u a d o r d a P i - o v i u c i a d c M u c a u , a t c n d e n u o a o m o s » i o . a i t ° 3 . ' d o d e c r e t o n . ' 5 : 7 3 4 , d c ^ • 
quc rcqaei4n 0 condutor de l / classc do quadro geral perbanehtc 1 1 ?^  : ^ « 1 ..; ^ ;« :;..1;; « «;;»^ 1; =^  0 ) :“ ^ ' ‘ fi„o ohrafi l>ublicas dns Col6nins, acfuardando apo3enta9ao, Mnmiol da Africn’ cstabuiecciul<> a sua c<i"ivnlcnci;i 
. , ^ ,. , - . ” -1 -« ,1^  „«., fnm,>n r1« onvT7mn c..in a ilo lcn>i>o iic servii;o i>rcsinilu ims ctJ-
^ Iniicio dc Rezende, pedindo a l1qu1da5ao do sca tcmpo de scivi^ o , . „ ^^ a,M.iiici nu^  temi<w do dccrmo dc 
pmUndo ao Estado; hos termos do determinado no oficio n.° 052, 2O 'J OOO •: •• __[_ _ ^ ^ 
dc l5 dc Maio'do corrcnte' nno, da Dircc9ft0 Uernl dos Sfcrvi90s “ _ 
‘Ccutrais para C>kte Gov^ rno, isfco d/parn efeito3 de aposenta9ao, dc- ‘ . ToTAr. 2^  308 . cla 'que,'emface do8 docnmant s jiintoa ao rcsp ctivopracess  Ciimpra-se ' :" dcapoeot ? o e conf rme 0 mapa qu6 abaxp segae, co  0 re- „ . .' ‘ . ., ^ , , „ , ,nn: r " ‘ .ouermtc. para os efeit s do dHp6sto decr h.'-5:824; de 31 dc P"l"cio do Governo cm M.cnii, 8 clc ,lulho Jo l02G.^ J^ ;^Jl<ci : M i d  VJlOi 2 6 ' a n o s e 137, i a s ; p r a o . f e i t o s d o d i s p o s t o n i ^ m m o de Almeida Maia Macjnlhnes, ” ' • • a c r c o u . * 5 : 8 ? i ? , : 4 ( i n | 5 . U K H j ? i a d t i ^ l a n o a c . 3 0 8 d i a ; ' c : p a r a . ( F o i p o g o 0 scl9 d c v i d o ) . ‘ ...,•••. • . .• "'' ‘ ‘ . . • ' ' ' . • . • . : ‘ “ ' 
I Appendix 8 
i BoteUm Oflcial de Macau 
Registration of tiie Benevolent Association of the Kun Iam Ku Miu 
i 
i .. . _- — ~ — 
m * 
* . A N O D B 1 9 2 8 - B O L B T m O F I C L ^ D E M A C A U - N A 3 8 - 2 2 D E S E T E M B R O 7UI 
. . • • . - _ _ ^ ^ ^ - _ ^ ^ - - - ^ ^ - ^ - ^ - - i ^ - - - - - w - w - - - ^ - i i ! ^ " ^ - ^ ^ 
— — — — — ^ — — — — — — — — — ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ I -- - ~ — -• - - - - ~~* ~-^^^—~". _ _ • . • ^ m0>mm^mm-m mmmmm^^^^m^ • • _i • • .. • 
• _ « « • - ^^mmrn • • • • • • • • • _ _ _ _ • • 1 _ • • • • • _ _ _ _ • • • 
\ d e a p o 8 e n t a 5 f t o , a W 8 1 d e A g o s t o f i n d o , 2 2 a i i o s e l 8 0 d I a s d e s e r - - C h o n g - C h e o n g , H o - I e c - l D n g , - C h i n n g - S e i i g - C h o i , C l i i o -
I vi50, confortne 0 mapa quo abaixo segue: . -Chcng-Vai, — Ho-Veng-Fai, Uo-Veng-Clinu, K o - K e n - F a i , 
I ‘ ‘ Uo-Iec-Kong, Ho-Kcng-Cbuin , -Chftn-S iu-Chconff , — Ohoi i -
I • Li.1ul t l t t9f to Aiw» DJat .Mrtn-Ian, - Satn-Veng-Clmn, — Sam-Vei i^' -Icc , — 8aai-Tonjr . I . C h a n , — S r t u i r C l m k - T o n g , . i \ m - C l i t i k . I c i i i j , — i ^ i " , C l n k - l - ' o n j : , 
, Tempo du serv iyo prcstado ua co l6 i i ia do Timor , U<i"klado . , ^, . ” „ . , , . „ ^ , ^ , 1 i w r P . P . n " 2 2 3 , d c 3 1 - 1 2 - 1 9 2 3 , d a m c s m f t c o l 6 n i a 11 1 “ - S f t m - C h i . L n , - H o J . e k . V o e H o . C u c n g - C h c . 
• T e m p o d e » c r v i e o p r e t t a d o n a c o W o l a d i i G u f n ^ , l I q a l d a d o p o r ‘ , , _ , • ” , , • • ‘ , . . , i 
P.>. n.' 1 7 2 ^ de l-10-102o, da inesma coWnia 2 8 Art. 5.° AaSS0c1a9a08er4.admiiUBt.rada por Uilia Conussao Uo 
1 'K%STn^ i6t^ te^ ;rB5Sir^ >rSi'r:toC.^ iUOti; . ;.cincomcrnbra8clcitosnnuaImo.ue pelo8 s6cio« cntro si scndo u.n 
f . , : ^ S : T : ^ ^ i ^ ^ ‘ U P ^ i d e n t c , a m s e c r e t d r i o , u r n t c s o u r e i r o e d o i s v 0 g a i 3 . 
d e s t a c o l O n l f t , d e s d c 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 9 2 0 A t ^ 3 1 < l e Ago>to d o 1 « 2 8 . . ^ ^ ^ 1 ^ 2 ^ ^ ^ n i c o . N o i i n p e d I m e n b o d o p r e s i d e n t e u s s i i a s f i u i v u c s s c r u o 
i .. SosiA .15 854 exei'citlas pclo secreUrio. 
I. A o d i c t o n u r , n o n i « r m o « d o p a r a g r a C o d n i c o d o n r t . i g o J . c l o A r t . 0 . ' A c o i K i s s f l o d i r e c t o i t i p r c s t i i r d n n u a l i n c n b e c o n t a i . l e i a -decreto 11." A:823. de 31 de Mftio de iai9, e do artlgo 6.» do ‘ , , , , , , , , . . , „ 
<l«croto dc 20 do Setcmbro dc 100K, a equival&ncia do tcm- lliada e dOCUmeataaa da SOa Hamini3tra9aO. po do 8crvlco prwtftdo nwi col6nhw doTimoroaft Ouin(? . . , _ • . • , . ^ . . , , ^ ‘ , : [ i a r n c K t a c o l u n i a .'. 0 l'J1 A r t . 7 . A c o m i s s i l o d i i ' C C t o n i t c n i d c s n l i m c t c r n s c o n t a s « l a s i i > i 
•> ToTAt ~22 iso ‘ adininistra9fion nprora(ilo dos s6cio8 rcuiiidos ein a^setTil>liii gcral 
f . ; atc qninze dias dcpois dc iindo 0 scu cxercicio. 
Curopra-8C. . | Art. 8.® Oi rendimcutos da as80cia9a0 scnlo emprcgiics 110 cxor-
• l*AMo do Gov4i-no cm Macan, 12 de S8tcml)ro de 1028. | cicio do cuIU> (Io Buda dentro da a8s0cia9a0 e eni ol_ras d« kuef i -
I 0 Governador , c4nc ia . 
siHitr Tamagnini ih So%m Barl>osa, Art . » . • A as30cia9ft0 t ica 8ujeita a Ici portt ignc5a qtiai i f . i> ao r e -
(Fui iuiKu 0 s6lo duTid(t). gimeii da proprlodadc e aquisi^Oo dc bcns. 
A r t . 1 0 . ' O i c a s o s n a o p r c v i s U > s u c s t c s c s b a t u l o M c i j i i o u O l c l u u > 
— ~ ~ " g e j a m c o u t r a r i o s s e r < l o r e s o l v i J o s p e l a a u e t n b l e n ^ c u i l d o s w i e i o s . 
^ Direc9'io dos Sdr7i90s dc Adn:ini3trn9ao Ciri! cm M>iCJii, 17 dc 
N / 1 7 9 S t i t c i n l > r o d o l 0 j . < < . - 0 l > i r c c t o i . d o n S c r v i v r > s « l o A d i n i u i s i r n ^ r t * > 
0 0(*vcrnndor Jo Macau, ouvida a 9ec9'io pcriuuncutc do CunHc- . Civil, Joto Pereim iU Jlagat/tafn. 
l b o d o C o v 6 r u o , a p r o r a o s E « t a t u t o « d a A s s o c i a ^ t t o a K u n - I u i n - K u - 0 - ' » » i o < ' - - ^ t a i v u b i i c a . ; . i . . $ i . - i ' i 
-Mio>, qiic baixam assinados pelo Director dos Servi508 de Admi-
nutra9ft0 Civil c fazctu parte integranto dcsta portaria. 
Ccmipra.se. ’ 
I P a l d c i o d o G o v 6 r n o c m M a c a u , 1 7 d e S c t e m b r o d c 1 0 2 S . N . ® 1 8 0 
0 Go7crimdor, Xeudo Li-Iioi-ch'io, proprietirio de uin tciTcno cjiu a :irui du 
I ‘ Aiiw Tamagnini th Sousa Bnrhosa. 3 9 7 - ' , 5 7 , s i t u a d o j n n t o d n C a I 5 a d a d e S . M i g u c l , r c q i i t r i d o q i i c 1 ! “ . 
I . • : f O s s e c e d i U o p o r t r o c a d o r e f e r i d o t c r r e n o u i n t a l h a o d c t e i r e i i o s i -
I t u a d o j u n t o d a m e s i u a r u a e p e r t e n c e n t e n o E > t & d o , c o m a u r e u d c 
I 372^ ,00; 
E H l a ( u i o s d a A s s o c i a c a o d e p i e d a d e e d e b e n e a c 6 n c i a d e i i o n i i n a d a R e c o u b e c c n d o - s e s e r v a i i t a j o s a a o s i n t c . ^ s e s d o E s t a d o a t r < x . a 
c(Kan-lMn*Kii*MiO)> ^ § M . ^ ^ ^ \ pudida, tauto innis qiie, se^undo 0 novo plaiio ile urrnamontos, itU 
.. H C l ^ > ' - t imamente aprovado para a parte Norte da cidnde. c(everu sei- uti-
Artigo 1.0 PeIo8 presentes estatat03 e legaIizada a sitnn9a0 dn liJ^ado para abertura duma nova via publica, uma p a r t e t e e tcrrcno 
i g r e j a o a p a ^ o d c K u n - I a m - K u - M i o ( )quo e x i s t e c o ' » a i r e a . l e S a O ' " ' , x 2 ; 
cm Macnn na povoafSo do Mon^>Ku lid mats de cinqUenta nnos. 0 Gorernador dn Colonia de Mucaii, ouriJns a ComissTu. dc Tcr-
Art. 2.0 Tal igi.cja ou pagode 6 transfoi.mada numa associu9r10 ® :i Scc^ iU> Pcnnauciitc (lo Couscllio do Clovcino. .:nnc.-tlc. "m 
dcpiedadecb3uefic6ncia com igunI denomina^.lo: Kim-Tam-K'n-Mio ^ m o s do ni.tigo 0." do regulamento pam a coticcss;lo dc tcrrjnw 
( 1 da provincia de 3Iacau, aprovado pclo dipIoom lcgislativo provin-
1 ¾ ¾ m n m ^ ' , c i u l D . ® 1 8 , d c y d e M a i o u l t i m o , u t r o c n p c d i d u p o r I . i - l i o i - c b ' i a 
Art. ;••• 0 fim dc8ta associagao e veiicrar 0 lJucla, cxerccr 0 sen Jo seii terrciio com u drea dc :l07'"',r.7, sitnudo jnitto da Coi^dai 
culto, aconseIliar 0 beni, cnItivar a moral e praticar acto8 ile bene- ,]e S. Miguel c constnnte d>t planta-junui ao rcspcc-tiro proces8o, 
livencia. por uin tallii'io dc tcricno ^itnadu junto dii ines"m Cai/fflda 0 pertcti-
Art. 4. 86 podem fozcr parte da supradita ass0cia9ft0 os descen- cente ao Estndo, com a iii.wi ile 372"',00. 
^cntes do8 fandadorcs da referida igreja ou pagode e os iodividuos Cutnpra-sc. 
. . q a e tcnbam maisde trte aoo3 de resid6nciaiia p070adl0 de Mong- ‘ • . . , , , . ” , , „ ‘ 
„ ‘ PaWcio(loGov6i.nocniMacau,lt)deScfccrabrodclP2S. 
, * u f t * 
{ 1.® Os fttodadoret da iueaciouada igreja ou pagodc forum 0 Governador, 
i Chi0"Vw-Kunn,-V0ngf-Vai-Fnn,-Chan-Iun-Le0nK,_Cbi0": Ar/t<r Tanmynini rf« SousaM^* 
r • 




Conservat6ria do Registo Predial 
Registration of the Kun Iam Ku Miu 
i 
I 
j — … … ― ‘ 
LIVRO 
_ _ - . -
pAct 1 
) 
«9 22008 (B115, 110) Apre8enta9ao n8 2 de 29/11/1993 0117,59V,116131,AQ 
4ATUREZA: Urbano "^'* 
rREGUESIA: N.SENHORA DE FATIMA G25M,152,3796,AQUI 
3EN0MINACA0 PAGODE KUN IAM KU MIO 
5ITUAC&0 — 
3/N,AVENIDA DO CORONEL MESQUITA 
3E - PROPRIEDAOE NS42 OA AVENIDA CORONEL MESQUITA 
3W - AVENIDA CORONEL MESQUITA 
«W - NS46 DA MESMA AVENIDA S BNCOSTA DA COLINA DE MONG HA 
ffE - ENCOSTA DA COLINA DB MONG HA 
^ A TOTAL: 1510.0000 mq AREA COBERTA: 586.0000 mq 
^ A DESCOBERTA: 924.0000 mq 
WTRIZ: arti90 n« 003576 
/ALORx $40,000.00 
)CONSERVADOR: FRANCISCO CRUZ MARTINS DAVID 
*** AVERBAMENTOS *** 
^presentagIo n® 2 de 29/11/1993 
«9 1 
lECTIFICA9&0 DA Ai^ EA DE 1870 PARA 1510 M2.' 
PLANTA N23446/91 DE 1992/03/20. 
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Appendix 9 
Conserva^ria do Registo Predial 





I ( G ) I N S C R i 9 O E S E A V B R B A M E N T O S 1 
i _ j 
^ ^ * • • ^ • ^ • ^ * ! • • • • ^ ^ ^ ^ • ^ ^ • ^ • ^ * • ^ ^ • ! * * ! • * ^ ^ ^ • ! • ^ ^ ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * • ^ • • • • • • * • • ^ " * • " • • • • " • " " " " " " " * " " ^ " * ^ " " " " " * " " * * " " " " ^ " ^ * " * ^ ^ ^ ^ " * " " " " " " * ^ ^ " " * " ^ ^ " " " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " ^ “ 
I 
Apreaentacao n8 2 de 29/11/1993 InscricSo n8 3796 (L» G25M fls. 152 ) 
SUJEITO(S) ACTIVO(S)t 
DEN0MINAg&0; ASS0CIAg&0 DE PIEDADE E BENEFICfiNCIA KUN-IAM-KU-MlO 
Sede: AVENIDA CORONEL MESQUITA,PAGODE KUN IAM KU MIO,MACAO. 
j PR^DIO(S) 
22008 (L8B115fls. 110 ) 
I Facto inscrito: AQUISig&0 
Causat USUCAPI&0 
-
Valor: $40,000.00 MOP 
Documentoa; ESCRIT.7/2/66,FLS.37 L8 31B DO 28 CN E DE 
— — ^ — — 
RECT.23/9/93,FLS.88 L871D DO 1« CN. 
0 Conservador: FRANCISCO CRUZ MARTINS DAVID 
FIM 
I 
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Appendix 10 
Questionnaire - Kun Iam Tong 
Date: Day ofthe week: Time oftheday: 
1. How often and in which occasions do you come to the temple? 
2. Do you come to the temple alone or accompanied? With whom? 
3. Do your family members also come to the temple? How often, in what 
occasions? 
4. Reasons for coming to the temple? 
5. To whom do you pray? what do you pray for? 
6. What kind ofhelp does the Goddess provide? 
7. What does Kun Yam teach (general knowledge about this Goddess) 
8. Why did you choose this temple? 
9. Do you go to other temples in Macau? Which temples? How often? 
Why? 
10. Have you ever been to a Catholic church? Ifyes, in what occasions? Is 
any member of your family Catholic? 


























Survey conducted in the Kun Iam Tong 
Age of worshippers 
35% jm 
30% H 
25% n H - f l H |SMacauKunYamTong~~ 
20% | H s i " B — — • ( _ 
^ H m S i _ .|,,| H I BHongKongWongTaiSin 
15% ^ H ~ ^ ^ H B n ~ ^ ^ V (1989) 
10% ^ ~ ^ “ ^~~^^^^^^^f 
^ S H ^ H i m f f l ^ H H 
: : h B H W 
20or 21-30 31-40 41-50 51 and 
below above 
Frequency of visit 
Hong Kong Wong Tai Sin (1989) 
Number of visits per year 
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